Igor Djadan

Conservatives tend to describe the outlook of the left as "utopia." Leftists like to refer to conservative viewpoint as "a myth." It is interesting that neither side feels shy of such blames. It isn't shameful for the leftist to be a kind of dreamer and utopist, and for the conservative to be regarded as an admirer of myths. It may be said that a myth is a utopia directed opposite to the time axis, a kind of dream of the past, whereas a utopia is a myth that heads forward. But a myth that heads forward cannot be completely earthbound. When we dream of the future and try to construct it we can't stay totally attached to the past. When we take thought for the morrow we can't remain completely in the earthly limits. The future's "earth" is often what we call "utopia" today. Hence the seeming paradox that some of the views and even ideologies that seemed liberal and progressive yesterday are regarded as conservative and reactionary today. Utopia feeds on decomposition products of myths. But everything has its end. Just as bodies turn into dung, any utopia, when its life history ends, shrinks in due time to the size of conservative's brain and turns into a myth.

One of such utopias is the dream of the Great Israel. Jews once dreamt of a powerful, independent state that would stretch from Nile to Euthrates; Betar men marched along the streets of Vilnius in brown shirts a-la Hitler Jugend, while their leader, Odessa revisionist, poet and writer Jabotinsky called on them to follow the example of Ukrainian nationalists and love their historical motherland as Taras Shevchenko loved his.

The state was established, but after that everything happened not as it had been planned. It turned out that there lived not only Jews but also Arabs in the Middle East. That hadn't been taken into account. For some reason, Arabs didn't want to live in the new Jewish state. It turned out that Jews, being still inconsiderable in number, could not "digest" the whole former British mandated territory, just as the Soviet Jewish community couldn't fully Judaise the Jewish Autonomous Region. And yet the greater part of the Palestinian Jewish population didn't resign itself to the first partition of Palestine, when the area to the east from Jordan, where almost no Jews lived, was taken from the Palestine Mandate, and the Kingdom of Transjordan was established.

As it became clear later, the presence of Arabs involved yet another danger. If Arabs decided they wanted to live in the Jewish state, things could become even worse, since Jews could object living with them. Thus, no matter how Arabs behaved, everything was bad. That's how the Middle East conflict started. There seemed to be no alternative but to take possession of the land and force Arabs out. For the neighbors, the utopia of the land flowing with milk and honey turned into the anti-utopia of the Zionist entity belching fire and brimstone.

Palestinians think they are suffering for someone other's sins. It were Europeans who exterminated Jews in their concentration camps, so why do Arabs have to pay the bill? Moreover, no sooner Arabs had nationalized their oil than America, which had been rather reluctant to grant visas to Jews when they were trying to escape gas chambers, "all of a sudden" became a strategic ally of the Jewish state.

As any Russian infant knows, few people except Russians are able to translate the "feelings of Asians" into a language that the "civilized society" would understand, although the Arab-Israeli controversy has nothing to do with a "conflict of interests." If it were a "conflict of interests," the dispute would have long been settled by means of mutual concessions and compromises. Judging by the apparent irrationalism of Arabs, the real conflict has no pragmatic reasons; it is rather a result of resentment. In the East, there's nothing harder to settle than the consequences of insults. The answer to arrogance is hostility, which can hardly be eliminated. It may be said that, due to some cultural specificities, Arabs have a very strong sense of self-esteem, and in no case would they lose their dignity. It was only after the "preventive strike" of 1973 that Anwar Sadat agreed on a truce with Israel, after he made the Israeli experience the same feelings, the same horror of a military disaster that Arabs experienced in 1967 after Israel's "preventive strike."

Russians, who have experienced no less humiliation in their history than Jews, can often hardly understand why Arabs react so strongly to Israeli "lawful acts of self-defense." Apparently, Arabs just don't have a historical experience as rich as ours, which we are by right proud of. The Middle East conflict is certainly a typical example of cultural discrepancy and misunderstanding.

As for Americans, there's another reason that prevents them from understanding Arabs. Americans are too "civilized," which in practice means that they are almost completely impervious to the opinion of the "neighbour," unless the latter was "born free" (that is, in the United States). By the way, the Hebrew word that corresponds to neighbour in the biblical "Love your neighbour as yourself" is zulato, which means "another one." In terms of American civilizational model, loving "another one" is a cultural nonsense. It appears that the only person an American is able to love is his "cultural clone," the one who has the same civilizational status.

