Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan’s critical choice
Aldar Kusainov

Introduction

At the end of 2001 and throughout 2002, Kazakhstan witnessed a struggle between invigorated opposition groups, whose leaders include disgruntled business executives, and an increasingly authoritarian government. The ongoing battle, punctuated by the recent convictions of two prominent opposition leaders and a law on political parties that heavily favors pro-government factions, will exert significant influence over the country’s development.

Kazakhstan is perhaps unique in Central Asia in witnessing the emergence of a powerful political opposition along with a rise in prosperity. Those entrepreneurs who managed to quickly accumulate wealth during the first decade of independence are now showing greater interest in establishing a stable political framework to facilitate further economic development, especially in Kazakhstan’s lucrative oil and gas sector. Although many tycoons served in government earlier in the decade, by the late 1990’s most of the so-called "New Kazakhs" had joined the ranks of the opposition, providing key financial backing to efforts to keep President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s power in check.

The infusion of new individuals, influence and funding has emboldened the opposition. A deep split among the power elite replaced the previous imbalance, in which the authorities could handily defeat any challenge made by an opposition group. As the opposition’s influence has grown, Nazarbayev has responded with increasing pressure on independent media and freedom of expression, culminating in the arrest, trial and sentencing of two key figures in the new political movement.

Today Kazakhstan is at a critical crossroads: the leaders and citizens of the country will have to make a decision between allowing a higher degree of tolerance for alternative voices or accelerating the recent trend of authoritarianism and possible radicalization of politics. Kazakhstan’s democratic and economic development may hang in the balance.

Background

Early Independent Political Movements

Kazakhstan gained its independence on December 16, 1991. As in many of the former Soviet republics, the years just before and after the Soviet Union’s collapse saw a flowering of Kazakh culture and political assertiveness. However, these promising beginnings faded in the face of the increasing dominance of Nazarbayev’s administration and a growing intolerance of dissent.

The first wave of opposition figures emerged before the country’s independence, during the era of former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika reforms. Major players included the Party People’s Congress of Kazakhstan (PPCK), led by writers and public figures Olzhas Suleymenov and Mukhtar Shakhanov, and two branches of the Communist Party, one recasting itself as the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan (SPK). Nationalist movements such as Azat and Zheltoksan also played a critical role in the push for independence, although their influence waned as the 1990’s wore on.

Initially, despite (or perhaps because of) Nazarbayev’s high popularity, authorities tolerated some political debate and free exchange of ideas. Mass meetings became an important venue for the discussion of reforms. In late 1990, after a series of meetings with the major movements and parties, a threatened Nazarbayev was able to negotiate a moratorium on these meetings. This move seriously undermined the influence of the new movements at their earliest stages of development. Efforts to nominate an opposition candidate (Hasan Kozha-Ahmet of Zheltoksan) for the 1991 presidential elections failed, and Nazarbayev took the presidency in an uncontested race.

In late 1993, the pro-presidential Union of People’s Unity of Kazakhstan (UPUK) and the PPCK carried out a joint effort to dissolve the Soviet-era Council of People’s Deputies. Elections to the newly formed Supreme Council of Kazakhstan occurred March 7, 1994. Non-presidential parties won a considerable number of seats in the new body, with the PPCK and SPK the largest opposition groups represented. The opposition continued its consolidation in preparation for presidential elections the following year, forming a coordinating council of parties known as Respublica.

Nazarbayev’s Power Play

Before long, Nazarbayev’s administration would take steps to stem this budding plurality. On March 12, 1995, not long before the presidential elections, the Constitutional Court of Kazakhstan declared the parliamentary powers of the new Supreme Council illegitimate on a technicality. The Court conferred provisional legislative authority upon the president, giving Nazarbayev the ability to issue decrees of statutory force.

Shortly beforehand, Nazarbayev had signed a declaration creating an Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan. This was a deliberative body with many of the characteristics of a parliament, but with the crucial difference that it was largely subordinated to the executive branch. Not long after its first session, this new Assembly called for a referendum to prolong Nazarbayev’s term until December 1, 2000. The referendum was passed on April 29, 1995 amid accusations of widespread irregularities by local and international monitors, such as representatives of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Subsequent presidential decrees gave Nazarbayev exclusive power to propose constitutional amendments, dissolve Parliament, appoint and dismiss the government, call referenda and appoint regional and municipal governors.

