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Kazakhstan's Army: Non Smooth Formation

Vitally Khluipin, Andrey Grozin

This review was prepared by two experts. Vitally Khluipin and Andrey Grozin who have been working in Kazakhstan for several уears and are now working in Moscow. The FCA chronicle is not in full agreement with the authors' views which are sometimes tendentious. The authors base their conclusions upon acts derived from Kazak and Russian periodicals (the FCA chronicle, has removed numerous references and a list of publication sources).

In one essay, Kazakhstan's Military Force's condition, is a difficult and wide task to explain. The following review is a discussion. To note, state and analytical structures in Kazakhstan have not yet attempted objectively and fully inform the public about realistic military problems. Due to such circumstances, the articles written by independent experts are of special interest.

Number, rank and mobilisatoin resources

It is not easy to review the number of Kazakhstan Military Forces (KMF) due to an abundance of expert estimations. In 1995 (having been the Kazakhstan Security Council secretary), Tulegel Zhukeev, stated that "the announcement of KMF numbers is a state secret".

When the Soviet Union collapsed, a large military group was housed in Kazakhstan, which had permanently reduced since the Middle Asian Military District (MAMD) reformation between 1998 and 1989. The total number of troops accounted for nearly 160,000 people. The primary military division was the 40th army, hose military groups fought i Afghanistan.

What was the 40th army group? A large army corps located at Semipalatinsk city (the 1st army corpse still existing), the corps accumulated the 68th infantry division with staff located at Sary-Ozek, the Red Banner four-regimented training division (later transformed to the 210th, joint training centre) and a few military divisions in Otar; the 78th tank division (Ayaguz), the 44th rocket team; the 645th artillery regiment and the 962nd reactive artillery regiment (all in Semipalatinsk). Also accumulated were three technical equipment storage's (one for each division, in case of mobilisation (one tank and two infantry) N5202, N5203, and N5204. Also the Air Military Force Corps, chemical forces and small divisions and the two battle ready military groups, namely the 35th ALF air landing team (Kapchagai) and ground support team of the Soviet divisions in Germany, which for unknown reasons moved to Kazakhstan after the Soviet Union collapse (now located near Almaty). In the spring of 1997, the 1st "model" infantry regiment, the republic's battle ready formation, was established at the home of this ground support team.

The military groups, obtained by the republic after the collapse of the Soviet Union, were located within the territories, close to China (historically, the Central Asian Military District (CAMD) was extended to enforce eastern borders of the Soviet Union towards China). China (a possible enemy) had just began considering the idea of "four modernisation's" and it's army was a weakly trained and a poorly equipped mass, aimed at holding partisan actions. The CAMD was regarded as a pherein, where non-prospective officers were sent and where military capabilities were not up to date.

Problems occurred after the Soviet union's collapse, a heavy burden for Kazakhstan: it was left a poor army. With admitted predomination of quality over quantity, Kazakhstan's Military Forces advantage in Central Asia could be brought to naught by neighbours, primarily Uzbekistan. At present, Tashkent has less military equipment than Kazakhstan, nevertheless it has a more organised army.

In 1994, the Kazakh President's Advisor, Tokhtar Aubakirov, asserted that "Kazakhstan's Military Force accounts for nearly 60,000 people" compared to past data this showed a reduction. Western experts stated that Kazakhstan Military Forces comprise of 76,000, including 40,000 army and 36,000 militarised group personnel. An English analyst and professor, Christoph Biyt, showed a different number, 42,000 persons. He took into account the realistic number of people "called up" for military service, this amount seems to be more exact.

Between 1993 and 1995, nearly 70% of officers resigned from Kazakhstan's Military Forces. "At present, we have a lack of officers not only in military groups, but in the Ministry for Defence," wrote the newspaper, Caravan in August 1995.

Kazakhstan's military leaders are trying by the use of different methods, to retain officers from administrative, to active personnel duties. However this has not succeeded: in 1994, the lack of offices reached 60% and the situation has not changed recently. Officers in reserves, admitted to change the staff, graduated from universities and sometimes decline from military service. Those who come to the army, by virtue of weak training, perform sergeant's duties: discipline, line order, accompaniment to banya or agricultural works.

A few official opinion polls show that the primary reasons which make officers leave Kazakhstan is the relatively low income (it is 5 to 6 times higher in Russia (depending on work experience and professional training).

Formation of the Kazakhstan Forces faces a tougher stance. Social and economic deterioration in the republic has adversely affected the labour forces quality. The military committees focused upon quantity indicators: the total appeal plan, is 90 to 100% fulfilled. Not surprisingly in 1995, President Nazarbaev issued a decree regarding amendments to the Overall Military Duty Law, which provides, personnel responsible for the control of "calling-up". The military committees need everyone, without any selection even those, who under the law have the right for adjournment. The Military Prosecution has considerable data on people, with tuberculosis, mental sicknesses, and who are the only family-feeders. A number of personal decisions are directed to military committees but Almaty's Military Court chairman, R. Toimatov says, "they are not responded to".

