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KazFlico.gif (121 bytes) Kazakhstan

Bad-tempered people for a silly mullah

Farid Murtaza

Everyone in Kazakhstan understands that two by two makes four, and seven is seven, and by no means eight. Everyone, excluding Balieva, Yertysbaev and such likes whom you cannot regard as sane persons.

The intrigue about the date of the presidential election inspired by president Nursultan Nazarbayev has ended up paying the price for him. President just wanted to distract the attention of the opposition, but he has drawn the attention of his active political opponents and other people instead.

Being aware that seven never makes eight, Kazakh citizens have also calculated that three doesn’t make two, and that Nazarbayev’s next presidential term would be at least the third or even the fourth one. But no means the second.

The Transition Age

The Bible tells about tzar Solomon’s ring with the two words engraved in it: "Everything passes". When the tsar died, the ring was taken off his finger to see another engraving that read: "This will also pass away"…

May be Nursultan Nazarbayev wears an amulet with the engraving: "Everything will pass. And I will stay".

During his meeting with Karaganda miners, N, Nazarbayev readily answered the question whether he was going to stand for president: "Well, if the miners want me to…"!

In fact, the miners haven't asked him to do so. And metallurgists haven't asked either. Indo-British mine-owner, or Kyrgyz-Israeli metallurgical baron and unknown "masters of the copper mountain" may have asked him to. Though these court oligarchs do not insist as much as they did seven years ago and largely out of the fear to fall into disgrace. They realize that "the first president" unwilling to allow "the second president" fights against the nature whose laws cannot be revised by this Majilis.

In the USA, the last-term politicians are called lame ducks. The Russians have invented even a more precise definition "coming back from the fair". There was a fair in Nursultan Nazarbayev’s life: the announcement of independence, international recognition, market reforms, making of the state, and great expectations… These will never come again. Tiredness, animosity, intrigues, loneliness, total lack of understanding, ill-feeling towards the whole world, the fear of the future remain now.

I am not sorry about Nursultan Nazarbayev as a person at all. He is the architect of his own misfortunes. The family collapse, splitting of the elite, the "Kazakhgate" scandal, the moving of the capital to another town – these are the fruits of his own activity. In this manner little children and old men behave.

Uncritical self-appraisal is another sign of ageing. A famous doctor in Almaty who consults almost every Kazakh top officials "in their sixties" says to his patients that they are again in the awkward, transition age. Though this is a reverse transition. And they should clearly see their capabilities.

Infarctions and insults often affect the old men married to young women. You can compare their experience with politics. In Monaco Duke Rene could have ruled until he was very old, for 50 years. The young, transitional states need new dynamic leaders, Yeltsin, Shevardnadze, Kuchma, even Akaev – all of them have exhausted their resource. Nazarbayev hopes to win not the election but the battle with the relentless time. The outcome is known beforehand and doesn’t depend on the central election commission’s vote count.

No-winning Strategy

The official and dependent press and TV companies are so ashamed of their links with the president’s family that they file "dignity and business repute" lawsuits when someone even mentions Dariga Nazarbayeva. Though they still serve her and her father. One of such "services’ includes reiterating that the opposition is disintegrated, exhausted, demoralized, depersonalized, marginalized, delegitimized, etc., while Nazarbayev is unified, strong, clever, great, cheerful, important, and loved and so on.

It makes no sense to argue about his cheerfulness. It is much more important to assess his chances to stay in power, and not even after the forthcoming election but at least for the next year. Pro-government reporters and political scientists should analyze Nazarbayev’s strategy for the year ahead, at least instead of endlessly predicting the opposition defeat. Then they would understand that the president is bound to lose anyway, just because he has cornered himself. The way out will be determined by the circumstances: he will go to exile (like Akaev), to oblivion (like Shevardnadze) or to prison (like many expect Leonid Kuchma to do).

No-winning prospects for Nazarbayev proceeds from the pure analysis of the choices he has left for himself. For instance, the date of election. Actually, the president is unable to put it off for a year, as in this case he will be a rebel who plots coup d’etat. This will happen after the term of obligatory announcement of the election date expires in September. Then the opposition, the entire nation, and - after January 10, 2006 - the world community will regard Nazarbayev as an usurper.

Since Kazakh president appoints everyone, other state authorities: akims, ministers, courts – will also become illegitimate on the night of January 10. The cautious officers may retire on grounds of sickness, and the silly will stay and participate in the iniquity and anti-constitutional rebel. In the nearest future they will face reduction from rank, legal prosecution with further repentance and expiation according to Georgian, or Ukrainian scenarios.