The Opposition in the Late 1990’s

Within the context of Nazarbayev’s rapidly expanding authority, the next wave of opposition leaders was drawn from the ranks of disillusioned high-ranking government officials. In April 1996, ex-Ministers Peter Svoik and Galim Abilsiitov created the new Azamat movement, along with Kazakhstan’s former envoy to China, Murat Auezov. The movement registered officially as a party on March 27, 1999. However, while prominent, this group lacked the funding and connections to pose a serious political threat to the regime.

Akezhan Kazhegeldin, a former prime minister, joined the opposition in mid-1998, and his rhetoric calling for the enactment of democratic ideals in the country quickly gained him a relatively broad following. Kazhegeldin was also media-savvy, bringing under his control and utilizing for political ends a number of small periodicals and TV stations. (He was less successful in his attempts to gain control of the popular local newspaper Karavan and the television station KTK, which owner Boris Giller allegedly sold in June 1998 to Nazarbayev’s son-in-law Rakhat Aliev.)

In the face of increasing pressure, many earlier opposition members rallied around Kazhegeldin’s newly founded Republican People’s Party of Kazakhstan (RPPK) in early 1999. Hastily-passed amendments to the country’s election legislation forbade Kazhegeldin from participating in the presidential elections of January 1999. This was followed by electoral fraud, widely documented by groups such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), in the parliamentary elections in October of that year. As a result, not a single member of the RPPK won a seat in parliament. Opposition members formed the new Forum of Democratic Forces of Kazakhstan (FDPK) in October 1999, presided over by Kazhegeldin, with the goal of intensifying the struggle against Nazarbayev’s growing power. However, governmental obstruction and the group’s own organizational shortcomings stymied its rise, and the opposition lay dormant for almost two years.

The Opposition

Major Players

In autumn 2001, leading representatives of the Kazakhstani business elite – some of them holding posts in Nazarbayev’s administration – founded a new political movement, the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DCK).

Most of the influential members of this group had benefited from the privatization of state property in the early 1990’s. As in many privatization efforts following the collapse of the Soviet Union, a small number of financial partnerships seized control of some of Kazakhstan’s most profitable and strategic industries. From the outset, this new business elite was closely integrated with the government due to the size and influence of the companies it controlled. Moreover, some of the most prominent "New Kazakhs" themselves held key governmental posts. Among the New Kazakhs in government were: Mukhtar Ablyazov, energy minister and head of the Astana-Holding investment group; Zeinulla Khakimzhanov, the minister of state revenues, who was at the same time well connected with the Kazkommertsbank financial group; and Nurlan Kapparov, the former president of the Kazakhoil state oil monopoly and a leader of the Accept financial group.

In addition to the competition between these technocrats for control of various enterprises, they often came into conflict with the upper echelons of the old Communist nomenklatura. In such an atmosphere, Nazarbayev had the luxury of playing one group off another and thereby balancing rival claims to protect his own political authority.

As Nazarbayev’s administration asserted greater control over the country’s economic life (an event all the more significant as foreign investment in the oil sector had begun to flow into the country), Kazakhstan’s emerging tycoons grew uncomfortable over their decreasing ability to safeguard their interests. If these businessmen needed further proof that Nazarbayev did not intend to leave well enough alone, a report by the Kazakhstani Agency for Strategic Planning was released that laid out the government’s plan to consolidate major industries into large system-wide conglomerates under state management. This plan would have the effect of strengthening the position of Nazarbayev’s family and close associates at the expense of other influential business interests.

At the time, Nazarbayev’s relatives and close associates already exerted considerable influence over several crucial economic sectors and government services. His elder son-in-law, Aliev, headed the special services, tax police and customs, while the president’s daughter, Dariga, controlled a broad number of print and broadcast media outlets in partnership with her husband. Another Nazarbayev son-in-law, Timur Kulibayev, was influential in the oil, gas, and banking sectors. In the late 1990’s the family gradually strengthened and broadened its control, always at the expense of other powerful industrial groupings.

The Revolt of the Business Elite

The catalyst for the consolidation of these rival business clans into an anti-Nazarbayev alliance was a series of related events of autumn 2001. In late October and early November of that year, Nazarbayev’s son-in-law Aliev, in his role as head of the special services, attempted to strip Ablyazov of some of his holdings. The ensuing power struggle quickly embroiled other prominent business figures. Nazarbayev’s intervention effectively ended the struggle. Although Nazarbayev rebuked Aliev and removed him from his post, the president gave his son-in-law a new position in the administration and publicly derided the restive "new Kazakhs" in a speech on November 17.

