International Eurasian Institute for Economic and Political Research

 

Islam's 'Others' : Living Out (side) Islam
Hammed Shahidian

Until the 1970s, 'Islamic societies' were considered homogeneous, facsimiles of each other, founded on immutable religious precepts. This mystique simultaneously situated 'the Islamic world' in the realm of fancy and justified colonialist politics. Yet in recent decades, that approach has been disputed. New scholarship underlines that far from adhering to ordained laws, Muslims must meet earthly realities; far from replicating an ideal, societies with a predominant Muslim population comprise diversity and dissension.

Categorical identifications like 'Muslims' and 'Islamic countries' prevail in academic and non-academic parlance. When scholars dismiss misconceptions of a uniform 'Islamic land', emphasis falls strongly on the diversity of Islamic expressions. Overlooked are many of us who do not identify ourselves as Muslims ­ either we consider ourselves many things including Muslim, or harbour alternative religious convictions, or simply do not adhere to any creed. Casting our societies 'Islamic' automatically designates Islam as norm, all others as deviation. We are made strangers in our own home.

But not only in academic pages do we appear as the strangers. In real life, presumed Islamic ubiquity suffocates us. Our life has been a tireless effort to escape the shadow of Islam, to redefine social parameters, and hence to create a rightly deserved space: open societies wherein all are legitimized. From our standpoint as marginalized 'others', Islamic culture and politics appear dissimilar from both orientalist and diversity approaches.

Where monolithic walls of orientalism have been smashed, a wider net of multifarious Islams entraps us 'others'. Being some kind of Muslim becomes our quintessential determinant. We are presented as family ­ as if we welcomed this ­ as adherents of, not subjects to, Islam. Islam is thus judged the culture, Islamic politics the politics. In most contemporary scholarship, 'defending Islamic culture' is posed as the prime element of nationalist agendas. What of those who do not defend Islamic culture yet still take part in resurgence? Doubtless, strands of the nationalist movements prioritize defending Islam; yet one can hardly equate nationalism with Islamic zeal. Consider how the 1979 Iranian revolution is deemed an Islamic revolution, notwithstanding insurgents' staunch opposition to the Islamic Republic, and the brutal persecutions that have bloodied culture and politics under the IRI. Islam's 'others' are seen but ignored, heard but unacknowledged. Our omission results through formulating from the outset a paradigm obfuscating difference.

We could more easily accept omission were it limited to socio-historical descriptions. Yet our alleged piety comprises normative discourses and political imperatives: all we do ought to be in an Islamic context. We hear that 'any instance of diversity opens a broader range of avenues for the Middle East in search of its cultural identity within Islam'.1 What does this statement mean? Is this a truism ­ viz. 'if we stay on the road of Islam, we'll end up in many Islamic places'? A political agenda ­ 'Muslim Middle East, search for diversity in Islam to maintain our Islamic cultural identity'? Or an inevitability ­ 'there is no alternative to Islam in the Middle East'? But, what happens to non-Muslims in a 'Middle East in search of its cultural identity within Islam'?

 

Old politics revisited

We enter the inescapable maze of 'many Islams'. Intellectual life in this labyrinth has been stifling as we must search for a(nother) new and improved Islam. At every turn, we confront one more prosaic assortment of 'regressive' and 'progressive', 'fake' and 'authentic' Islams. We invest valuable energy engaging with hackneyed claims that 'this version differs fundamentally from others'; 'this rendition works unprecedented wonders'. Consider enthusiasm over 'Islamic feminist' threadbare clichés. Triteness dressed barely less offensively than the original. We are encouraged to rest content because Qur'anic verses that 'suggest a more egalitarian treatment of women are highlighted' in the 'Islamic feminist' revision.2 But what does it mean to treat women in a 'more egalitarian' manner? Why should women's rights be based on edicts granting but some degree of equality? On what is this august order based? Verses 'call[ing] for restrictions on women's actions are reinterpreted. Often a word has multiple meanings and a less restrictive synonym can be adopted'.3

Old politics revisited: impose a biased rendering of edicts, take a deep breath, and hope for the best.

I do not deny the possibility of change in Islam, nor that followers could revise Islam to accommodate the modern world. Yet I object to the rest of us ­ we 'others' ­being roped within the 'new improved' paradigm as our only alternative. Assumed Muslims, we are compelled to seek alternatives only from this collection. We are urged to posit human rights and liberties ­ nowadays especially gender politics ­ in the particularistic fashion of cultural relativism. 'Westerners might object to our solutions, but these are compatible with our way of life'. Presumably part of a happy family, we are silenced lest we offend a relative. We are told that every (re)rendering, every apologia for Islamic dicta, signals intellectual virility ­ or, in fashionable postmodernese, posits 'choices before an active agency'. Yet genuine surges toward new intellectual life are considered suspect, susceptible to manipulation.