Despite "mass call-up" the situation remains the same. In 1991/1992, up to 40% of 120,000 people were relived form military service due to poor health. Another 2.5% did not attend the call-up departments despite a threat of sever punishment. At present, over 10,000 of 40,000 people are admitting inappropriate ability for military service. However, "each third person has to be in the army to fulfil the military plan".

Under the military's medical assistance and publics opinion pressure, in 1995 the Kazakhstan Army introduced a "body indicator" term, which determines the weight of a man, appropriate for military service. Simultaneously, nearly 70% of called-up personnel were decided inappropriate and sent for treatment.

In the spring of 1996 a sharp deficit in personnel, of military groups made the republic's military and political leaders increase the military service term from 1.5 to 2 years and non-ranking soldiers holidays were abolished. Powers honestly admitted, this was carried out "for economic reasons" with the purpose of economising funds. Primary military preparatory was taught in professional, technical, and secondary schools.

With a lack of soldiers and low to medium classed officers in Kazakhstan, the top brass increased. Our data showed that the number of generals is soon to exceed 25. By May 9th 1998 another seven officers will have been given the rank of general.

Kazakhstan has now a tremendous number of generals and their correlation towards other military men is highlighted and sometimes it is not understood what they control.

As is well know, any military conflict includes the states main resources and reserves are the primary bulk of officers. A small army, to be formed in Kazakhstan provides powerful mobilisation support. However, the republic has problems here, too. Despite the fact that in 1991, nearly 130,000 people (including over 120,000 officers) and in 1996, 785,500 people (61,000 officers) were recorded, the old Soviet current mobilisation plan providing a call-up of 78,000 people (including 9,000 officers) has not yet been revised. In 1991, the mobilisation reserve staff were trained, now the reserved officers are left without attention due to a breakdown in the military committees' operation.

The Organisation and Mobilisation Department under the Kazakhstan's Ministry of Defence made another attempt, they developed a project concerning an alternative service establishment. The project provided an increase of Military Forces' cleared for action and retention of numbers at there present level. The draft project "makes a strict provision concerning the fact, that the Ministry of Defence would like to have an army of 30-35,000 military men, who will study military elements, simultaneously help at crash and accident sites, collect harvests and perform other voluntary work. It is said that it is not a "civil alternative", but an "alternative" service and it is planned to direct people to work in military groups or in the Ministry of Defence. The republic's leaders are trying to create a free militarised labour army (70% of "alternative-men" income will be provided by the Ministry of Defence's administration), while the operable Kazakhstan Military Force will not be ready for battle.

The declared course (aiming at contracting people) has not been fulfilled, it is planned that by the year 2000 the army will be composed of voluntarily contracted men. Only some military men from the National Guards will be contracted by the state.

The army: battle worthy status

Since independence, Kazakhstan's Military Forces have only four times held war re-enactment training, namely a two-sided large-scale training which involved different military groups (on August 15th 1994). It was the largest military event held in the republic since independence and air tactical training of the 149th Guards, bombardier air regiment in September 1995.

At the end of November 1996, a second air tactical training session was held by the 149th air regiment (all numbers of military groups are similar to the "Soviet" numbering which is now present in Kazakhstan). The largest most recent air tactical training was held on May 4th 1998, when the republics air defence divisions, mobile and general designated forces participated. N. Nazarbaev attended all the aforementioned events together with the Defence Minister, commanders of military groups, other Kazakhstan political leaders and the military attaches of Russia, Germany, China, Turkey, and France.

Estimating the battle ability, level of Kazakhstan's Military Forces, their furnishing and battle preparatory, management and the like, it would be wise to focus upon the largest army training event held between 1991 and 1998, at the August 1994 training, on a Central Polygon of the Kazakhstan Ministry of Defence near Otar.

As a whole, nearly 2,500 people and over 600 military units were involved. The majority of military men and equipment from the 210 specific training centre located near Almaty in the Gvardeisk settlement, participated (nearly 5,1000 people, including 800 officers). The Centre has 219 tanks, 424 military armoured vehicles, a 224 field artillery armament, and 4 launching operative tactical rocket appliances. The Military Air Forces and Air Divisions located near Almaty also took an active part in the training.

During the training, tasks concerning concentration of necessary forces and means within the 2-5 km defence area in "battalion-regiment" connection, were considered (involvement of the field engineering division and a small chemical prospects).

Apart from defence ("red" covered Almaty from the "blue" impact), in the summer of 1994, Kazakhstan's Military Forces have trained organisations on inter-relations between groups and divisions with further counter-offensives in the "battalion-team" sector.