On the day of Nazarbayev’s speech, an auction was held for the state’s share of the country’s largest bank, Halyk Savings. From the beginning of 2001, powerful interests such as Kazkommertsbank and an investment group led by Ablyazov had publicly contended for a controlling stake. In the context of this strong competition, the emergence of a latecomer, the financial group Mangistaumunaigas, as the auction’s winner was viewed with suspicion. In addition to appearing as a prospective buyer at the last moment, the group was reported to have close ties to Aliev. If true, Nazarbayev’s extended family would have almost complete control of the country’s leading bank.

On the next day, November 18, apparently prompted by the combined effect of Aliev’s actions against Ablyazov, Nazarbayev’s response and the Halyk Bank auction, a press conference announced the founding of the DCK. Main figures in the new movement included Ablyazov, Deputy Prime Minister Uraz Dzhandosov, Governor of the northern Pavlodar region Galimzhan Zhakiyanov and the parliamentary deputy Tolen Tokhtasinov.

The DCK announced its commitment to the rule of law and democratization. It advocated the direct election of regional governors, and came out strongly against corruption. Such admirable goals contained within them the self-interest of those promoting them, as the members of the DCK were fighting for their economic as well as political rights. The DCK’s platform was dedicated to reducing the power of Nazarbayev’s associates in relation to that of the movement’s own leaders. Some observers, such as commentator Talgat Ismagambetov, suggested that for the DCK, the language of democracy and inclusiveness was more of a means than an end.

Regardless of intent, the founding of the DCK brought into sharp focus the deep split among Kazakhstan’s ruling elite. After a few days’ delay, the government’s response came in the form of a widely broadcast speech by Prime Minister Kasimzhomart Tokayev in which he demanded the removal from power of all members of the DCK. A number of major government officials resigned, including Dzhandosov, Zhakiyanov, Labor Minister Alikhan Baymenov and Deputy Defense Minister Zhannat Yertlesova. Other politicians suspected of having ties to the DCK were also removed or transferred to other posts.

Many members of the DCK appeared to be taken aback by the harsh response from Nazarbayev’s regime. The movement’s founders countered with a public relations campaign in which they maintained that their primary aim was to establish a level playing field for business in Kazakhstan rather than to oppose Nazarbayev. This campaign mixed criticism of the economic dominance of the president’s family with optimism that the ejected DCK supporters would soon return to their posts. When this began to appear unlikely, newspapers such as Ablyazov’s Vremya Po intensified their criticism of Nazarbayev’s regime.

Opposition Relations

Meanwhile, in December 2001, the RPPK’s Amirzhan Kosanov, Azamat’s Peter Svoik and Gulzhan Yergaliyeva of the PPCK announced the foundation of the United Democratic Party (UDP), of which the influential Kazhegeldin was a member of the governing board.

Kazhegeldin and members of the earlier opposition had responded ambivalently to the formation of the DCK. While they welcomed the anti-corruption and pro-democracy stance of the new movement, the older generation of opposition leaders viewed with suspicion the DCK’s ties to the administration, and its more moderate position towards Nazarbayev himself. (The newly formed UDP insisted on Nazarbayev’s ouster, while the DCK initially expressed willingness to work with Nazarbayev to attempt to broaden political participation.)

Despite differences in their levels of opposition, the two movements did interact and cooperate to a certain extent in the early days of their coexistence. Zhakiyanov and Ablyazov in particular worked closely with the UDP as representatives of the DCK. On January 19, 2002, when the theater venue for a UDP-led opposition meeting was abruptly closed, Ablyazov donated his own space, and together with Zhakiyanov participated in the session. For its part, the DCK held a large meeting only one day later, attended by an estimated five thousand citizens of Almaty, including some major UDP leaders.

These events mark a reshuffling and further delineation of the Kazakhstani opposition. The UDP continued to cooperate with Ablyazov and Zhakiyanov, and much of the old opposition rank-and-file joined the DCK. Meanwhile, moderate DCK leaders split off and founded the Ak Zhol Party on January 29, staking out a more centrist course in an attempt to achieve some level of understanding with Nazarbayev.

Government Reaction

In addition to marking the beginning of a tactical division between opposition groups, the events of early January 2002 hardened the presidential administration’s stance towards political opposition. The large turnout at the DCK rally apparently shocked the authorities into action, and on January 25 Nazarbayev gave a speech laden with criticism of the movement, demanding that law enforcement agencies take steps "to stop the buffoonery."

