Until the 1970s, 'Islamic societies' were considered
homogeneous, facsimiles of each other, founded on immutable religious precepts. This
mystique simultaneously situated 'the Islamic world' in the realm of fancy and justified
colonialist politics. Yet in recent decades, that approach has been disputed. New
scholarship underlines that far from adhering to ordained laws, Muslims must meet earthly
realities; far from replicating an ideal, societies with a predominant Muslim population
comprise diversity and dissension.
Categorical identifications like 'Muslims' and 'Islamic countries'
prevail in academic and non-academic parlance. When scholars dismiss misconceptions of a
uniform 'Islamic land', emphasis falls strongly on the diversity of Islamic expressions.
Overlooked are many of us who do not identify ourselves as Muslims either we consider
ourselves many things including Muslim, or harbour alternative religious convictions, or
simply do not adhere to any creed. Casting our societies 'Islamic' automatically
designates Islam as norm, all others as deviation. We are made strangers in our own home.
But not only in academic pages do we appear as the strangers. In real
life, presumed Islamic ubiquity suffocates us. Our life has been a tireless effort to
escape the shadow of Islam, to redefine social parameters, and hence to create a rightly
deserved space: open societies wherein all are legitimized. From our standpoint as
marginalized 'others', Islamic culture and politics appear dissimilar from both
orientalist and diversity approaches.
Where monolithic walls of orientalism have been smashed, a wider net of
multifarious Islams entraps us 'others'. Being some kind of Muslim becomes our
quintessential determinant. We are presented as family as if we welcomed this as
adherents of, not subjects to, Islam. Islam is thus judged the culture, Islamic politics
the politics. In most contemporary scholarship, 'defending Islamic culture' is posed as
the prime element of nationalist agendas. What of those who do not defend Islamic culture
yet still take part in resurgence? Doubtless, strands of the nationalist movements
prioritize defending Islam; yet one can hardly equate nationalism with Islamic zeal.
Consider how the 1979 Iranian revolution is deemed an Islamic revolution, notwithstanding
insurgents' staunch opposition to the Islamic Republic, and the brutal persecutions that
have bloodied culture and politics under the IRI. Islam's 'others' are seen but ignored,
heard but unacknowledged. Our omission results through formulating from the outset a
paradigm obfuscating difference.
We could more easily accept omission were it limited to
socio-historical descriptions. Yet our alleged piety comprises normative discourses and
political imperatives: all we do ought to be in an Islamic context. We hear that 'any
instance of diversity opens a broader range of avenues for the Middle East in search of
its cultural identity within Islam'.1 What does this statement mean? Is this a
truism viz. 'if we stay on the road of Islam, we'll end up in many Islamic places'? A
political agenda 'Muslim Middle East, search for diversity in Islam to maintain our
Islamic cultural identity'? Or an inevitability 'there is no alternative to Islam in
the Middle East'? But, what happens to non-Muslims in a 'Middle East in search of its
cultural identity within Islam'?
Old politics revisited
We enter the inescapable maze of 'many Islams'. Intellectual life in
this labyrinth has been stifling as we must search for a(nother) new and improved Islam.
At every turn, we confront one more prosaic assortment of 'regressive' and 'progressive',
'fake' and 'authentic' Islams. We invest valuable energy engaging with hackneyed claims
that 'this version differs fundamentally from others'; 'this rendition works unprecedented
wonders'. Consider enthusiasm over 'Islamic feminist' threadbare clichés. Triteness
dressed barely less offensively than the original. We are encouraged to rest content
because Qur'anic verses that 'suggest a more egalitarian treatment of women are
highlighted' in the 'Islamic feminist' revision.2 But what does it mean to
treat women in a 'more egalitarian' manner? Why should women's rights be based on edicts
granting but some degree of equality? On what is this august order based? Verses
'call[ing] for restrictions on women's actions are reinterpreted. Often a word has
multiple meanings and a less restrictive synonym can be adopted'.3
Old politics revisited: impose a biased rendering of edicts, take a
deep breath, and hope for the best.
I do not deny the possibility of change in Islam, nor that followers
could revise Islam to accommodate the modern world. Yet I object to the rest of us we
'others' being roped within the 'new improved' paradigm as our only alternative. Assumed
Muslims, we are compelled to seek alternatives only from this collection. We are urged to
posit human rights and liberties nowadays especially gender politics in the
particularistic fashion of cultural relativism. 'Westerners might object to our solutions,
but these are compatible with our way of life'. Presumably part of a happy family, we are
silenced lest we offend a relative. We are told that every (re)rendering, every apologia
for Islamic dicta, signals intellectual virility or, in fashionable postmodernese,
posits 'choices before an active agency'. Yet genuine surges toward new intellectual life
are considered suspect, susceptible to manipulation.
