Publications

NATIONAL PROBLEMS IN THE STATE POLICY OF KAZAKHSTAN

Following Kazakhstan and Russian press publications
Moscow, 1998

The present publication presents a brief overview of results of The national problems in the state policy of Kazakhstan research effort. The research was based on the monitoring of the Russian and Kazakhstan press, Moscow, 1998, and carried out by the Interdisciplinary studies center “Volkhonka, 14” within The complex program of comparative research on political culture in post-Soviet republics. The Eurasia information analysis center played the role of information sponsor. Full text could be found in the Russian edition: "Natsionalniye problemy v gosudarstvennoi politike Kazakhstana. Po materialam kazakhstanskoi i rossiiskoi pressy", Мoscow, 1998.

This book provides overview of a public discussion on problems of national relations and national policies in to-date Kazakhstan. The research includes samples of the Kazakh and Russian press publications over the period October 1997 – October 1998.

The topicality of problems, which have been discussed, relates to three basic factors: the threat of the Russian-language population emigrating from Kazakhstan, double-cross state policies in relation to existing national problems, the importance of ethno-national factor in the early presidential campaign in Kazakhstan.

The book has several thematic divisions:

The initial chapters provide a description of the national composition of republic of Kazakhstan, the political tumults based on national hostilities grounds, goes into the mutual claims of the Kazakh and the Russian-language population. The important problems of humanitarian and political character are viewed in relation to the intellectual elite role played in national relations, their development and the realization of the national state policy. Special attention has been attached to the language factor in the national conflicts. Some chapters are devoted especially to results of the current national policies: large-scale migration; political, national, personnel, social and economic problems. The role of the Russian factor and the national problems in relations between Kazakhstan and Russia are given special prominence. The book provides insight to the currently expressed viewpoints on the possible development strategies of the national situation in Kazakhstan, and prospects of building a poliethnic state.

Each thematic section begins with the general information analysis reference.

The multinational character of the country and a threat to political stability of society. – “Irresponsible policies and destructive mass media" as the only source of national contradictions. – “Magic formulas" of the official power” – President Nazarbayev shrewd national policy. – Instinct of self-preservation as an actual cause of interethnic peace in republic of Kazakhstan.

Like a lot other CIS states, Kazakhstan is a multinational country. Even in the general context of the existing diversity of nations and nationalities living in the former USSR republic, Kazakhstan is unique. Its uniqueness relates not only to the number of nationalities (statistics cites more than one hundred different nations and nationalities) but also to the role they play. The "title" nationality is not domineering in the quantitative relation, though creates a threat of potential conflict, currently felt in the Kazakh society, voiced by various politicians and discussed by mass media.

The multinational population of Kazakhstan is reality to be faced by any sensible politician, wishing to enjoy popularity among the republic's citizens. The unique poliethnic state composition conceals not only vast potential advantages (in case the country's leadership pursues an adequate policy), but also specific potential threats (in case this policy is inadequate and provokes national tension). In conditions of the deepest economic crisis, inherited by the post-Soviet republics from the former USSR, potential threats have noticeably increased, while social discontent has not infrequently acquired dimensions of the national conflicts. Foreign experts have recently been engaged in much talk on differences in the Kazakh and Russian mentalities, on destabilization and "Jugoslavization" of Kazakhstan. [15.09.98; Kazakhstanskaya pravda. Sergei Mukhametshin. Vector of common sense]

Judging by results of the polls, 8.7 percent of Slavs, 8 percent of Kazakhs and 7.9 percent of other ethnoses' representatives feel tension in their inter-ethnic relations. In other words, while the conflicts intensity between different nations at the level of interpersonal contacts is currently very low, the feeling of discomfort in this sphere is definitely present. The official scenario, meanwhile, is the following: there no problems of national relations, while those politicians and political writers who seriously and well-reasonably try to discuss the reasons of large-scale migration of the Russian-language population from Kazakhstan, are declared if not "enemies of society", then surely persons, responsible for instigation of national hostilities in order to gain political weight. The chief counter-argument of the official power is that the alleged "national conflicts" are in practice not seen at the level of interpersonal conflicts and in relations between simple people. The concern of society over the national relations and possible conflicts is being explained exclusively by the destructive activities of mass media:

… A strange paradox has been more than once illustrated by examples of national relations in Kazakhstan. The Kazakhs' personal relations with other nationalities' representatives are assessed by people in a far better way than the state of inter-nation relations within the society: "We have good relations inside our village, city, region, etc., though in the neighbor village, city, region, etc., they say they are bad." This is a direct result of mass media efforts. [18.05.98; Kazakhstanskaya pravda. Н. А. Nazarbayev. The moral and political choice of intelligentsia]

Quite a number of publications have emphasized that the low level of personal contacts conflictability between various ethnoses representatives stems not from the "shrewd policy of president Nazarbayev" but from the natural desire of people to preserve their status quo in national relations, combined with nations of Kazakhstan friendship and cooperation policy known to have shaped over a long time period:

...A certain social stability was established not so much due to the authoritarian regime repressive actions but for most part due to specific peculiarities of the Kazakhstan population structure. The poliethnic character of the population has specified certain compensation and mutual social activity neutralization on the part of various societal groups. [8.10.98; Nachnyom s ponedelnika. Valentin Makalkin. Pre-election race picks up speed. President acts on the effective side]

The officials' allegations of the well-being in the sphere of national relations often look like exorcising the public, though the latter is contradicted by practice and the not infrequent violation of traditional zhuz division of functions, the growing discontent among Russian-language population, which has already found expression in mass emigration from Kazakhstan and disturbances of the early '90s.

