The "Fundamentalist" Threat to
Uzbekistan: Crisis or Chimera?
Dr. Reuel Hanks
The recent "invasion" of Surkhandarya, Uzbekistan by "Islamists"
represents but the latest stage in an escalating cycle of violence directed against the
Karimov government. The actual military threat posed by such insurgencies is minimal, and
such actions actually serve to reinforce the perception among Western and Russian leaders
that Karimov represents a vital barricade against Islamic fundamentalism. Karimov’s
authoritarianism has not brought increased stability, but on the contrary has radicalized
the opposition and destabilized Uzbekistan and its neighbors.
BACKGROUND: Since independence in 1991, the regime of Islam Karimov has
maintained a steadfast campaign against political opponents, particularly those seeking
legitimacy or consensus via Islam. Even before complete Soviet collapse, the
organizational meeting of the Islamic Revival Party in early 1990 was broken up by
government forces, and throughout the last decade, the threat of an alleged
"Wahhabist" movement in the Fergana Valley has provided the rationale for a
consistent campaign of intimidation and arrest. Rather than secure religious freedom, a
new statute on religion passed in 1998 gave the government sweeping powers to crush any
"unsanctioned" religious activity.
The last eighteen months have witnessed an escalation of violence in Central Asia,
initiated by the Tashkent bombings of February 1999, and continuing with a series of gun
battles and small-scale invasions, the latter directed against Uzbekistan from surrounding
states. In August of 1999, two waves of Uzbek insurgents attempted to enter Uzbekistan via
the Batken region of Kyrgyzstan. The invaders were allegedly supporters of the outlawed
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, led by the dissidents Juma Namangani and Takhir Yuldash.
The effort quickly stalled, with the rebels eventually withdrawing and releasing several
hostages they had taken. Both the Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan governments alleged that these
"Islamic terrorists" had used Tajikistan as a staging point, and may have been
trained and equipped in Afghanistan.
On August 6 of this year, another force numbering between 50 and 100
fighters entered Surkhandarya in southern Uzbekistan. Once again the "Islamic
militants"appear to have come from Tajikistan, although Tajik officials denied that
any such force had crossed the Uzbek-Tajik border, or had entered Tajikistan from
Afghanistan. Reportedly armed with sophisticated equipment, the insurgents killed a dozen
Uzbek soldiers, and were in radio contact with bases in Afghanistan, according to the
Uzbek Foreign Minister, Abdulaziz Kamilov. Heavy fighting eventually dispersed the
guerillas, with some attempting to flee into neighboring Kyrgyzstan. The Uzbek media,
along with the Russian daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta, reported that the
"Islamists" are followers of Namangani and Yuldash. Both men, previously reviled
as "Wahhabis" in the Uzbek press, are believed to be hiding in northern
Tajikistan.
IMPLICATIONS: The recent fighting has little military or strategic importance,
at least in terms of unseating Karimov or spreading "Islamic fundamentalism."
Were the insurgents twenty times more numerous than reported, they would still be no match
for the Uzbek military, the region’s largest and best-equipped. The absence of
meaningful political reform, coupled with severe violations of civil and human rights by
the regime, has rendered lasting stability in Uzbekistan a distant, if not unattainable
goal. This, along with a worsening economic situation, may serve to swell the ranks of
those violently opposed to the Karimov regime, and lead to additional
"invasions." The major significance of the clash lies in its symbolic value for
both sides.
For the insurgents, such actions serve to remind potential supporters in Uzbekistan of
two essential aspects of their struggle. First, they have now proven that they possess the
ability to harass the Uzbek regime and force it to commit sizable military resources
against them, ultimately perhaps pushing Karimov to grant at least limited political
pluralism. In addition, the raid has shown that bombing of rebel bases in northern
Tajikistan by the Uzbek Air Force in August of 1999 had little effect on the group’s
ability to conduct cross-border operations. Secondly, and more importantly in a symbolic
sense, the rebels are attempting to cast themselves in the minds of disaffected Uzbeks as
the post-Soviet reincarnation of the Basmachi, anti-Bolshevik guerillas who carried
on a decades-long struggle against the superior force of the Soviet Army in Central Asia.
For the Uzbek government, this recent episode against the forces of
"fundamentalism" provides tangible evidence that U.S. and Russian faith in
Uzbekistan as a firebreak, prohibiting the northward movement of radical Islam, has not
been misplaced. Such faith was underscored by the promise of more than $32 million in U.S.
military aid last February. Russia has also promised military aid, including advanced
surface-to-air missile batteries—weaponry that would seem to have quite limited utility
against small units of guerilla fighters. Symbolically, the incursion strengthens
Karimov’s credentials in Moscow and Washington as an authoritarian leader who
nevertheless is preferable to the perceive alternative of a radical Islamic theocracy
striving to undermine the entire region’s stability and eventually inciting the unruly
Islamic residents of southern Russia and western China.
CONCLUSIONS: The Uzbek government’s failure to enact democratic and economic
reforms, as well as its continued authoritarian approach towards opponents, particularly
those organized around Islam, has radicalized the opposition. As those excluded from the
political process turn to increasingly desperate and violent actions in an effort to force
the government’s hand, they inadvertently provide the regime with the rationale for
further crackdowns and militarization of the region. The cycle of violence serves to
strengthen the self-portrait so carefully cultivated by Karimov since independence: that
of a post-modern Ataturk, committed to battling the atavistic forces of reactionary
mullahs, while striving to firmly tether Uzbekistan to the West.
Such an image has played well in Moscow and Washington over the last decade, but
ultimately may be self-defeating. Even if Karimov is able to retain power for years
without granting the opposition, including Islamic groups, a larger voice in the political
process, periodic violence and instability will continue to plague the region. This in
turn will damage Uzbekistan’s position of regional leadership and severely curtail badly
needed foreign investment and tourism, and require ever-larger military budgets.
Ultimately, a critical mass may be reached that engenders the trans-regional instability
the West and Russia both seek to avoid.
AUTHOR BIO: Dr. Reuel Hanks is Assistant Professor in the Department of
Geography at Oklahoma State University, and Editor of the Journal of Central Asian
Studies. His interests in Central Asia include national identity, the influence of
Islam in politics and society, and economic development.
Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, August 30, 2000
http://www.cacianalyst.org/Headline3.htm |