It is quite interesting, however, that on the Russian political scene one has to position oneself as an "Israeli patriot" to join the rank of "sound", that is, centrist, political authorities. It is generally assumed that the interests of democracy demand to blame Palestinians for the bloodshed, in which the number of killed Palestinians is twice as much as that of dead Israelis. Shame on those Palestinians! However hard they are bombed, however many of them are locked in concentration camps, they still don't want to elect proper leaders for themselves!

The attitude to those who are involved in the Middle East conflict has turned in Russia into an important issue of domestic policy and serves as a "litmus paper" of how "democratic" a politician is. It isn't necessary to assess the real state of affairs in the Middle East. It is also unnecessary to consider the danger that Israelis have been exposing themselves to for 35 years, shortsightedly delaying the establishment of the Palestinian state and thus using cheap Palestinian labor force and natural resources. Indeed, why should Russian politicians, who behave rather undiplomatically towards Palestinian leaders, care for the opinion of a considerable number of Israelis who spot the danger for Israeli democracy in withholding Palestinian lands, rather than in establishing a Palestinian state?

It never occurs to them that there is yet another, much more serious danger. Feeling that they will soon become a majority, Arabs may stop committing terrorist acts and struggling for independence and start a struggle for their voting rights using more peaceful, internationally accepted means, just as it was in the RSA before the fall of apartheid. In this case the international community will quite possibly support settling the problem on the "multicultural" basis and establishing universal suffrage. Imagine that soon Palestinian patriots on the other side of Jordan (the number of which has exceeded 60%) would overthrow their tyrannical ruler and unite the Western Palestine (which would have lost its specifically Jewish status) with the Eastern one. How happy would Likud party members be, who still have a drawing of united Palestine on their shirts!

The only response the Israeli ultra-right consider "reasonable" in the light of this demographical perspective is withdrawal of Arab population from the territory of Palestine. I wouldn't, however, waste my readers' time on explaining why the idea of deportation of Arabs, which worked in 1948, will not work now. It's just a matter of experience. Even the government of the former Jewish terrorist Shamir, which was the toughest in the Israeli history, didn't risk doing that when the Gulf War presented the most favorable opportunity. So what's the use of talking? Let those whom these plans inspire dream about them in their beds!

Meanwhile, the artificial prolongation of the Great Israel utopia's senile life threatens the life of the real Israel. The utopia must finally cease to be regarded among practical guidelines and pass into the domain of night emissions. This clinical history allows to clearly retrace the process of death of the utopia, from the early stage of illness to its agonal stage, including its transportation to the graveyard of Jewish hopes and its solemn burial among the obelisks of biblical parables and fairy tales. Yes, fairy tale is an appropriate word! Having served its day, the political program has turned into a fairy tale.

Before the collapse of the USSR, 40 % of its citizens were of Muslim nationalities. The percentage of Arabs on Israel-controlled territories is about the same today. Had Russian leaders been as shortsighted as the current leadership of Israel, not only Chechnya but half of the country would have been a continuous "safety zone" today. Or perhaps what we have today would not be exactly Russia.

It was only after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the strong national core revealed itself, that Russia could continue developing as a democratic state. For similar reasons, the Israeli democracy will be doomed to degradation, apartheidization and fascisation if the problem of separation of Israel and Palestine is not resolved in the nearest future. So Russian politicians, who rather confidently draw parallels between Russia's struggle against Chechen terrorism and Israeli-Palestinian confrontation, fall into a serious error. The difference between these two situations is that Russia has already passed through the period of national separation, whereas the Holy Land is in the very middle of it. Besides, the two regions, hardly comparable in size and population, are in different stages of the historical cycle. Hence similar events do not always mean the same and may lead to absolutely different conclusions and sometimes demand absolutely different actions from politicians.

In the current situation, peace in the Middle East seems to be a delusive dream, a utopia. And this utopia is all the more important for its restless inhabitants right now when something can and must be done, since it is clearly impossible to continue living like that.

http://english.russ.ru/politics/20030203.html