Attention towards the command-staffs, methods of holding military events (compared to the group training in operative and tactical sectors) relates to a tendency of military group reduction, military equipment and army funds within the post-Soviet states. On the other hand the world's leading countries believe that in the next 20-30 years, the primary military actions will not be global wars, but local ones i.e. frontier conflicts and other severe military resistance with the use of highly-exact armaments and mobile army structures. The difference is in scale only: China -"front-army", NATO-" team-division", Uzbekistan "-"battalion-team".

Three years have passed since Kazakhstan attained independence and held it's military training. Further events were a "military performance for the head of state" and they adversely affected the abilities of Kazakhstan's Military Forces. The training involved the same small divisions. The majority of Kazakhstan's Army.

Found out about the training from television reports. According to a source from the Kazakhstan Defence Ministry, the funds allocated for the Ministry are satisfactory for military salaries, feeding, soldiers equipment and military pensions only. There are no funds for military preparatory.

The positive factor of the 1994 training was the Kazakhstan Military Forces interrelation of groups and divisions, their ability to concentrate necessary forces and funds to making a limited counter-offensive, application of investigation aviation, use of anti-mechanised helicopters and military aviation.

Generally, the training showed a good ability to use different gun fire, like barrel and reactive artillery, mortars and air defence means, which prevented a counter-offensive of tanks and artillery regiments from the armoured vehicle infantry. Military equipment, available from Kazakhstan's land forces and battle aviation, like "land-air" rockets" and reactive unguided missiles, were used in several firing events. The results of the military event showed that "all the tasks settled for a two-sided command-staff training were successfully fulfilled".

During the last spring air defence training (1998), the focus was the actual use of various armaments, available from the Kazakhstan Air Defence forces (from Igla rocket evasive actions to C-300 zenithal-rocket complexes). For a person who hardly imagines the peculiarities of modern military actions, they even seemed to be exciting: everything was in smoke, everyone shot... However, the detailed training review showed that conditions in the Kazakhstan Army had deteriorated. The primary training area was a command spot, where the president came. Radio surveillance mobile stations and launching rocket appliances were collected on a small shout. The "hostile" plains, attacked by zenith machine-guns near the command spot, were flying in the air. The command spot and jibe Air Defence areas were entirely unmasked. The communications were not operable. During the training, different armaments which sometimes affected each other, were used. Taking into consideration that military attaches from the embassies situated in Almaty were present, one could only guess what reports on the Military Forces actions in a close-to-battle situation they have been made.

To note, during the Zten-razbat-97 training and modern tactical training of military groups held in May 1998, only defensive actions were completed: Air Defence Forces management in a massive air impact, Military Forces resistance to an offensive enemy and enemy liquidation, by Special Air Landing Forces. Sources from the Defence Ministries of Russia and Kazakhstan mentioned that while the training schedule had been developed, one primary element was considered: the attention of Uzbekistan political leaders to air landing, air navigation and other special divisional formation and strengthening.

Air training

Kazakhstan held one and a half hours of air defence training between 1995 and 1996. The purpose of which was to control military aviation readiness, fulfil military tasks, inter-relate and to manage aviation communications. The training has shown that specific "elite" divisions of the Air Defence Force, (ADF) have a relatively good "battle worthy" status, good military equipment and armaments, compared to other Kazakh air divisions. They are able to successfully execute their tasks in small groups, within 1-2 squadrons.

However, the most-equipped ADF divisions do not represent the, general position of Kazakhstan's military aviation due to a lack of fuel for flights, equipment and air armament expense, usage expenses and a lack of air and technical units,

Our thoughts regarding Kazakhstan's military aviation position, are based upon the official 1995 complex air training review. Thirty five planes and helicopters were involved, (all the 195th bombardier air regiment, located in, the Nikolaevka settlement near Almaty) with participation of helicopters from the 457th separated combined air regiment (Almaty, 7 planes and 6 helicopters) and the 218th separated combined squadron (Almaty, 12 helicopters). Military pilots showed to N. Nazarbaev, the acrobatics of planes, destruction of armoured equipment and air photo surveillance.

The air defence training was a mere "military show": planes and helicopters, hardly inter-related and the "enemy" allowed themselves to be shot as targets (no anti-tanking defences or "enemy" aviation" was in operation).

The next training held in November '96, at the grounds of the 149th air regiment, was conducted to past scripts: "The military readiness, skills of the division management and organisation of inter-relations between different divisional groups was checked".