In March and April 2002 respectively, Ablyazov and Zhakiyanov were taken into custody, each charged with abuse of power during their tenure in government. The detention of Zhakiyanov in particular garnered international attention, as he had taken refuge to escape arrest in an Almaty building housing several European embassies. The standoff ended April 4, when the Kazakhstani authorities agreed that Zhakiyanov would remain in custody in Almaty with full access to the national and international press. After a few days of detention in Almaty (by which time, observers note, the Western delegates from the World Economic Forum’s Eurasia Summit had left the city), Zhakiyanov was promptly flown to his former constituency of Pavlodar and placed under house arrest. Despite widespread reports of his deteriorating health and international criticism of this violation of the diplomatic agreement, he remained under house arrest until he received a seven-year prison term in August.

This verdict came not long after the conviction of Ablyazov for a six-year term July 18. Nazarbayev critics claim that both trials were politically motivated and targeted at discouraging the further development of the opposition.

Future Prospects

Obstacles and Assets

Continual pressure from the government makes immediate prospects for the opposition’s future appear limited. In addition to the alleged persecution of figures such as Ablyazov and Zhakiyanov and a series of anonymous attacks against independent media, a recent law on political parties is hampering the opposition’s development. This legislation calls for the re-registration of all political parties according to new guidelines, which stipulate that parties must have nationwide representation and at least 50,000 documented members. Since none of these groups have such broad organizations in place, the DCK and other, smaller opposition movements (with the exception of Ak Zhol and the Communist party, which appear able to independently cross the threshold) face the difficult choice of uniting or moving underground.

Despite the obstacles that the authorities seem to be placing in front of the new Kazakhstani opposition, the nature of the movement and the level of the country’s development may be in the opposition’s favor. The main opposition movements in Kazakhstan enjoy access to funding and influential supporters that may help sustain them in a prolonged struggle against incumbent authority. The financial resources of the DCK are significantly lessened by the imprisonment of two of their most wealthy leaders – Ablyazov and Zhakiyanov. However, the movement retains significant clout, including an important alliance with the Communists, who have strong regional connections and a presence in parliament. What is more, Ak Zhol remains well financed, with a broad support base of its own.

If Ak Zhol or, more likely, the DCK decides to confront the authorities directly, one key constituency that may prove a deciding factor is the growing number of small- and medium-sized business owners, many of whom are active in the country’s oil and gas sector. Whether such a power struggle occurs depends on a number of factors. Nazarbayev is again playing a balancing act, and his next moves will be critical in determining Kazakhstan’s political future.

Three Scenarios

The president and his associates may continue their hard-line policy towards the political opposition. This would likely take the form of increased harassment of non-state media outlets and further prosecution of DCK activists. Such policies would stand a good chance of radicalizing the opposition, while at the same time forcing it underground. Concurrently, Nazarbayev and his family would continue to expand their control over the political and economic levers of power.

A direct confrontation with Nazarbayev’s government would not be a foregone conclusion in favor of the administration, however. As already noted, the leaders of the opposition have resources and influence that opposition groups elsewhere in the region lack. The DCK might be successful in using its remaining economic connections and familiarity with state structures to oppose Nazarbayev. Government corruption scandals, especially the so-called "Kazakhgate" affair, in which it was revealed that the government had concealed a Swiss bank account with over $1 billion in oil revenues, keep Nazarbayev in a potentially vulnerable position. This is particularly true as inquiries by US prosecutors have brought the issue to the international stage. [For background information, see the EurasiaNet Business and Economics archive]. Any new revelation concerning the Kazakhgate affair could potentially do serious damage to Nazarbayev’s domestic political position, even possibly prompting his resignation.

It is precisely Nazarbayev’s vulnerability that makes a third variant most likely. In this scenario, the regime and the less radical members of the opposition come to an agreement in which power is redistributed and Nazarbayev’s support base reinforced. The Ak Zhol party could play a critical role if Nazarbayev in fact attempts to achieve compromise with his opponents. By levying punitive measures against his most outspoken critics and co-opting the more pliant ones with lucrative and influential posts, Nazarbayev could attempt to divide and conquer, thereby navigating his way out of the crisis. The January 7 appointment of Ak Zhol co-chair Dzhandosov as an aide to the president and the nearly-simultaneous summoning of RPPK chairman Kosanov on tax charges may indicate that this process has already begun. Perhaps even more troubling for the opposition is the January 10 report on the Respublika news website alleging that the DCK had been stripped of its registration and had its bank accounts frozen.

If Nazarbayev does manage to come to an accommodation with the moderate opposition while sidelining the rest, he will survive only in a significantly weakened state, having opened the door of compromise to a powerful interest group. It remains to be seen whether this is the beginning of a much longer struggle, or merely another bump in the road for the president and his allies.

Editor’s Note: Aldar Kusainov is a Central Asia-based reporter who employs a pseudonym out of fear of government reprisals.

Daniel Sershen is project editor for this series.

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