Political discontent based on national conflicts. Mutual claims of the Russian-language and the Kazakh population

First signs of national conflicts - Official actions on the part of state power - "State-territory claims of Kazakhs to Russians - Reaction by the Russian-language population to the policies of building the "multiethnical state of the Kazakh nation"

The period 1990-91, was marked by the Kazakh and Russian-language population actions of discontent in the north Kazakhstan territory; the opposition press became active, in particular, the Cossack newspapers, containing claims of the Russian-language population to the state power. Most part of them had been not satisfied, explained by Nazarbayev's definitely negative attitude and passiveness of the Russian foreign policy actions.

The reaction "from below" followed immediately and entailed quite a number of spontaneous political events, setting the center on the alert. In January 1994, there was a meeting in Ust-Kamenogorsk, organized by the local Slavic culture community. The participants in the meeting had demanded to form in East Kazakhstan the national autonomy of ethnic Russians, to give Russian language the constitutional status of the state language and to introduce the institute of double citizenship in the republic. The meeting was participated by some ten thousand citizens. [1.05.98; Delovaya nedelya”. Zhanna Bolatova, Eric Zhunusov]

The years 1990-91 became period of prosperity for the Kazakh opposition press. The circulation being not so large, the relative "softness" on the part of officials has led to appearance of a variegated picture. <...> The Urals Cossack community was regularly publishing the Kazachii vestnik (The Cossack Herald) newspaper, containing appeals to the president and government of Kazakhstan "to dissolve the nationalistic associations Azat and Alash, accused of organized provocations and outrage". Naturally enough, Azat and Alash did not hesitate to return like for like, publishing their own newspapers and blaming the Cossacks for doing the same. They appealed to the president to bar the Cossack formations and to rename Uralsk. <...> These negative scenarios were opposed by Nazarbayev's strong power, supported by strict laws. "We intend to have a strong government for the period of overcoming the economic crisis, strong executive power, sure to ensure that our citizens abide our state laws," – said the president. [10.04.98; Delovaya nedelya. Zhanna Bolatova, Eric Zhunusov. Materials and ideals]

The contradictions between Russian, and on a wider scale, Russian-language Kazakhstan citizens and the Kazakhs are revealed in concrete claims, which as distinct from traditional conflicts - "Russians-Jews", "Russians-Ukrainians", as a general rule, do not concentrate on the morals and manners level. Concrete claims are known to become in practice some kind of "state" claims. Thus, the Kazakhs will always refer to the Soviet period as the period of extinguishing the Kazakh culture, language, historical memory of the people, the policies of colonization of Kazakhs.

Do Kazakhs have grounds to take offence at the Russians? As much as one wants! The Russian language remains the state language, the Kazakh language, to use gentle terms, has practically stopped to develop. [19.06.98; XXI vek. Pyotr Svoik. Kazakhs and Russians: will they be part of the new community?]

Kasymkhan, yet unknown composer (translation from Kazakh): – The problem exists. We have been practically extinguished by the Soviet power during past 80 years. Not only the language has suffered. The people's entire culture has suffered, too. In fact, we are the Mankurts - people oblivious of their past. [24.09.98; Express К. Altair Tamayev]

There is an opinion that the Russian-language "arrivals" from Russia, Ukraine and other former USSR republics pose a threat to the ethnic independence of the Kazakh nation. Friendship of the "great" people and "minor" peoples is perceived as disastrous for the "minor" peoples, since the "great" people is habitually domineering over the "minor".

Friendship between various individuals is a positive fact. "Friendship" between one "great" and a number of "minor" peoples and nations is catastrophe. It refers above all to small peoples and nationalities. The Kazakh people had to "become friends" with the Russian people to such a degree, that in result of this "crude" cultivation, the whole generation of Kazakhs has been brought forth, ignorant not only of their own history, of their akyns and batyrs, but even not knowing at all or badly speaking their native Kazakh language.

This argumentation actually explains the current national power policy, aimed at formation of a multiethnic state.

The Russian-language citizens of Kazakhstan have not let pass unnoticed the contradiction between the declared and the actual policies of the authorities. The latter have officially declared the equality of rights of all peoples and nationalities, while in actual fact they pursued "the Kazakhs supremacy" policy.

President Nursultan Nazarbayev has officially declared: "The ideological consolidation of our society is the future of Kazakhstan". This is a right and correct slogan, though not meant to alleviate the life of the people. The great nomadic movement began: people were running away from Kazakhstan. They were running away from Taldy-Kurgan. The Russian speaking were running away - to Russia, Germany, Baltic states… They had become strangers in Kazakhstan. They worried about their children's fate. Taldy-Kurgan, together with other cities, had become dangerous to them. Day and night any drunken spindle-legs could come up and scare the wits out of them. [7.07.98; Pravda. Valery Ermolov, Oleg Kildiyarov. The great migration. The Russian-speaking flee Kazakhstan.]