Although the Kazakh Defence Ministry leaders have stated "our air force is now in the air, compared to 1991 and 1993". Such allegations are vague due to the sad state of air divisions, located far from Almaty (e.g. the 485th separated helicopter regiment in the Uch-Aral settlement and the 27th free air squadron in the city of Semipalatinsk). In mid 1994, based upon rumours from MAF divisions, the mass media informed, "the 457th separated combined air regiment has no fuel, helicopters are unable to be used and the reserved funds have enough kerosene to keep military duty in order". In recent years, due to the President's attention to the MAF, the situation has changed, although no radical reforms have occurred.

With only marginal payments the conduction of MAF, armament training became an overhead and therefore after 1996 no large-scale military training has been held by squadrons.

Special military force division

At the end of 1995, the Foreign Ties Department chairman, under the Defence Ministry, A. Isengulov, stated "the republic has no quick-reacting forces but it has other divisions, able to be mobile if necessary, e.g. the land-storming groups". The general major was seemingly aiming at the 35th separated air landing team (nearly 1,8000 people, including less than 200 officers and nearly 456 armoured vehicles),'"located in the city of Kapchagai and the Almaty land-storming team (contents and equipment as already described).

Over the past years, special designation divisions have received more merit and world admission as an effective army element, able to successfully execute limited tasks, on the local conflict scale. The same can be said of India, Pakistan, Iran (the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps), Iraq, Israel and Turkey. The quantity of personnel staff in one Chinese, air landing regiment ranges from 5 to 7,000 persons, without special divisions. These are included in the general military armies and special provision divisions. However, China has four specific air landing teams and it aims at enlarging its military force element.

Concerning Uzbekistan's special designation forces (the Special Designation Corps), the Tajik opposition assures that they are relatively large and have been effectively "moved over" into military positions (Uzbekistan's MAF has also had military training, long distance firing on Tajik Islam adherents from defence constructions in the Romitsk ravine, to the East of Dushanbe). When training was held, in Tajikistan, (April '95) the inner Kazakh military regiment in modzhakheds (together with frontier and landing regiments) conducted a "Black Friday" event, in the Pzhikhov ravine. The results of this occurrence were 17 deaths, 35 injuries (1 burnt and 1 shot), 5 destroyed lorries and huge armament losses.

Attempting to create "a small completely-furnished, professional mobile army, Kazakhstan's military and political leaders are aiming at the development of mobile communications.

Level of technical equipment

Kazakhstan's military leaders asserted that "morally obsolete equipment is a relative term", while the military technology and the equipment of Kazakhstan's Military Forces meet requirements at present. Western experts state 30% of Kazakhstan's armament is modern.

Only Air Defence Forces posses modern military equipment in Kazakhstan. Today's Kazakhstan has an obvious advantage over it's neighbours, in technical equipment and quantity, except for Russia and China (as for quality indicators, Kazakhstan's military planes are suppressed by China's mass).

At the end of 1993, the Military Balance had determined that Kazakhstan's MAF was equipped with 370 planes, 25 helicopters and 25,000 personnel. However, these numbers seem to be low. Over the same period, Russia's Institute for Strategic Researches (RISR), Kazakhstan's MAF and Air Defence Forces (ADF) had 714 various planes. Over the past three years, Kazakhstan's military aviation fleet has reduced due to technical equipment obsoleteness and crashes, etc. Between 1996 and 1997 the MAF and ADF possessed 628 planes (including 339 military, 108 fighters, 154 fighters, fighter bombers and 77 scouts). The ADF fighting aviation was represented by one division only - the 356th fighting bomber regiment (20 planes). The remaining air equipment belonged to the MAF (the 134th air division, 7 aviation and 2 helicopter regiment), The majority of air divisions, acquired by Kazakhstan were included in the 73rd air army of the USSR (it's main part was left in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan).

The moderness of Kazakhstan's air equipment is easy to explain: Astana is actively "choking" military equipment from Moscow in exchange for Russian debts. Russia owes Kazakhstan rental for the launching site Baikonur (Kazakhstan's leaders state that Russia owns nearly $480 million); for training grounds (over $100 million) and strategic bombers (40 Ty-95 MC) which were carried out from Kazakhstan after the soviet union collapse. The republic prefers to receive debt payments by modern equipment, primarily military planes: Cy-27 and MiG-29 (including training "sparks"). According to official Kazakh sources, by April 1998 "Russia will not yet have delivered twenty eight Cy-27 planes. Moscow was obliged to transfer seventy three air equipment units to Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan's military aviation fleet is represented by fighters Ту-16, Cy-24, and Cy-27, fighter-bombers MiG-29, MiG-27, MiG-23, MiG-21, scouts Cy-17, NiG-25 RB, military transportation planes An-24, An-26 and helicopters Mu-8, Mu-24, Mu-26 (Kazakhstan is the only post-Soviet Central Asian republic that has Mu-26's).