Propositions that, in a non-Islamic context, outrage audiences, are
taken uncritically when authored by 'insiders'. The argument that hijab liberates by
allocating women a safe zone might raise concerns which yet are rarely verbalized lest the
inquirer be stamped 'Eurocentric'. No such reaction would be elicited were the statement
transposed into a non-Islamic situation: 'Modest dress protects women against rape'. Our
benevolent colleagues should recognize that Islam's 'others' have tried for a long time,
notwithstanding difficulties, to rend the veils of roundabout apologies. We appreciate
their regarding non-Westerners as civilized, capable of ameliorating their societal ills.
But their silence deprives us 'others' from genuine concerns, sincere support, and
thoughtful exchange. Worse yet, this silence betrays a(nother), albeit more sophisticated,
form of racism by intimating that though they would not tolerate such an argument about
themselves, it might explain our situation. We do not expect them to fight our battles
(nor do we appreciate their deciding our battles), yet we welcome democratic dialogues. In
the context of equal exchange, non-native critiques do not sound condescending. Indeed,
many 'others' share more in common with our geographical strangers than with fellow
denizens of our land.4
Twin clubs
Political and cultural hurdles are compounded when Islam is designated
the official creed. State and religion become twin clubs, at each other's convenient
disposal whenever either is challenged. This partnership claims its toll on our efforts.
Frequently, some feel obliged to 'watch what we say' to avoid identification with
'deviant' foreign theories. Such self-censorship distorts ideas, overlooks dangers, and
avoids pivotal though perilous challenges that some resistance might survive. The problem
is obviously not association with non-native ideas; rather, that anything can easily be
branded 'foreign'. Could one create a 'safe space' for defiance, without penalty of
treason? I believe not. When competing voices within the Islamic discourse are easily
condemned, what safety has a non-Islamic, let alone an anti-Islamic, voice? Were we to
stand as far from 'foreigners' as might be imagined, safety would remain illusory.
Accusation of treason is often wielded as a weapon against Islam's 'others'. With no sin
to avoid, we may only dodge the attack. But when we express this inherent jeopardy, we are
blamed for repeating orientalist propaganda, if not for colluding with the enemy.
When we refuse to think within Islam's limits, we are rebuffed: 'ours
is an Islamic society within which we must seek cultural identity'. When critiquing Islam,
we are answered that 'religion is not really "that important" in light of
"other factors" economic, historical, political, or cultural'. Postmodernists
advise that we attend not to Islam, but to its interpretations. But do Islam and its
construal belong to mutually exclusive planes? We thus run smack into a contradiction.
Were Islam so strong as to define societies, it could not be haphazardly jettisoned due to
interpretive diversity. Conversely, a fluid, shapeless Islam would serve a very limited
analytical purpose.
We are reminded that some Muslims toil for reforms; that religion alone
is not responsible for our social ills; that injustice is not exclusive to Islam. We
object not to Islamic reforms, but to their inadequacies. Many of us have opposed all
oppressions; not solely those rooted in Islam. Indeed, we were guilty of not according
Islam the infamous 'cultural factor' its due strength. Islam has been a major
contender in the process of social change. Where it has not directly opposed our efforts,
it circumscribes the scope of our endeavour to its own benefit. This force must be
combated to achieve justice, democracy, and freedom.
Towards the future
No moratorium on Islam need be called, no quarantining of Islamic
ideologies need be legislated. Yet Islam must be construed in real life, not just in
apologies as merely one factor to contend with. Democratic orders should accommodate
believers, but prefixed by Islam, no democracy proves genuine. We must dispense with
illusions of 'overall egalitarianism', 'greater liberality', and sanctions 'nonetheless
feminist'. Islam is repeatedly presented as the inescapable solution to our problems.
Various reformulations amount to little more than repackagings of old wine in new
linguistic bottles. Little has been offered to even promise a democratic, free future.
Accomplishing the goals of social justice, democracy, freedom, and gender equality
requires that we transcend the boundaries of Islam, especially political Islam's borders.
We must walk uncharted paths, rather than familiar alleys ensuring loss.
Hammed Shahidian is associate professor of Sociology at the
University of Illinois at Springfield and holds a joint appointment at the Institute for
Public Affairs at that university.
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