A lot of Russians explain their departure not so much by the economy factors (the economic situation in Russia is no better than in Kazakhstan), but more by the absence of professional career opportunities, discrimination in recruitment requirements, based on nationality features (first of all, to the state structures), nepotism, restricted Russian-language broadcasting and telecasting, etc.

Originally, when the migration passions have just begun to stir the society, the Kazakh authorities explained the process in a simple way: people flee economic hardships. But this is an argument on the Evil side. The situation in Russia is equally difficult, all those Kazakhstan residents are aware of that, and still they are going - 80 percent of migrants from Kazakhstan are driven to Russia. All of them cite different arguments. Some are concerned over their children's future, others do not have any professional growth prospects, still others are troubled by the decrepit local democracy, kneaded on eastern mental endowment, while each of them is right in his/her own way <…>. So they are marching along the road. [October, 1998; 451 po Farengeitu. Vassily Buravkin. The smoke of Motherland has become very bitter]

The analysis of press publications demonstrates that claims expressed both by the Kazakh and the Russian-language population refer not to relations between various persons but to relations between persons and state, artificially giving rise in this way to a national conflict.

The most important demands of the Russian-language population (which have not lost their topicality even now) are formulated in the following way:

• attaching the Russian language, same as the Kazakh language, the statuses of state languages (for instance, executing clerical work in both languages);
• providing for education in republic of Kazakhstan in the Russian language at all levels - from secondary to higher education establishments;
• refusal from gradual liquidation of the Russian-language broadcasts by the electronic media; free access to the Russian press and mass media;
• equal economic opportunities and rights for all nationalities in republic of Kazakhstan;
• changing of personnel policy, in result of which the Russian-language population is being squeezed out of the power structures;
• introduction of a double citizenship institute;
• barring ultra-nationalistic organizations and elaboration of a well-thought-out national policy;
• autonomy and even full separation of northern regions of Kazakhstan, housing the bulk of the Russian-language population, and their annexation to Russia.

On the other hand, the Kazakh nationalistic organizations have painfully reacted to the well-known speech by Andrei Solzhenitsyn and have come out with slogans of the type "Kazakhstan to the Kazakhs". Fears of the Kazakhs and the state power, representing in fact their interests were also numerous:

• loss of ethnic independence;
• loss of political and economic stability, civil war on the basis of national conflicts with painful results for the Kazakh population;
• separation of the northern regions of Kazakhstan;
• interference of Russia into Kazakhstan's domestic affairs;
• and finally, loss of independence by Kazakhstan.

The Kazakh authorities state policy in the field of national relations in the republic is not yet clearly formulated, but such policy really exists in practice, it is rather logical and, according to some political journalists' estimates, pursues aims of building up a multiethnical state.

The role of intelligentsia in the national relations

The intelligentsia as the stabilizing and destabilizing factor of national relations - Russian-language intelligentsia in the role of step child to the state policy - "The inferiority complex" of the Kazakh intelligentsia

The official position in relation to the Kazakh intelligentsia is double-sided. The Russian-language intelligentsia is being practically unnoticed as it cannot serve as a tool to construct a multiethnical state. Besides, according to numerous estimations, the better part of it has already left Kazakhstan.

The Kazakh intelligentsia, on the one hand, is viewed as a stabilizing factor in national relations:

We should say directly to-date and do credit to the Kazakh ntelligentsia, it has never failed to reveal its reservation and wisdom for a number of years, not allowing its emotions to be splashed out as a call-up to arms. Hence the amazement of some downhearted experts, predicting a series of sanguinary conflicts on the territory of Kazakhstan, which is simply explained. They have not taken into account a specific circumstance - the historical and social responsibility of the Kazakh intelligentsia, which has passed the maturity examination, arranged by the will of fate at the end of the century. [18.03.98; Kazakhstanskaya pravda. Address by president Nursultan Nazarbayev. The moral and political choice of intelligentsia]

On the other hand, Nazarbayev's address, having provided a generally positive assessment of the intelligentsia, contained instances of open discontent. To his mind, intelligentsia was basically dangerous, playing the role of a potentially destabilizing factor, and having affected other CIS countries. Simultaneously with that, Nazarbayev had stressed unequivocally that the state was unable "to rule" the intelligentsia as before, due to purely economic reasons. The state had no money for that.

It was precisely the intelligentsia in a number of countries, balancing on the brink of all the above conflicts and actively involving ever new participants in the conflict that flared up, and aggressively inciting "their own kin" against "the strange kin". All that had ended in the "big blood". It was precisely the intellectual elites who were also to blame for the most of acute national fights, started by newspaper discussions and ending up with the "automatic gun" arguments. <...>

Time has come to mention yet another component of relations between the intelligentsia and society, taken at large. Regrettably, our intelligentsia has not escaped from those fatal peculiarities, which have more than once led the entire history of the both continents' vast part to a fatal catastrophe.

In their own time, quite a number of outstanding Russian thinkers wrote in the famous Vekhi magazine: the error committed by the intelligentsia was that it had substituted the political excitement for the political education of the ordinary people. Next paradox was that it had demonstrated its inclination to despotism and disrespect for a different person. In relations with power, it had demonstrated at times - either a condescending challenge or the not so hard to achieve readiness to agree. (Vekhi. Мoscow, 1991; from 1994).