Military equipment for the landing forces, is of less quality than MAF equipment. In 1993, the Military Balance settled the following numbers regarding Kazakhstan's equipment: 1,200 tanks and 1,500 military armoured vehicles (MAV). To compare, Uzbekistan, say independent Russian experts, had 280 tanks, 780 MAV, 265 planes and 24 helicopters.

The latest specified data (1997) concerning Kazakhstan is as follows: launching appliances for operative-tactical rockets 37, tanks T-54, T-62, T-72 total 1,567, military armoured vehicles BMP-1, BMP-2, BTR-70, BTR-70, BTR-80 total 2,944, armament and mortars 1,853, (including self-propelled howitzers Akaztiya, rocket appliances Grad and since 1995, a few rocket appliances "Uragan"), anti-tank mechanisms 502, (including 211 anti-tank rockets), zenith-rocket complexes 99, (a few ZRC C-300 are available, quality and modification are not yet specified) and a 281 zenith armament.

Another 10 to 15 military planes and helicopters and armoured technology will show Kazakhstan's ADF means will be the average level of military equipment, compared to its near republic neighbours. However, deepening system crisis and mass migration have broken the countries defence potential. To note, the countries Military Training Complex wholly depends on orders and deliveries of store parts and replenishments from Russia and therefore, is in financial breakdown. The republic has no serious basis for equipment repair and improvement of military technology. No funds for the purchase of modern equipment, from abroad are available in Kazakhstan.

For the present Kazakhstan, (suffering from social and economic problems), the purchase of modern equipment is not possible: a wing rocket or modern fighter bomber costs up to $50 million. Clearly, it is not enough to have 2-3 system rockets or a dozen bombers within the ranges of "reasonable sufficiency".

During the mentioned air training, a few numbers regarding costs of the MAF equipment were declared: "One of the aviation "air-air" rockets costs $5,700, another one - $30,120, while the "air-land" rockets are priced at $14,815 and C-25 rockets cost $6,610". This equipment is not updated due to its expense.

Kazakhstan's military marine forces

On April 2nd '93, Nazarbaev signed a decree "On Establishment of Military Marine Forces in the Republic of Kazakhstan". When the Caspian Military Marine Flotilla was divided, the republic acquired 18 units of relatively large means. Kazakhstan's leaders were persistent in attaining their share of the USSR property and were not discouraged by the fact that there was no place to put ships: the Guriev (now Atyrau) port was not adapted for shallow water and the Shevchenko port (now Aktau) was badly equipped. In the 1993/94 and 1994/95 winters, ships were used externally for ice breaking and to support the living operations of the primary ship born system. The republic's leaders also, attempted to obtain marine means from foreign countries.

This came to fruition in 1993, the US vice president, Albert Gor, promised to "gratuitously transfer" six border boats to Kazakhstan (the first was presented in July 1994) and to assist in the construction of the Kazakh fleet. American and Kazakh Defence Ministry representatives drew a joint project for Kazakhstan's border service development.

Apparently, the republic tried to build its own military vessels. In May 1996, the joint-stock Scientific Research Institute "Gidropribor" made its first boat, in Uralsk,for the Kazakh Military Force. Before Uralsk's defence enterprise Zenith produced a fast patrol border boat. In May 1998, the first Kazakh military ship, a small mine sweeper "Berkut" was constructed in Uralsk's harbour. (It has taken a few years to be constructed due to the financial problems of Kazakhstan's Defence Ministry). The vessel is the only one in the country's military fleet, equipped with an artillery armament (small calibre).

In October 1997, an agreement for delivery of two mine-sweepers and 2 guard boats was signed with Russia (on the account of the Baikonur debt).

What was called a military ship in Kazakhstan could hardly be regarded as marine means to the world as it was impossible to make it mobile. On November 17th '97, Nazarbaev issued a decree: the republic's military marine fleet was reformed to a specific type of Military Forces and the remaining vessels together with their crews were transferred to frontier guards and called the "border guard".

This finished a formation of a traditional army tirade in Kazakhstan: Land Forces, MAP and MMF. A young republic has acquired forceful attributes, available in any state, which respects itself. Another issue is a coincidence of conditions reflected in orders and report with every day life problems of army infrastructure.

The republic's "military marine" ambitions have sometimes been driven into strange situations. On May 19th '98, six guard boats from the Kazakh Customs Committee, (purchased for $54,000 per-unit, from the Arab Emirates) during their first appearance on water went into "strong winds" and were ship-wrecked. One boat sunk instantly, the others rolled over and were thrown all over the Caspian. "The crews were not prepared and they were unable, not only to patrol the border waters but to manage the vessels," stated Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta.

Frontier forces

Kazakhstan's Frontier Forces were established on the grounds of frontier formations of the powerful East Frontier Spot (located in Almaty) and the Almaty High Frontier Command In-st 11 и t i о n и n d-e г d ест ее of President Nazarbaev as of August 18th, 1992 (within six months of independence).

