Investment strengthens Russian ties to Uzbekistan
Sergei Blagov
The Islamic militant threat in Uzbekistan is encouraging the
strengthening of ties between Tashkent and Russia. From Uzbek President Islam Karimov’s
standpoint, Russia is willing to provide economic and security assistance without
attaching stringent conditions concerning the conduct of his administration. Moscow, in
turn, is eager to make deals that help restore its geopolitical influence in Central Asia.
Islamic militant action so far in 2004 – including the July 30
suicide bombings in Tashkent, and with the late March violence that left at least 47 dead
– suggests the Uzbek government may be facing a prolonged insurgency. [For
background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Karimov himself has not ruled out the
possibility of another terrorist strike. "Nobody can provide any guarantee that
[Islamic radicals] ... will not show up tomorrow," the Russian daily Nezavisimaya
Gazeta quoted Karimov as saying.
As Uzbek authorities grapple with the Islamic radical threat,
Tashkent’s relations with Western institutions and governments show signs of increasing
strain. Frustration over Karimov’s reluctance to implement economic reforms has driven
the International Monetary Fund to withdraw its representative from Tashkent, and the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to scale back its assistance efforts. In
July, Uzbekistan’s lackluster record on human rights and democratic reform led the US
State Department to suspend up to $18 million in economic assistance. [For
additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Another major factor in the tense relationship between Uzbekistan and
the West is the Karimov administration’s ongoing crackdown on individual liberty. [For
additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Given the rising Islamic
radical threat, Karimov’s clampdown is unlikely to abate. Thus, the human rights issue
will likely remain a sore spot in Uzbekistan’s interactions with the West.
Russia’s desire to project geopolitical influence in Central Asia
seems to override any concern about Tashkent’s human rights practices. Therefore, Russia
may be Uzbekistan’s only viable alternative as a source of investment and assistance.
During a July 3 meeting in Moscow with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov, Karimov
seemed to confirm this view when he characterized Russia as a "priority
partner." [For
additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive].
So far, Moscow has shown a much greater interest in expanding trade
ties than in bolstering its strategic presence in Uzbekistan. Most recently, attention has
focused on the acquisition of Uzbek cell phone provider Uzdunrobita – an entity
controlled by Karimov’s daughter, Gulnara – by the Moscow-based Mobile Telesystems
(MTS). On July 16, MTS agreed to pay $121 million for a 74 percent stake in Uzdunrobita,
which controls just over half of Uzbekistan’s small cell-phone market. MTS also agreed
to an option to buy the remaining 26 percent for $38 million within the next three years.
The deal is being touted as the largest direct investment ever in Uzbekistan by a Russian
company.
The financial terms indicate that politics played a large role in the
Uzdunrobita-MTS deal, effectively acting as an incentive for Uzbekistan to explore closer
economic cooperation with Russia. According to a July 19 article in the English-language
daily The Moscow Times, MTS agreed to pay roughly 33 times what Uzdunrobita itself
estimated its worth to be in 2002.
The MTS deal may be part of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s drive
to further integrate the economies of member states of the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS); in particular, those of Central Asia, where the US military presence in
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan is seen as a threat to Russian interests. The Uzdunrobita
agreement was signed just days before Putin declared that Moscow must push to expand
cooperation with CIS states or risk "a total loss of interest" in the
organization.
For Russia, energy is another important investment sphere. This June,
Putin and Karimov signed a $1-billion, 35-year production-sharing agreement for the
development of Uzbek natural gas deposits. Under the agreement, top Russian oil producer
LUKoil will develop the southern gas fields of Kandym, Khauzak and Shady, which contain
280 billion cubic meters of proven reserves. LUKoil will take a 90 percent share in the
project, with Uzbekistan’s Uzbekneftegaz holding the remaining 10 percent.
According to Putin, Russia’s natural gas monopoly Gazprom also plans
to invest $1 billion in Uzbekistan. The energy giant has already begun natural gas
production at Uzbekistan’s Shaxpaxty field, the Itar-Tass news agency reported August 3.
In addition, Gazprom has indicated an interest in acquiring 44 percent of the Uzbek
pipeline monopoly Uzbektransgas, but the purchase has yet to materialize.
While concentrating on trade ties, Moscow has also created space for
the growth of security cooperation. The two countries signed a strategic partnership
agreement in June, and plans for a Tashkent-based regional terrorism center were announced
at a summit meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Tashkent on June 17.
In the aftermath of the July 30 Tashkent bombings, some Russian experts
suggest Moscow should take rapid action to help Uzbek authorities crush the Islamic
radical threat before it spreads. A Moscow political scientist, Pavel Zolotarev, warned;
"There is a great danger that [Islamic radicals] from Uzbekistan will infiltrate
Russia."
Zolotarev, who is the deputy director of the USA-Canada Institute in
Moscow, blamed the US-led invasion of Iraq for sparking a chain reaction of Islamic
radical-inspired terror, including that which has hit Uzbekistan in 2004. (Uzbekistan is
Washington’s most important strategic ally in Central Asia). "It was not possible
to keep the United States from [taking] an erroneous step [in Iraq]," Zolotarev said
in comments published by Nezavisimaya Gazeta on August 1. "Now we have to reap the
fruits."
Editor’s Note: Sergei Blagov is a Moscow-based specialist in
CIS political affairs.
EurasiaNet, August 4, 2004
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