Two more psychological peculiarities of the intelligentsia: hatred for any power and the revolutionary impatience. <...> As far as hatred for any power is concerned, in our current conditions, it is supplemented by hatred for the rules of the steppe, cultivated for a number of years. This was a conscientious ideological orientation to exterminate respect for the national power. [18.03.98; Kazakhstanskaya pravda. Speech by president Nursultan Nazarbayev. The moral and political choice of the intelligentsia]

Nazarbayev simultaneously called out to overcome the national intelligentsia and the national political elite inferiority complexes. The Russian-language Kazakh intelligentsia had not been taken into account at all.

Regrettably, the simple and devastatingly effective thought of the all-round venality and worthlessness of the Kazakh elite had been successfully instilled into the mass consciousness of the Kazakhs. This slogan was helpful in instilling national nihilism, while disrespect for great names of the past is strangely enough being felt even now. The frequently appearing misunderstanding of the complexity of the modern stage of the national history is an easily discerned heritage of the past, when everything what is done "at the top" is spontaneously anathematized. The Kazakh intelligentsia has as far failed to extinguish this stereotype from its consciousness. This idea, disgusting in its human essence, parasitizing on the all-nation difficulties, linked to a clear understanding that no political punishment would ensue, receives no moral rebuff from the Kazakh intelligentsia. [18.03.98; Kazakhstanskaya pravda. Speech by president Nursultan Nazarbayev; The moral and political choice of the intelligentsia]

Some publications contain allegations that all Russian intelligentsia has already left Kazakhstan, presenting a problem for the non-Kazakhs: nobody is capable of distinctly formulating the position of the Russian-language Kazakhstan citizens.

The law on languages in republic of Kazakhstan - The Kazakh language as the only state language - State policy of ousting the Russian language and the threat of destabilization of national relations

Judging by the number of publications, one can clearly see that the national conflicts are directly revealed in the problem of state language. Giving the Kazakh language the official status of the state language has not attached it the state status de facto. Most publications note that the Russian language is domineering in the mass media (though its presence has been steadily reduced), it is widely used in the spheres of public politics, art and science.  

The fate of the Kazakh language remains the most serious problem, seemingly to require more than one decade to be use on equal terms with the Russian language. [5.09.98; Kazakhstanskaya pravda; S. Mukhametshin. The vector of common sense]

Against the background of this gloomy past, [what is meant here is the policy of Russification of the Soviet period - A.B.] blasphemous are the occasional proclamations of oppression on the part of the so-called indigenous population, which itself is in need of help, and of the tragic fate of the Russian language, which has not yet attempted to yield its positions. [18.09.98: Kazakhstanskaya pravda; A. Akhmetov. The smoke of Motherland to become sweet and pleasant]

The chief area of using the Kazakh language is inside households. The spreading of the Kazakh language is hindered by practically totally absent special terminology, dictionaries and manuals. Clerical work is conducted in Russian, even the laws are initially written in Russian and afterwards translated (often with mistakes!) into the Kazakh language. Despite the adopted law on languages and the declaration of an openly discriminative policy in relation to the Russian language, it still remains in the background, due to absence of practical institutional mechanisms of executing and control.

What do you think happen, if this question is decided according to D. Mambetov, proposing to do away once and for all with the Russian language? The state will most definitely collapse, and you are most definitely aware of that. The industrial production will stop running, the cultural ties will break apart, etc. What will become of science, education, especially the higher one? There are no text-books in the Kazakh language, at least, on technical subjects. More than that, the Kazakh language has neither terms nor certain notions, to be frequently used by the modern science. I know by hearsay of some facts when diplomas at the Kazakh technical colleges were defended in the Kazakh language. The diploma was initially written in Russian, then with much pain and a lot of mistakes translated into the Kazakh language, while the defense proceedings could not but bring smiles to the faces of Kazakh teachers and afterwards smoothly went in the Russian language. [1.09.98; Kazakhstanskaya pravda. I. Vaganov. Angry letter]

There is another, purely psychological problem, when a certain part of the young knows the Kazakh language one-sidedly, that is knows the household, family language. They speak with their mother and father in Kazakh, while in the streets they are feel shy to speak their native language, when everybody at school and in the yard speaks only Russian. Such should be told: don't be afraid to speak Kazakh, don't feel ashamed of you native language. [13.08.98; Aktyubinsky vestnik; Satimzhan Sanbayev, writer and cinema actor, Murat Aueziv, etc.; A Kazak and a Kazakh should communicate in the Kazakh language. Address to all Russian-speaking Kazakhs]

Adoption of Law on languages in republic of Kazakhstan in fact presupposes turning the Kazakh language not just into a state language, that is the language of state institutions, government, parliament, courts, etc., but into the language of inter-nation communication:

July 1997 saw the adoption of Law on languages in republic of Kazakhstan. It read: "The duty of every citizen of republic of Kazakhstan is to master the state language, which is the major factor of consolidating the people of Kazakhstan. The state language is the major factor of reaching national accord, the greatest possession and an inalienable attribute of any nation". [8.08.98; Akmolinskaya pravda; Е. Daueshov. To master the language of the state one lives in is a civic duty. ]