International boycott combined with civil disobedience campaign of the opposition will change the situation within several moths. In spring, when it is not so cold to hold rallies in the streets, hundreds of thousands of citizens will be crying "Ket!" in the squares.

Another scenario is holding the election in December this year. The decision will look like forced by the threat of mass protests, warnings by Western governments, and discord in the president's entourage.

N. Nazarbayev will lose even in the case he's elected on time. His participation in the election cannot be legitimate. After 14 years at the helm, the ageing president is unable to prove that this was his first term in office. The nation has grown wiser and will not listen to such shameless speculations.

N. Nazarbayev’s third election can be neither honest, nor fair. It shall not be held at all, its outcome is void de jure from the very beginning. If this is not obvious to everyone, the election campaign will make it possible for the opposition to tell every voter the truth.

Opposition’s refusal to run for president along with "impersonator and usurper Nazarbayev" will follow a wide campaign of explaining this viewpoint in European capitals and discussing it with international organizations. They will support the boycott, refuse to send observers and will not announce the results lawful in advance. Possibly, Nazarbayev would find in his backyard some new "engels-abbasovs" to make him as a fake competitor, and even then he would face boycotts, the campaign of civil refusal to recognize the power, the spring, meetings, "Ket" and the three paths – silent voluntary custody at his dacha (Shevardnadze), sore press-conferences in Moscow region (Akaev) and long interviews at the prosecutor’s office (Kuchma).

Nazarbayev will carry out the forthcoming campaign in his usual style: with falsifications, barring of unwanted candidates, preventing candidates from free access to mass media, etc. But the outcome of the election means nothing. The opposition, the nation and the international community will regard them as they regarded the results of V. Yanukovich’s election in Ukraine. Boycott, civil disobedience, meetings in spring and the three scenarios will follow such victory.

Let’s imagine for a moment that due to some impossible irradiation, since July 1 Nazarbayev will start fair election and provide his competitors access to mass media and will not prevent them from tours and meetings with the voters, will not shut down independent media outlets and orchestrate provocations against opposition politicians. It is difficult to imagine, but let’s just try.

It is clear that during the campaign the opposition will tell so much dreadful truth about their main competitor that he will have to hide out of shame. The "Kazakhgate", which already has become the talk of the town, would be discussed in mass media and by opposition. It would become a civil agony of the former head of the state, the father of independence, the symbol and guarantor of the Constitution. The three scenarios of further development of events remain the same.

Dariga as Machine-Gunner?

Nazarbayev's not so poignant henchmen, especially those who have no place to flee after they lose power, may be contemplating a forth scenario of the development of events, namely the Andijan one. Some consider it possible and even acceptable. A thousand and a half left on squares dead as a result of machine-gun fire are considered a "moderate price" for a chance to cling to power – especially when it connected to cash machines - for yet another term. However, this scenario appears to be more terrible for Nazarbayev than the above three ones.

It would liken him to Islam Karimov, though more disgusting and false-hearted. The persecution of the Tashkent dictator by the United States and Europe would make Nazarbayev reluctant to even think about such a possibility. After the massacre on a square in Almaty or Astana, the prospect of international tribunal similar to that against Milosevic or Central African hangmen could become so real for Nazarbayev that Sarah or a Gulnara would have to start packing food and cloths for the jailed president.

For Central Asia, Andijan served not an example to follow but as a vaccination against using force to counteract the people who rise in revolt. Even if Nazarbayev - in a state of aberration - uses forced against his own people, he would never persuade the world that Islamic terrorists or drug dealers attacked him. Western embassies would do the utmost to warn the president against using guns against the people.

One should also bear in mind that the degree of civil maturity and humanity in Kazakh society is by far higher than in Uzbekistan. Secret services and the army are part of this society tied to it by numerous bonds of kinship and neighborhood. Despite the letter requesting to give the internal ministry machine- and submachine-guns, one could hardly imagine minister Turisbekov ordering to shoot at unarmed marchers, women or children. The minister is tall and formidable, but his reason and discretion would almost certainly have the upper hand in a critical moment.

Apparently, the president would commission the prime minister to do the dirty work for him in order to have someone to shift the blame afterwards. But Akhmetov would hardly use force either as he realizes that nobody would follow his orders while he would be unable to avoid responsibility. From all other officials, whom Nazarbayev could make scapegoats for the massacre, one could expect the same logic.

However, one should not altogether rule out a possibility of using arms, as there will be a handful of despaired relatives and henchmen by Nazarbayev's side. The situation that took place in the fall of 2001, when Rakhat Aliev and Dariga Nazarbayeva took their children and hid in a bunker ready to fire back, could repeat.