Kazakhstan inherited good material and technical fundaments, the intellectual potential of chief officers, longstanding experience within the Soviet-Chinese border and an improved bordering system.

Kazakhstan frontier-men faced personnel problems as the Military Forces did. On June 17th, 1993, the Almaty High Frontier Command Institution, under Kazakhstan's Committee for National Security, was reformed into the Military Institute and two faculties were established there: the faculty of internal forces and the government connection, forces faculty. However, this innovation did not succeed due to the general weakness of the Institution's educational basis, lack of qualified teaching personnel and marginal financing funds. At the end of 1995, young officers were trained on an "intensified three-month course" for guarding Kazakhstan's Military Institute of Frontier Forces.

Kazakhstan's Frontier Forces were repeatedly reformed. Between 1991 and May 1995, they were included in the Kazakhstan's Committee for National Security, charged by a commander -deputy chairman for the Committee. Between May 1995 and March 1997, they became an independent body, named Kazakhstan's State Committee for State Border Defence. Since March 1997, the forces belonged to the Defence Ministry.

Concerning the structure, Kazakhstan's frontier forces are composed of division: 30, 35, 50, 96, 129, 132 and 134. The total quantity accounts for nearly 15,000 personnel.

President Nazarbaev's decision to relocate the Border Army to the Defence Ministry has caused negative attitude waves, from some frontier-guards. Many Kazakh army personnel resigned (generally medium command link officers). Two honoured veterans, living in Kazakhstan, from the frontier-guards the USSR general-reserves lieutenant hero, Merkulov and the chairman of the Frontier Veterans Union Group, reserves colonel Davydov, appealed to the President to abolish the decision. No reaction has followed.

Analysing the frontier groups condition (August 1997) their new commander, T. Buzubaev, called "personnel the most painful matter, there is an apparent lack of experienced and warranted officers". The commander stated "I am concerned and cannot be calm because I know groups are not even completing 70% of their five years, of service". To improve the present situation the following measures were suggested:

- Reduce training terms at the institution of frontier-guards;

- Recruit civilian institution graduates to frontier groups;

- Trust officers positions to warranted officers;

- Return personnel, who were fired from the frontier groups, to the border;

- Accept women into frontier groups.

With regards to the frontier groups achievements and military successes, Buzubaev with satisfaction approved "the boundary post designs".

As for the personnel problems, the commander attempted to solve them in August 1997 by the premature graduation of one hundred and forty two officers, from Almaty's Frontier Guard Institution. In July 1997, ninety seven warranted officers were successfully promoted to the rank of lieutenant. As a result of these actions, by the winter of 1997, the frontier personnel plan was almost completed, although the necessary numbers of commanders, primarily for divisions and departments, were still low. Buzubaev noted "a considerable part of the plan is still not completed". Meanwhile the central administration, for the frontier department, was reduced by 100 personnel units.

Regarding discipline and crime among frontier-guards, in 1997 they desired improvement. Compared to 1996, as the first seven months of 1997 unfolded, crimes increased by almost 150% (144 cases) and breaches of military discipline reached 870 cases. In 1996 "non-military" personnel losses of the frontier groups accounted for thirteen persons, within the seven months of 1997 there were twelve.

The frontier groups "awkward" situation is smothered by an agreement between Russia and Kazakhstan regarding "Joint Efforts for the CIS's External Border Defence", a joint effort for Kazakh/Chinese border defence. (The Uzbek leader, Islam Karimov, stated "the state is not independent and its borders are defended by alien soldiers").

Military theory and military science

Kazakhstan still has no military doctrine. Projects for this document were arranged by specialists and experts from scientific institutions, although no final version was furthered.

The text for the military doctrine (existing since 1993), consisted of a copy of the military doctrine adopted by the USSR President, M. Gorbachev. Kazakhstan reproduced the same "peace" document, which refuses common military terms like "theatre for military actions", "presence of a potential military threat, its source" and "potential enemy". Kazakhstan's doctrine could not stand up to its criticism and was amended four times, although no new inclusions were made. The doctrine, was brightly described by Kazakhstan's military theoretician, K. Serikbaev, "The republic's military doctrine is derived from the issue that war, as a means for political goal achievement became obsolete and is not applicable." (magazine Mysl, N4, 1994).

The only relative growth of Kazakhstan's military doctrine was suggested by the former secretary of Kazakhstan's Security Council, Baltash Tursumbaev (present ambassador to Turkey). "The document was aimed at local military conflicts, in Tajikistan and Afghanistan etc.. When a prospected, possible resistance with Uzbekistan was expected". The project has never been published and after Tursumbaev left it was consigned to oblivion.