If the state status de jure is easily to be attached to a language, it would be more difficult to make this language a means of inter-nation communication de facto. This requires a well-thought-out state policy and the existence of corresponding philological tradition, based on historical and purely economic factors. In other words, language knowledge should benefit everybody, irrespective of either laws or good intentions. Therefore, the world status of the English language has by no means been established by the British or American legislation. In a similar way, the great role of Latin in Middle Ages was not specified by its juridical status as a state language. Lack of understanding of the actual language practices leads not only to the language policy failure, but also to various kind curious incidents, presenting the power in the ignominious way:

“I was deeply moved by president Nazarbayev's statement on the importance of English language in our national system of education. He said in particular: 'The English language should become basic language in Kazakhstan, the language of education, culture and communication.' - On hearing that, I have begun to regard this country from the point of view of its unique vistas", – said General Director on Central Asia, Oxford University Press. [23.09.98; Vremya po Grinvichu; G. Abenova. Kazakhstan opens the Oxford University Press representative office]

For the Russian-language population, not speaking Kazakh for the most part, the official language policy is one of the most serious threats in view of existence of legislative limitations to nominations for high positions in the state apparatus. Besides, the current attempts to introduce higher education in the Kazakh language are bad for potential career prospects in Russia, hamper access to sources of information, hinder cooperation with colleagues from Russia and other CIS states. It goes without saying, that the lowered status of the Russian language can ultimately result in a threat of the Russians' self-identification in Kazakhstan.

...The number of Russian printed editions is slowly but surely going down. <...> Radio stations are left with mere 10 percent of the Russian-language broadcasts. [7.06.98; Kommersant; S. Smetanina. Nazarbayev was asked Russian question]

In result of daily talks with those who decided to leave Kazakhstan, I have come to believe: to ascribe everything [departure of the "non-indigenous population"] to the ailing economics of Kazakhstan, means to oversimplify the above question consciously or subconsciously. A lot of my interlocutors refer to the language problems, reduced radio and TV broadcasts in the Russian language, difficulties related to receiving education. That is why people try to leave for Russia, their historical Motherland. [12.03.98; Kovcheg; Yu. Kirinitsiyanov. People at both sides of the border should be calmed down]

The state language policy in the form it is being currently implemented, shows, on the one hand, a clearly manifested technical inability of the power to put their decisions into life, while on the other, places the Russian-language population into a deadlock situation and provokes a social blast with hardly predictable consequences. One of manifestations of the national conflict is emigration from Kazakhstan, predicted to acquire threatening dimensions.

Migration as consequence and potential source of national conflicts

Reasons of migration in the official interpretation – Independent valuation of the migration factors – Outside and inside migration – "Chinese threat" as a consequence of current national policies – Zhuz system and prospects of new ethnic "combing-outs'

The national question policy is definitely affecting the processes of the population migration. According to various estimations, up to 1.5 million of the Russian-language population have left Kazakhstan over the past five years. The Kazakh population is also leaving, though on a far smaller scale. Assessment of reasons of emigration is significantly different: the official sources claim that its has a purely economic nature, while the sociology polls by state agencies show that national problems are not domineering (rate 10th-20th as to their significance).

Another important argument used by the power and formerly used in Latvia and Estonia, is the natural drive of the Russian-language population to live in their historical Motherland. In stating that they seem to overview the fact that for most of emigrants from Kazakhstan their only historical Motherland is not Russia but the former USSR - an absolutely different country with a different political system and a different history.

– You seem to stress the poliethnicity of Kazakhstan as one of its major advantages, while the republic is being abandoned by the number of people, sufficiently exceeding the number of newcomers. Though the saying is: leave well enough alone…

– There are several reasons to that. Suffice to name the economic crisis, forced leaves, cutting down on a lot social programs, in other words, all the circumstances we have induced upon ourselves but are gradually trying to overcome. Besides, there exist purely human reasons: the wish to reunite with one's own family or just to live in one's historical Motherland. [10.09.98; Trud; O. Kvyatkovsky. Nursultan Nazarbayev: The situation is fully controlled. President of Kazakhstan answers questions of Trud correspondent.]

The independent experts assert that the chief reason of emigration is a political one, related to national policy of the state and "squeezing" the Russian-speaking population out of Kazakhstan.

The Alfii Apiev's weekly reporter (Zaman-Kazakstan, 17 July 1998) asks a question: "What served the reasons of emigration of other nations' representatives from Kazakhstan?"

Oleg Petrovich, aged 50, a Ukrainian, answers:

– Perhaps, they are scared by the policy of presenting advantages to the "indigenous" population. Who is now holding the reins? Who tries, being not satisfied with his present position, to "push" his relative or acquaintance to equally prestigious positions in life, while other nationalities representatives are barred from making a professional career? To make a career in the current context, one has to give bribes or to have "profitable connections". What will come out of that in the future? This is what concerns people most of all. [31.07.98; Karavan]

The official press presents quite a number of publications by authors with Russian names, flinging mud at the Russian-speaking emigrants, "trading their Motherland for the long ruble". The Russian mass media often publish letters from Russians living in Kazakhstan, resentful against "fairy-tales about the infringement of Russians' rights". All this kind publications are munching the only message: "Nobody waits for you there (in Russia)". The latter sounds quite reasonable, but cannot stop people from leaving away.

To be absolutely honest, one has to acknowledge that some of those who left speak about oppression of the Russians in Kazakhstan with the only aim of receiving the status of refugee or a forced immigrant, which in accordance with Russian laws provides for sufficient material, law or other kind privileges. As the poet once said, "we are not to see how the uttered word echoes back"... [17.04.98; Kazakhskaya pravda; O. Kovalenko. How the uttered word echoes back...]