It's almost impossible to imagine the president's elder daughter – an MP, a singer, a PhD in political science, a grandmother and a celebrity simultaneously – firing a machine-gun like a Soviet-era civil war hero. But as the experience shows, the family has their guards, the North Caucasian thugs for whom the lives of hundreds of people are not worth a rush. The task of the patriotically minded officers among the national security committee and the ministry of the interior is to block them.

Deep in his heart, the Commander-in-Chief seems to have put up with the prospect of loosing power as a result of a popular revolt. Not for nothing his new residence "Ak Orda" in Astana has two secret tunnels: one goes to the airport and the other to a Kustanai road in the direction of Russia. For a long time Turkish construction workers failed to understand the reason. They were explained that these were the roads for trucks that would deliver foodstuffs to the residence. Turks are unable to understand special features of national residence building, when those in power enjoy popular adoration and at the same time ready for scamper.

The Kyrgyz Crisis

It turned out that Askar Akaev was unprepared to flee, and this fact shocked Nazarbayev. He was especially impressed that his former relative traveled five hours in an uncomfortable Russian military and transport aircraft of the type "AN-12", where there are steel benches along the aircraft sides instead of armchairs and no in-flight catering.

The Kyrgyz revolution shattered Nursultan Nazarbayev mentally. He could have tried to convince himself that Georgia is quite another story, and Ukraine is far away. In the case of Kyrgyzstan, he could not repeat such stupid things even to himself.

Like the Kazakhs villagers, the poor and bullied Kyrgyz citizens, doped by the official propaganda, were not expected to go under the girdle of the disintegrated town opposition. They were not expected to do so, but they still did this. The opposition united and took control of the situation. The former political prisoner has become first vice premier; the exiled prime minister has become acting president. There is an ongoing international probe looking for secret bank accounts in world's banking capitals controlled by the toppled president's family members, while his main opponent has become prosecutor general in charge of the investigation…

The Bishkek story could have taught many leaders in the region a lesson if they hadn't have lost the ability to learn. Almost everyone saw that the Akaev regime was bound to fall except Akayev himself. The former academician turned surprisingly deaf not only to his own people but also to influential persons in the West who hoped to reason him and make him drop the suicidal idea to transfer the power within his family.

Several days before the tulip revolution, an influential US emissary arrived in Bishkek. He intended to suggest Askar Akaev a plan that would allow to resolve the crisis caused by the unfair and not free parliamentary elections. The elements of the plan that I know allowed to stop the opposition and launch a national accord mechanism. The plan provided for giving the opposition serious powers and important positions in exchange of dropping their most radical slogans.

Opposition agreed to the plan, but the Akaevs seemed to have decided that they were sacrificing too much. The spouse, the daughter and the son were scandalized by the demand to drop any political activities. As a result, the Akaevs have lost everything. Or next to everything. The remaining will be seized by international investigators and US lawyers who are on the trail of the family's moneys.

Only an imbecile could fail to notice the coincidences in the fates of the two presidents. Nazarbayev also has his supporters in the West. They also draft plans of a smooth and conflict-free solution to the brewing crisis. Some of them have also tried to persuade the president and offer him a chance to escape… When gods decide to punish a man they deprive him of his mind, ancient Greeks used to say. Afterwards he punishes himself on his own.

The Nazarbayev is unnerved by the support guaranteed the Bakiyev government by the international community in exchange for their commitment to democracy and human rights. In addition to the US printing house already in operation and serving all opposition forces, a powerful radio station is to be set in Kyrgyzstan which is expected to broadcast to the neighboring states. Bishkek stands a good chance of turning into a hub of the region's democratic forces, the true "Central Asian Switzerland", as Askar Akayev once said. Most probably, the former president meant bank accounts, not a high level of civil freedoms or a citadel of persecuted democrats.

The proximity of Bishkek to Almaty, as well Russian and US military bases there allow Kazakh opposition members to feel relatively secure in Kyrgyzstan. They won't have to travel to London or Washington for their important meetings anymore. A foreign bureau of the Kazakh opposition has been set up in Bishkek that will coordinate the activities of the exiled politicians abroad and the democrats inside Kazakhstan. Serik Medetbekov, a leader of the foreign bureau, has had some meetings and talks with the new Kyrgyz authorities in Bishkek.

As a rule, Nazarbayev's first reaction was a provocation: a grenade was discovered at the front door of an Almaty flat where Serik Medetbekov's mother lives.

As it is always the case with the authorities, the police are unable to find the culprits. When the power will change in Kazakhstan in favor of the opposition, the police will find them.