Propositions that, in a non-Islamic context, outrage audiences, are taken uncritically when authored by 'insiders'. The argument that hijab liberates by allocating women a safe zone might raise concerns which yet are rarely verbalized lest the inquirer be stamped 'Eurocentric'. No such reaction would be elicited were the statement transposed into a non-Islamic situation: 'Modest dress protects women against rape'. Our benevolent colleagues should recognize that Islam's 'others' have tried for a long time, notwithstanding difficulties, to rend the veils of roundabout apologies. We appreciate their regarding non-Westerners as civilized, capable of ameliorating their societal ills. But their silence deprives us 'others' from genuine concerns, sincere support, and thoughtful exchange. Worse yet, this silence betrays a(nother), albeit more sophisticated, form of racism by intimating that though they would not tolerate such an argument about themselves, it might explain our situation. We do not expect them to fight our battles (nor do we appreciate their deciding our battles), yet we welcome democratic dialogues. In the context of equal exchange, non-native critiques do not sound condescending. Indeed, many 'others' share more in common with our geographical strangers than with fellow denizens of our land.4

Twin clubs

Political and cultural hurdles are compounded when Islam is designated the official creed. State and religion become twin clubs, at each other's convenient disposal whenever either is challenged. This partnership claims its toll on our efforts. Frequently, some feel obliged to 'watch what we say' to avoid identification with 'deviant' foreign theories. Such self-censorship distorts ideas, overlooks dangers, and avoids pivotal though perilous challenges that some resistance might survive. The problem is obviously not association with non-native ideas; rather, that anything can easily be branded 'foreign'. Could one create a 'safe space' for defiance, without penalty of treason? I believe not. When competing voices within the Islamic discourse are easily condemned, what safety has a non-Islamic, let alone an anti-Islamic, voice? Were we to stand as far from 'foreigners' as might be imagined, safety would remain illusory. Accusation of treason is often wielded as a weapon against Islam's 'others'. With no sin to avoid, we may only dodge the attack. But when we express this inherent jeopardy, we are blamed for repeating orientalist propaganda, if not for colluding with the enemy.

When we refuse to think within Islam's limits, we are rebuffed: 'ours is an Islamic society within which we must seek cultural identity'. When critiquing Islam, we are answered that 'religion is not really "that important" in light of "other factors" ­ economic, historical, political, or cultural'. Postmodernists advise that we attend not to Islam, but to its interpretations. But do Islam and its construal belong to mutually exclusive planes? We thus run smack into a contradiction. Were Islam so strong as to define societies, it could not be haphazardly jettisoned due to interpretive diversity. Conversely, a fluid, shapeless Islam would serve a very limited analytical purpose.

We are reminded that some Muslims toil for reforms; that religion alone is not responsible for our social ills; that injustice is not exclusive to Islam. We object not to Islamic reforms, but to their inadequacies. Many of us have opposed all oppressions; not solely those rooted in Islam. Indeed, we were guilty of not according Islam ­ the infamous 'cultural factor' ­ its due strength. Islam has been a major contender in the process of social change. Where it has not directly opposed our efforts, it circumscribes the scope of our endeavour to its own benefit. This force must be combated to achieve justice, democracy, and freedom.

Towards the future

No moratorium on Islam need be called, no quarantining of Islamic ideologies need be legislated. Yet Islam must be construed ­ in real life, not just in apologies ­ as merely one factor to contend with. Democratic orders should accommodate believers, but prefixed by Islam, no democracy proves genuine. We must dispense with illusions of 'overall egalitarianism', 'greater liberality', and sanctions 'nonetheless feminist'. Islam is repeatedly presented as the inescapable solution to our problems. Various reformulations amount to little more than repackagings of old wine in new linguistic bottles. Little has been offered to even promise a democratic, free future. Accomplishing the goals of social justice, democracy, freedom, and gender equality requires that we transcend the boundaries of Islam, especially political Islam's borders. We must walk uncharted paths, rather than familiar alleys ensuring loss.

Hammed Shahidian is associate professor of Sociology at the University of Illinois at Springfield and holds a joint appointment at the Institute for Public Affairs at that university.

E-mail: mailto:shahidian.hammed@uis.edushahidian.hammed@uis.edu

Notes

1. Charrad, M. M. (1998). Cultural Diversity within Islam: Veils and Laws in Tunisia. In H. L. B. a. N. Tohidi (eds.), Women in Muslim Societies:
Diversity within Unity. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 77 (emphasis added).

2. Afary, Janet (1997). 'The War against Feminism in the Name of the Almighty: Making Sense of Gender and Muslim Fundamentalism'.
New Left Review (224), p. 105 (emphasis added).

3. Afary, (1997), p. 105.

4. I discuss this issue in more detail in: Shahidian, Hammed (1999). 'Saving the Savior'. Sociological Inquiry 69(2), pp. 303-27.

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