One cannot help getting amazed at all those fairy-tales about Kazakhstan: they say, the language is discriminated, the Russians are "squeezed out", their children are barred from higher education. <…>

Apparently, a lot of Moscow journalists are too quick in making their conclusions, as the base themselves on separate facts and opinions of those Russians who have left Kazakhstan. <…> publications and TV stories, based on these allegations, are harmful in the first place to us, Russians, who continue to live and to work in Kazakhstan. We are the majority. [10.10.98; Izvestia; E. Kuznetsova. Nobody infringes the rights of Russians in Kazakhstan]

The second in importance rates emigration of Germans from Kazakhstan.

The important consequence of the currently pursued national policy is domestic migration. The press has noted a clear-cut tendency of the Kazakhs moving from the southern regions to Almaty, to central and northern areas, especially, to Astana neighborhood. In the future, this could lead to the disappearance of the densely populated Russian-language regions.

The Kazakhstan population, including the ultra-nationalists, widely discusses another important consequence of weakening of the Russian ethnos - the Chinese threat. Immigration of the Chinese to Kazakhstan is stimulated by real or seemingly real territorial concessions to China by Almaty, not only from the geopolitical but also from the ethnical points of view:

The Chinese are countless, compared to them even the Great Rus would seem an ethno-dispersed group on the planet. They can easily swallow both the Kazakhs and the Russians. Almaty and some nearby regions are even to-date being actively "settled down" by the Chinese, while our short-sighted sultans, not able to see beyond their office rooms, cannot wake up from the "power euphoria".

It is high time for the Russians to realize the danger of this overdosing of Kazakhstan with this long-failed idea of internationalism and to avert the ruin of their "big" neighbor nation and the "between Russia and China" buffer state. [October 1998; Kazakhskaya pravda, # 10 (36). The Kazakh ultra-nationalists of the first half 21^st century will remain oblivious of their kith and kin]

The reaction of Russia to the anti-Russian policy of Nazarbayev at the inter-state level is practically absent from publications. The press mentions only Kirienko's speech in relation to subjects, which due to apparent reasons has currently retreated from the front pages. Meanwhile, the recent awarding to Nazarbayev of the Order of Andrew the First Call is viewed by a number of analysts as a political step, undertaken by Nazarbayev's lobbyists in the Russian president administration.

Every policy has its own price. The political price of the orientation at construction of the monoethnical state is authoritarianism or dictatorship. In the democratic society, it is impossible to oust or to turn nearly half of the entire country's population into "citizens of substandard quality". Besides, we have no guarantees whatsoever that the "Moloch of national purity" would not demand new victims: zhuz system is a ready-made scheme for the new ethnic "combing-outs":

It only seems that the non-Kazakhs are being ousted for the sake of the Kazakhs. Look at the power composition: the "vacancies" are mainly taken by one zhuz representatives. Does all that mean that the incumbent power, having reached its goal and ousted the Russians and other non-Kazakhs, would not pursue the same, only far more energetic policy in relation to other zhuzes? Will not the ethnic victory of that kind be crowned with temptation to complete this process with the zhuz victory? There is an old anecdote: a wise Armenian is going to die and tells his children: take care of the Jews! To their surprised questions he answers: when they do away with the Jews, they will start chasing us. [08.10.98; Yarmarka; A. Kazhegeldin …To praise the steppe, not diminishing the mountains…]

 

Political and economic aspects of national problems

The danger of playing the "Russian-language card" by the Russian politicians – Personnel polls and "combing-outs" for the benefit of the "title nation" - Emigration of the Russian-language population as a factor of destabilizing the economy - Nationality competition instead of market relations

The national "slow" or "quick" going conflicts usually lead to formation of political forces, coming out in favor of rights of the Russian-language population, above all, of the Kazakhs. The latter is expressed in its extreme form in demands to segregate northern regions. On the other hand, political discrimination of the Russian-language population, its actual refusal to take part in the active political life and its partial self-withdrawal from the sphere of public policies, have led to increased feelings of tension revealed by the "domineering" Kazakh population. Besides, the formal raising of the status of Kazakhs as the "title nation" is not supported in practice by any intellectual and economic prerequisites.

The number of serious political consequences could also include the imminent danger of "playing the Russian-language card" by the Russian politicians. This political step and potential advantages have not yet been used by the opposition in practice, perhaps, due to Nazarbayev's shrewd policy.

…The ethno-demographic composition of Kazakhstan, existing in result of the migrants' policy of the tsarist Russia, and afterwards, the USSR, – is one more factor, potentially threatening the territorial integrity of Kazakhstan. The numerically domineering over the Kazakhs Russian population of the north Kazakhstan gives rise to the clearly-felt danger of a possible separatism. The more so, that there are certain political forces in Russia, constantly "munching" the theme of trampling down Russians in Kazakhstan and of the ostensibly made by the Bolsheviks territorial present to the Kazakh people. Russians in north Kazakhstan are being hammered the only thought: to get annexed to the Russian Federation together with their land territories. [11.09.98; Delovaya nedelya. Umirserik Toleshovich. National security of republic of Kazakhstan: "windows" of vulnerability]

Another ailing instance in the national relations is personnel policy. The registered tendency towards the increased percentage of presence of the "title nation" in the state structures has begun long before perestroika and the announcement of state independence. It has found its logical completion in the incumbent power current policy. The formal grounds is the Kazakh language examination, obligatory for all state officials.