Not-Nursultan Not-Nazarbayev Joins the Game

Some time ago, a witty pamphlet was published in the newspaper Data Nedeli about an ideal candidate in the forthcoming election. The author called him "Not-Nursultan Not-Nazarbayev" with the qualities contrary to those of Nazarbayev. The candidate is not a long-time career communist and he has never betrayed his patron. He has never taken bribes from oil majors. He has no daughters compromising their father and the president. He has no sons-in-law who seize someone other's businesses like hungry dogs… In other words, the ideal outcome for the nation will be to never have Nursultan Nazarbayev as an official anymore.

In fact, the idea of the unknown satirist coincided with the strategy, which – to the best of my knowledge – was submitted by Akezhan Kazhegeldin during his meeting with leaders of Ak Zhol party, the communist party and the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan on November 12 last year in London. It was there that the approach was formulated which allowed to remove the barriers among the parties. It is not so important who would be president of Kazakhstan next time unless it's not Nursultan Nazarbayev anymore, they said.

Democrats chose Zharmakhan Tuyakbai, and his candidacy was not welcomed with open arms by all. Some opposition members, largely from among the veterans, saw Tuyakbai as a not very public and charismatic person. To be honest, I also thought that Zharmakhan Tuyakbai won't be strong enough to become a leader and won't dare to openly drop the administrative style and the way of thinking that enabled him to achieve success as prosecutor general, Majilis chairman and Otan party master.

But the power of history is so strong that it plunges a man in its torrent and turns him into a tool of progress, giving him the qualities needed in this very moment and in these very circumstances. Step by step, very difficult, suffering the attacks of the Nazarbayev thugs, Tuyakbai turns into a single opposition candidate commissioned to morally and intellectually oppose the president everyone is tired of. He seems to acquire the features of the Not-Nursultan Not-Nazarbayev whom the country needs so badly.

Tuyakbai's recipe for success is simple: don't be like Nazarbayev! Don't fear the truth! Do not steal! Do not waffle! Don't create cronies and acolytes! Don't persecute the people who are smarter than you!

There simple facts only seem revolutionary against the background of the corrupt Nazarbayev's entourage. It's already a victory that Zharmakhan Tuyakbai has managed to escape this entourage. However, this is the victory won over himself only. This is not enough as the nation expects that he wins a victory over his strongest political opponent, the incumbent president.

Tuyakbai is facing a virgin land of problems. He has to learn how to talk to the people, formulate his views, and suggest his solutions to most difficult problems. He has mastered just the genre of collective press conferences so far and also inquiries to the president and parliament that will never be answered honestly.

It's bitter to see when against the background of a struggle for power in Kazakhstan designed to topple the usurper president, the single opposition candidate indulges into insignificant correspondence with the prime minister over the privatization of city electric networks or hotels. Under this corrupt regime, any privatization would be illegal, which will be disputed after the new power wins a victory. Isn't the example of Ukraine or Kyrgyzstan clear enough?

Why waste efforts and distract the attention discussing the notorious agricultural and industrial complex, when nothing has been said yet about the opposition election strategy, when the topic of "Kazakhgate" hasn't found its place in the election campaign program?

At the same time, the opposition leader keeps silence about the significant and truly important events. He seems to have no flair for seeing the so-called "information causes", which allow a politician to attract the attention of the society.

For instance, what about the trip that he took to the US and his dinner attended by George Bush. How did it take place? Who sponsored it? Whom did the opposition candidate talk to and about what? It's hard to imagine that Zharmakhan Tuyakbai failed to raise the problem of the forthcoming elections with the US politicians and officials. What is the position of the long-standing friends of Kazakhstan such as John McCain and Joe Lieberman? The democratic leader is silent. Perhaps, he is unable to understand what has happened there?

According to a report by the Vienna office of The Eurasian Transition Group, posted on his web site, Zharmakhan Tuyakbai visited the SDNY prosecutor's office. There the prosecutors work who have filed charges against J. Giffen and exposed the huge criminal corruption body with Nursultan Nazarbayev on the top of it.

Since Zharmakhan Tuyakbai is not involved in the "Kazakgate", the subject of his talk with the prosecutors could not be a secret for civil society. Otherwise rumors could spread that it focused on the fate of Nurlan Balgimbayev, Tuyakbai's distant relative, former minister and prime minister who took almost as many bribes as Nursultan Nazarbayev did.

We could only hope that Zharmakhan Tuyakbai has decided to prepare a "secret weapon" that he would use at the decisive phase of the struggle to tear the image of the president to tatters. However, he could hardly go without a clear and definite position regarding the "Kazakhgate" scandal at any stage of the struggle for presidency.

To be continued

IAC EURASIA-Internet, June 29, 2005

http://eurasia.org.ru

 

 

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