Iran pushes for positive political engagement in Central
Asia
James Purcell Smith
Following the dynamic international engagement in Central Asia after
2001 that dramatically shaped the role and place of the region in the forming new world
order, Tehran seems to be opting for continued ad-hoc cooperation with the states of
Central Asia where it can, and avoiding any possibility of collision of interests with the
countries of the region. This follows the established course of Iranian foreign policy of
the 1990s in the region. Despite remaining differences, Tehran has managed to find its own
niche of political and economic engagement with Central Asian states. Iran’s policy is
one of economic pragmatism and positive political engagement. But U.S. policy, Iraq and
Afghanistan raise the question: How long Tehran will be able to stay the course?
BACKGROUND: In the early 1990s, immediately after the collapse of USSR,
Iran adopted an assertive policy in a push to gain influence in Central Asia, both through
export of its Islamic ideology, through economic ties, and implying its political agenda
in a regional dimension under the aegis of international organizations. These efforts
briefly brought the Islamist government in Tajikistan under Tehran’s wings in 1991-1992.
Its defeat in the ensuing civil war transformed Iran’s policy into co-sponsorship of the
Tajik peace dialogue on behalf of the United Tajik Opposition. Tehran managed to build
close economic and political contacts with Turkmenistan, where Ashkhabad was interested in
a alternative export ways for its gas resources. Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov also
needed relations with a neighbor outside the CIS in order to further cement his
isolationist foreign policy and strengthen his power inside the country. However, the key
factor for the limited ambitions of Tehran in Central Asia was twofold: the unwillingness
of the newly independent nations to fall under the wings of yet another “big brother”,
and Tehran’s concern not to cause the outrage of the former “big brother” –
Moscow. Hence, from 1993 until the present, Tehran navigates its relations with Central
Asian countries following the principle of consulting with Moscow first, and avoiding any
contentious issue that might provoke the Kremlin’s anger. In return, Iran received
state-of-the-art Russian weaponry worth over $2 billion, advanced cooperation in building
its nuclear power plant in Bushehr, and Russian political support in the international
arena. A further reason that limited Iran’s geopolitical designs toward this region was
America’s policy of containment of Iran. Washington has consistently been pushing hard
to deny Iran strategic tools of influence over the region, like export oil and gas
pipelines. The fourth limiting factor, which is still affecting Iranian standing in the
region, is Tehran’s scarcity of financial resources and lack of technological know-how.
Due to its economic problems, Iran cannot be considered a strategic source of foreign
investment and new technologies for the economies of Central Asian states.
IMPLICATIONS: Tehran’s recognition of the necessity for active
engagement with the countries of Central Asia while avoiding any contentious issues pushes
Iran toward a pragmatic approach in bilateral relations with the region. Despite
disagreements with Kazakhstan over the division of the Caspian Sea, since 1995 Tehran and
Astana have been cooperating in oil-swap contracts. Depending on signed contracts, from 1
to 2.5 million tons of Kazakh oil are delivered to northern Iranian refineries and the
same volume of Iranian oil shipped via an oil terminal in Kharq island. In addition to the
Korpedzhe-Kurtkui gas pipeline, operational since December 1997, Turkmenistan also started
oil-swap operations. In Summer 1996, a missing 320 kilometer link of strategic Trans-Asian
railway was built between Tedzhen in southern Turkmenistan and Mashad in north-eastern
Iran, which noticeably increased Iran’s importance in the transportation of Central
Asian goods. After the 1997 peace deal in Tajikistan, Iran opted for mostly economic and
socio-cultural cooperation with Dushanbe. Stabilization of Afghanistan as a result of the
U.S.-led operation Enduring Freedom created an opportunity for neighboring states to probe
cooperation projects with the new Afghan authorities. In June 2003, Uzbekistan signed
agreements on trilateral cooperation on transportation with Iran and Afghanistan, in order
to use Afghan territory for transit purposes. Most experts on Afghanistan agree that this
kind of step-by-step incorporation of Kabul into the web of regional economy and
transportation infrastructure can create a mechanism for Afghanistan’s sustainable
economic recovery and facilitates long-term stability in that country. Trips by Iranian
President Mohammad Khatami to Azerbaijan in August and Dushanbe and Yerevan in September
2004 yet again underlines Tehran’s intentions to cement and increase its economic
cooperation, and especially investment cooperation, as a precondition for gaining
political leverage in bilateral relations. Tehran’s policy of economic pragmatism and
positive political engagement in bilateral relations with the countries of Central Asia so
far has been a “win-win” situation for the involved parties. The regional countries
have a direct interest in creating conditions for long-term sustainable development and
indigenous stability mechanisms in Central Asia, and especially in Afghanistan. However,
the most topical issue in the U.S.-Iranian and indeed global agenda today is concern over
Iran’s nuclear program. In the current situation, Tehran finds itself surrounded by US
troops in Iraq, the Gulf states, Afghanistan and Central Asia and the key question from
Tehran’s vantage point seems to be if, where and when the U.S. foreign policy strategy
of democratization of regimes in the Middle East will end.
CONCLUSIONS: Despite the volatility in world affairs and global
terrorism, a traditionalist and pragmatic approach to international relations in the
Greater Central Asia proves to be mutually beneficial. In particular, a peaceful
Afghanistan holds great potential for the development of relations between Iran and
Central Asia, as it will provide a route of transportation between Iran and the population
centers of the region. The prospect of rail and road links via Meshed, Herat and
Mazar-i-Sharif to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan could in the longer term be of crucial
importance for the region’s economic development.
AUTHOR’S BIO: James Purcell Smith is a New York-based expert on
Eurasian and Middle Eastern affairs.
Central Asia - Caucasus Analyst, Decenber 1, 2004
http://www.cacianalyst.org/ |