There is information that the language policy concept, approved by president Nazarbayev, (it served the basis for the list of official positions to be taken only by persons, who have passed the Kazakh language examination) has evoked, to say the least, concern in people, who do not know the Kazakh language. In accordance with this conception, (all!) Kazakhs are obliged to pass their native language examination before 2001, the rest of the citizens - before 2006. This will clearly lead in practice to the soonest result, when all the leading positions in Kazakhstan will be taken exclusively by ethnical Kazakhs, independent of professional level. The latter will hardly be liked by nearly 70 percent of the population. [17.10.97; Vek. N. Krylov. The train from Almaty to democracy.]

The percent correlation of all representatives of the "indigenous" and other nationalities in the power structures at all levels speaks for itself. 85 percent of Kazakhs in the president's administration, 72 percent - in the government and republican branches, 77 percent - in the akimates (regional administrations). [15-21.10.98; Obshchaya gazeta; A. Chubar. President's blunder. Will Nazarbayev concede to the early re-election?]

The most important economic factor to influence the production efficiency in republic of Kazakhstan, is departure of the Russian-language population. The press, besides, has been lively discussing the situation with the Russian-language and the Kazakh population within business structure. The "oligarchs" of the Kazakh economy are chiefly represented by the "title" nationality representatives, while the Russian-speaking form the core of the middle class, supporting the "oligarchs" and presenting a significant threat to them. An attempt has been made to use the status of the "title nation" in order to squeeze the Russian-language population out of middle business. The "oligarchs" need the national bugaboo, as they are interested not in the primacy of the Kazakh national idea, but in the net profit and the possibility to oust their competitors, even the potential ones.

The administrative, cultural and the undertakers' elite is by 80-90 percent composed of the "indigenous" population. The middle class, in the classic understanding of this term, is composed, it seems, exclusively of the Russian-language population. <…>

We have, therefore, that the elite, taking the privileged positions in the Kazakh society, is supported by middle class, composed in its active part by nearly exclusively the Russian-language population. The latter situation could be hardly to their liking. [15.07.98; Dat. G. Kasymov. Collapse of the Kazakh society. Or are the Karavan, Pyotr Svoik & Co. to blame for the Kazakh "ego" not having been realized?!]

Judging by publications, the Russian-language and the city population are more adapted to the market relations. "Sad is the fact, notes the article by Akhmed Dyusenbayev, that only the Russian-language and the city population are more adapted to the market transformations than the "title" nation, especially in out-of-the-way places. This is the tremendous guilt of the Kazakh-language mass media." [The liberal democratic party as the way out of deadlock?"; 30.01.98; XXI vek]

National relations in historic perspective

The oppressors and the oppressed - The common tragedy or mutual offenses

The press has presented a number of mutually contradicting points of view on the history of relations between the Russian-speaking and the Kazakh ethnoses. Following one of them, the Russian empire and further the USSR have conducted a consecutive policy of russification. Therefore, the "declaration of independence of Kazakhstan in the form of self-determination of the Kazakh nation" is a natural and just reaction of the Kazakhs to the attempt to assimilate them. Following the above logic, the oppression of the Russian-language population and the policy of ousting it from the republic, which followed in the aftermath, are regarded as a natural historical process. The above position is to be specified by references to the cultural uniqueness of Kazakhs, founding confirmation in the corresponding myths about the steadfastness, born kindness, wisdom of the Kazakh nation, etc.

In the course of two centuries, under the pressure of the Empire, the Kazakh people have been devoid even of their own name - we all were purposefully called "the Kyrghyzes". Now, when the Kazakh statehood has at last been established, acknowledged around the world and has ultimately formed, some hysterical gentlemen will appear and begin to claim: "No way to Kazakhstan becoming an independent state!" [15.05.98; Karavan; K. Yskak. Last thorn in one's side.]

The opposing view is based on the assumption that the Russian-language population, taken at large, cannot bear any responsibility for the policy of russification waged in the USSR, the more so that a good deal of Kazakh political figures of the then time were active in that. Besides, history of Russians and Kazakhs is inseparable one from another, and any juxtaposition of both of peoples has no historic perspective whatsoever.

…Only a full ignoramus can separate the history of Kazakhs from the history of Russians and profit from trading one of its parts to the disadvantage of the another. Our history is tragic but grand, but what is most important, - it is common. Since ancient times, we've been masters and slaves of one and the same vast and not assimilated enough territory, that is uncontrolled and not satiated with material and spiritual culture, and, in simple words, with common people. They were not Russians, who have oppressed Kazakhs, and they were not Kazakhs, who as far as they remember themselves, fought for their national sovereignty with the Empire (though both of these phenomena have actually taken place). They were we all, taken together, suffering and squirming in pain, caused by lack of strength and culture, gripped for already a thousand years in a vice of totalitarianism. [19.06.98; XXI vek; P. Svoik. Kazakhs and Russians: are they to form a new union?]

 

National problem in relations of Russia and Kazakhstan

The "not-to-let-out" scenario of the Russian power as an official stance - Separate public statements by Russian politicians - Agents of Nazarbayev's influence in the RF presidential administration?