Military force's material maintenance

The Army's deficient budget finances (official data shows 50% of real demand), the "privatisation" of the army's storage's and breaches of the funds distribution, are the primary reasons for the material maintenance sector crisis.

Soldiers, from many divisions, suffer from equipment and shoe problems. The Republican Guards, Special Designation Groups and some Defence Ministry departments, are the only well equipped.

The army's equipment volume accounts for only 15 to 20% of actual demand. A Ukrainian company won the spring '98 tender for, the emergency military services, shoe production. Kazakhstan's Home Front Service leaders informed "no Kazakh shoe factory could produce quality shoes for the army". Observers stated "the new uniform is only good for two to three months use, due to poor quality thread and materials.

Kazakhstan's Military Forces suffer from a lack of bedding, soap, medicine and medical appliances.

The army's food provision is better than production and delivery of textile goods, although problems occur here too, from insects. A daily meal for the Kazakh military groups reduced from 4,2000 calories per day in 1994, to 1,949 calories per day in 1995. The Defence Ministry's Medical Department has admitted that dystrophy is a wide-spread disorder within the army. At the end of 1995, the Defence Ministry's chief therapist informed "the standard soldier rations are 4,000 calories per day. Dystrophy begins when the intake lowers below 3,2000 calories per day. Even if the food services prepare food correctly, 800 calories are nevertheless lost by food substitutes, for example, egg powder for eggs and potato flour for potatoes."

Shortly after the appointment of the present Kazakh Defence Minister, Mukhtar Altynbaev, he publicly asserted "it is better to have no army at all, than one composed of mere goners". According to a source from Kazakhstan's Defence Ministry, soldiers' deaths from hunger were recorded in far "non-prospective" groups and divisions. "A soldier from, a usually non "demonstrative", division has not seen meat or butter and some-times even bread for months". Regarding the foods quality, hungry soldiers often refused to eat.

The army's moral and psychological climate

Since the first days of independence, Kazakhstan's army showed weak discipline and weak management skills. Between 1992 and 1993, the famous Baikonur events occurred, for which the power still remains silent. Concerning the second "Baikonur revolt" all data is still hidden. Some eye-witnesses said "the essence of the events is simple. Hungry soldiers from military divisions (Kazakhs in the majority), who were serving near Baikonur on different cosmic facilities revolted. They fought with officers and went on to the steppe with captured equipment".

From February 23rd to 25th 1992, experts recorded over 1,5000 "rebels". Kazakhstan's leaders informed of nearly "800 rebellion participants". Official data showed that "3 people died, 4 barracks and some official buildings were destroyed, 4 food warehouses were robbed and approximately 35,000 roubles were stolen". Independent experts believe that 4 people died, 25 were injured (9 officers, 3 warrant officers and 13 soldiers), 5 barracks and 2 living quarters were burnt. Fourteen warehouses of military property, 12 food warehouses and 53 group mess's were robbed also 17 vehicles were stolen.

The Commission for the Events Investigation was led by the first deputy defence minister, S. Altynbekov. The majority of participants and initiators of the announcements were native representatives. The primary rebellion reasons were settled as due to the hard service conditions. The Ministry's commission did not adopt preventative measures but hid the incident's repercussions (private divisions involved in the revolt, were prematurely sent home and no criminal cases against the arrested were executed).

Shortly after, between June 3rd and 4th 1993, a second "Baikonur rebellion" occurred. Nearly 1,000 people were involved and the number of victims was not specified but seemed to be less than in 1992. Some barracks, two staff buildings and a club with a library were burnt (destruction was flammable liquid, the fire-brigade was pelted with stones). Two warehouses and two shops were robbed. Rebels were dispersed by the arrival of special police, from gun firing squads.

This time the Commission, for the Events Investigation and Order, was led by Kazakhstan's chief military prosecutor, general-lieutenant Y. Khitrin, and the National Security Committee's major, (parliament deputy) E. Mustaphetov. The investigation discovered and executed criminal proceedings upon 150 "plotters and their adherents". Over 10 people were condemned to long prison sentences.

The battalion rebellions "frightened" power representatives and the extreme reduction of the military construction groups began (numbers dropped by five times in Baikonur).

The mass rebellions have come to an end, although desertion merged. Answering to a question on its reasons, the Supreme Court Military Colleague's chairman, justice general major Sagitzhan Dosym-uly Tasmagambetov stated "First the groups sometimes lack in food, clothes, heating and electrical energy and a hungry and undressed person is primarily concerned about, survival. Secondly, harassment. Third, clan dissension has recently appeared in the army. Habitual Kazakh feuds are based upon clan dislike. First, people are divided into North, South, East and West and then into three zhuz's. The majority dominates. Disobedient people are abused and then deprived of food. Adult people are guilty in everything. If they think that making steps to each other because of belonging to a clan is of merit, perhaps coming to army, their children would level a gun to a co-servant. What is the end of all this?" (Extract from an interview with the newspaper Egemen Kazakhstan, February 28th 1997).