The conflict potential of facts of oppressing the Russian-language population has not received any serious continuation in relations between Russia and Kazakhstan. The official statements by the Russian authorities were scarce - the press was chiefly concentrated on Kirienko's statement and the statement by Vladimir Kartashkin, head of The human rights advocates commission of the RF president. The latter informed the public in Akmola on 23 March 1998, that The human rights advocates had received a lot of appeals from Latvia and Kazakhstan.

...A lot of appeals in relation to human rights violations have come to us from the Russian-speaking population of two countries – Latvia and Kazakhstan, – said head of the human rights advocates of the RF president Vladimir Kartashkin, at their regular session in Akmola on 23 March. - In relation to Kazakhstan, – as he further noted, – taking account of our both states friendly ties, we try not to attach publicity to these appeals and not to send them to various structures. <…> [27.03.98; Panorama; O. Khe, V. Kartashkin. The RF president's commission for human rights.]

The Kazakh press has steadily followed the official track, in accordance with which no national problems existed in Kazakhstan, while the Russian-language population had equal rights with the Kazakhs. Nevertheless, the national press published from time to time some viewpoints on national problems in Kazakhstan.

It is also possible, that the Russian authorities' "not-to-let-out" scenario was related to the activities of "the agents of Nazarbayev's influence" in the Russian state structures. Noteworthy in this respect is the Moskovskii komsomolets publication of 14 October 1998, devoted to pro-Nazarbayev's position of Ruslan Orekhov, head of The chief state and law office of the RF president, not to mention Boris Berezovsky's tangible influence on the RF president. The latter is known to have serious economic interests based in republic of Kazakhstan and close contacts with the incumbent president.

On the way to formation of poliethnic state

The "above-the-ethnos" idea - Dictatorship as a natural form of building a monoethnic state out of poliethnic - Democracy as technology of constructing and running a poliethnic state

The authors of quite a number of publications see the way out of the existing situation not in construction of the "self-determined Kazakh nation" state but in formation of a poliethnic state, with the "above-the-ethnos" idea in its foundation. To serve in the quality of the latter, the authors mention, for instance, the strategy of forming and promoting the national elite (independent of its nationality).

In the Kazakh poliethic society, the privilege for power and property on the part of the "indigenous" ethnos clans, as of any monopoly, leads to degeneration of the ethnic idea, first, into the zhuz idea, then, finally, into a clan-tribal or "profitable connections savagery". All this produces a boomerang effect, striking a blow at the Kazakhs themselves, the more so - at the village Kazakhs, who currently live in far worse conditions.

To provide for mass support and a steady development, our state needs the "above-the-ethnos", and at the same time, an understandable and close to all Kazakhstan citizens patriotic idea. Such could serve, in particular, the idea of promoting the professional elite, independent of origins. Professionals and specialists in all branches should get all favorable conditions for fruitful work! They and only they can provide for the technological and economic breakthroughs. [18.09.98; Karavan; N. Amrekulov, politologist. The technological upsurge or the banana-cocaine precipice?]

A lot of political writers have not failed to notice that multinational states political systems are being realized either in the form of dictatorship (authoritarianism) or in the form of consecutive democracy. The authoritarianism in conditions of a multinational state is to degenerate into primitive nationalism. The attempts to form a "national party" in Kazakhstan, undertaken on direct approval by the official power, are nothing else than certain steps at the implementation of the said policy. One of scenarios of Kazakhstan's democratic development, taking into account not only the interests of the Kazakhs, but also of the Russian-language population, is developed in Akezhan Kazhegeldin's article "… To praise the steppe, not diminishing the mountains…".

If our grandfathers had made a clever choice, our fathers strictly followed it. Shoulder to shoulder with the Russians and their other fellow compatriots, they were fighting at the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. Arm in arm, they were building Baikonur and developing virgin lands. We have survived together through the horrors of Stalin's repression, and Kazakhstan has become native country for a lot of exiles. We marched together to our freedom. Are we going now to divide this freedom between Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs? [08.10.98; Yarmarka; Akezhan Kazhegeldin. …To praise the steppe, not diminishing the mountains…]

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The present collection also includes analytic articles, written by specialists in national relations and publicists, closely following the development of national conflicts in the CIS countries. The article by A. Baranov, "International relations in Kazakhstan: factors of stability and destabilization risks", discusses the essence of the national policy conducted in Kazakhstan and substituting the idea of monoethnic state for the democratic principles of social development. The consecutive orientation at creation of "the Kazakh nation" state is destructive for traditional ties between various peoples of Kazakhstan, providing for stability of the Kazakh poliethnic society and leading to the ever growing conflict between power and community. In N. Popov's publication, "National problems and the public opinion", are presented results of the Kazakhstan polls (1997-98), related to national relations problems. V. Khlupin's article, "The Kazakh zhuzez: the "democratic" tribalism of 21^st century", raises the problems of clan system in the Kazakh community and the influence of the zhuz system on the modern political situation in Kazakhstan.

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The series also includes collections of articles: "Moving the Kazakhstan capital in the mirror of press and the analysts' commentaries", Moscow, 1998; "Freedom of speech and mass media in Kazakhstan, Moscow, 1998. The thematic collection "Political leaders of Kazakhstan on the eve of elections" is nearing publication.