Army national groups and inter-zhuz discrepancies were officially admitted in July 1993, during the Defence Ministry's special training for the organisation of functioning with military servants. The commander for the Guards Landing Brigade, colonel U. Elamanov, mentioned "soldiers began to categorise themselves not only by appeal terms but by the oblasts from where they had come, i.e. representatives of Main and Medium zhuzs. (Extract from the newspaper "Voin Kazakhstana", August 10th 1993).

In December 1993, during the Supreme Court's close session, disturbing numbers were declared: 30% of due to be called up, young people, had not in autumn, come to military committees and over 1,000 had deserted. By July 1994, the numbers of people leaving groups was under inquiry. The numbers equalled that of three regiments and another regiment could be moulded from deserters (the 3rd part was directed to a discipline battalion and nearly 40%, to former service places).

However, the situation has not yet improved. Over the first six months of 1997, the Internal Affairs Ministry has detained 490 soldier "escapees". Analysing the types of young people, due to be called up in .1996, the chief of the Replenishing Division, for the Organisation Mobilisation Department N. Lutyuk, stated "in 1996, over 3,000 young recruits declined from call-up" (150 private cases were subjected to criminal proceedings). The tendency of the young's appropriation decrease has continued and at the end of 1996 accounted for 66% compared to 72% in 1995.

Generally, the low-income and socially unfavourable, young men go into Kazakhstan's Army. Official data has shown that 42% are the 1997 spring appeal's men, who were convicted by the MIA institutions and 8% had frequented Drug Rehabilitation Centres. Wealthy parents purchased forged medical receipts for their children or sent them to study abroad (primarily, to Russia).

The military perish and trauma level is at the highest CIS level, after Tajikistan. Incomplete data monitored that between 1993 and 1995, 1,512 sick people were fired from the frontier groups. From 1992 to 1994, 360 military servants died (Defence Ministry's data not including frontier and internal groups). In 1993, 555 people with nervous system sickness were fired. Total numbers, of unfit for duty personnel, fired in 1993 reached 3,000.

This data coincided with small military conflict losses. Over 1998's first quarter, 17 Military Force soldiers died (Defence Ministry's information).

Arms, equipment and military replenishments are still being stolen. In April' 95, Valentin Mangaziev, of the Defence Ministry Personnel Department, was arrested and convicted of bribery. Since the end of 1995, large thefts have been investigated in the Almaty Demonstrative Shooting Regiment (8 million tenge covered damage). An inspection check of the Guards Shooting Division-On the Otar city) "found serious breaches of official position by general Aubakirov (general major Aubakirov not cosmonaut T. Aubakirov) and by other officials". According to the Military Prosecutor, Y. Khitrin "breaches were expressed as squandering of state funds and lubricant transfer to other people". Concerning the six highly-ranking officers (almost all personnel form the command division link), criminal cases were executed against them all.

Some "criminal-army" cases are tragicomedy. On September 17th 1996, colonel A. G. Bazarov was convicted for having been a regiment's commander. He "freed" from the army's service a fugitive deserter for a $200 bribe. Eight years of correctional works were imposed upon a warranted officer "Chakhlykh", who from May to October 1996 stole 737 blocks of appliances for "decoding of secret military information". 132 sheets, included in the stolen package, had "confidential" imprints and were secured. The warranted officer dissembled appliances for store parts, at home and sold them at the Almaty rummage sale, when he was finally detained.

Over the first half of 1997, 769 criminal cases were considered by the republic's military courts. In 1996, Military Prosecutor, Y. Khitrin, informed that "every tenth military servant was visually surveyed by military prosecution institutions and by the State Surveillance Committee investigation bodies. Every 9th crime was hidden by military group commanders and the growth of official breaches, bribery and violent crimes in the Defence Ministry and frontier-guards was mentioned and suicides on the grounds of non-regulations relations grew by 250%, while trauma cases grew by 10%."

Kazakhstan's army's biggest problem is criminal officers. In 1996, over 30 officers were convicted for abusing power often expressed by the abuse of soldiers. An example of which is the involvement of the deputy chairman, captain-lieutenant Meiramov, with the Military Marine Forces border basis's (Aktau city) educational and social/legal operation, in the abuse of soldiers (by truncheon). He confided 12 soldiers to hospital. "Unfortunately, we have a long record of these abuses," stated Y. Khitrin.

Between 1995 and 1996, 226 officers were convicted, including 20% for mercenary crimes.

Focus Central Asia, No. 12, June 30, 1998