Ultimately, the Central Election Commission announced that over 22,000 international and domestic observers had been accredited to monitor the elections. The EOM encountered party and candidate observers in approximately 90% of the polling stations visited and “non-partisan” observers in 76% of those polling stations.

The accreditation of over 2,500 non-partisan domestic observers by District Election Commissions throughout Kazakhstan represented a significant development in citizen ownership of the electoral process. However, international observers tended to have more liberal access to the proceedings than their Kazakhstani counterparts.

The first round of voting took place in roughly 9,600 polling stations from 07:00 to 20:00. One hundred and eighteen international observers, including 18 parliamentarians from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, reported findings from their visits to 574 polling stations at which approximately one million voters, or about 13% of the total of 8,411,757 were registered to vote. Polling stations were observed in 12 of the 14 oblasts of the Republic as well as in Almaty and Astana. No precincts were observed in West Kazakhstan or Mangistau Oblasts.

In general, the election day on 10 October took place in a calm and peaceful manner. Only in 3% of the polling stations visited by international observers were tensions, minor disturbances, or undue pressure on voters reported.

The general performance of election officials was considered good in 70% of the sites visited by international observers. However, election officials were rated significantly lower in a number of specific areas. In over half of the sites visited, mobile ballot boxes, a focus of concern for opposition parties prior to the election, could not be observed during periods when they were not in use. Nonetheless, except in occasional instances where the number of voters making use of the mobile ballot box were disproportionately high, procedures were generally found to be in compliance with more restrictive regulations introduced for these elections.

Observers noted a significant level of confusion among voters about the new election system and how to mark the ballots. Observers repeatedly saw voters asking the precinct election commission members for advice on filling out the ballots.

Accountability for ballot usage partially depends on polling station officials signing each ballot at the time issued to each voter. In 51% of the polling sites visited, ballots were pre-signed or not signed at all, thus diminishing the effectiveness of this safeguard. Inconsistencies also were noted in adherence to rules for processing of voters, especially related to the use of the additional list for voters not found on the voter register. Only on rare occasions were voters required to present their Certificate of Right to Vote in order to be added to the list. The average number of voters added to the additional lists of polling stations observed was about 3% of the total number of voters for the precinct. However, observers encountered polling stations where the number of added voters neared 13%.

Official protocols summarizing precinct (polling station) results were not always the ones reported to higher level commissions. Frequently, results were not entered on official protocol forms, or when protocols were prepared, these protocols were drafts and were completed in pencil. In a majority of precincts observed, commission members carried the results either to a separate room where the protocols were typed, or to the Akimat (local or regional administration) where someone else completed or otherwise “adjusted” the forms in the absence of observers. Often, Akims were reported to have instructed election commission members that certain candidates were expected to win. The EOM has copies of flagrantly falsified protocols.

In particular, one known case occurred in plain view of international observers in Almaty where forged protocols were uncovered reflecting different results for the same polling station. Since this extraordinary event took place in one of Kazakhstan’s largest constituencies, the case raises serious questions about the magnitude of the problem and the reliability of results recorded for this constituency. This incident was brought to the attention of authorities at the highest level. However, no action was taken, and no sanctions were imposed.

When protocols were delivered to District Election Commissions, the forms were further altered. In general, observers were denied the opportunity to witness the tabulation process at the district commission level. For one district, the EOM has evidence of candidates with the first and third (instead of the second) highest vote-counts having been qualified for the second round. In another case, the District Election Commission Chairman resigned and filed a complaint rather than follow the Akim’s instructions to falsify the results.

The Central Election Commission’s regulations designed to promote the accurate reporting of results were not followed uniformly at the precinct and district commission levels. In 50 percent of precincts observed, requirements calling for multiple copies of each precinct protocol to be prepared immediately upon completion of the counting of votes, and the display of one copy of these protocols at the precinct – both instrumental to reduce opportunities for falsification – were not followed.

In determining that a full observation mission should be deployed for the elections, a key factor was the Central Election Commission’s adoption of a series of important regulations and procedural guidelines that:

• emphasized the role of both international and domestic observers and advanced their rights; and
• set in place procedures designed to promote the accurate reporting of results.

On both counts, the system failed.

In spite of assurances that all protocols would be available for public scrutiny, neither the Central Election Commission nor the District Commissions could provide precinct details to substantiate the final results when they were announced. Requests from the EOM for copies of worksheets showing cumulative precinct results were denied as well.

While the Election Law provides a 60-day period within which to organize the second round elections, the Central Election Commission ordered the second round to be held on 24 October, before the great majority of more than 400 complaints filed with the courts and the Commission could be resolved.

The rush to the second round was troubling because a determination that any election was invalidated would automatically disqualify the candidates involved from participating in the run-off election. The urgency with which the Commission pushed for the second round elections could ultimately mean that a winning deputy already seated in the Majilis could be disqualified if a court challenge caused an election to be declared invalid after the second round had taken place.

During the week preceding the second round on 24 October, the Central Election Commission announced improved and more transparent procedures for the second round vote count and tabulation of results. The Central Election Commission also initiated additional training seminars for the District Election Commissions. New measures designed to reduce opportunities for the falsification of results were laudable. However, significant doubts remained regarding the outcome of the first round, both for the ten Deputies elected in the party list race, and the 20 Deputies elected from the single-mandate constituencies. Moreover, those who qualified for the second round contest in the remaining 47 constituencies and who competed on 24 October did so in an atmosphere of public distrust and skepticism.

The EOM covered the 24 October Election Day with a total of 18 observer teams in 14 different electoral districts. These areas were selected according to a priority list developed by the EOM.

A total of 134 polling stations was visited on election day, and 19 additional polling stations were observed during the counting process. Voting took place in 47 of the 67 districts in an estimated 6,500 polling stations. Thus, the sample represents only about 2% of all polling stations. Due to the quantitative limitations of this sample, any percentages given in this analysis should be read as trends or patterns rather than hard evidence.

The “transparency checklist” issued by the Central Election Commission for the second round of the elections and the training workshops organized for the election commissions had a positive impact on the conduct of the second round polling on 24 October in some districts and precincts. In others, the violations encountered during the first round were repeated.

• In 43% of the polling stations, observers found that one person signed the voters list for several individuals, twice as often compared to the first round.
• In almost a third of the polling stations (31%), proxy voting was allowed.
• In 44% of the polling stations, the ballots were not properly signed. In only half of the polling stations visited, the handling of the ballots was rated acceptable.
• In 16% of the locations, people other than polling station commission members were in some way involved in the processing of voters.

Among significant violations, in Atyrau, one of the few districts where an opposition candidate qualified for the second round, the District Election Commission Chairman initially denied international observers access to the tabulation process and refused to follow the Central Election Commission’s “transparency” instructions. Later after violence broke out in one precinct, the same observers were informed that their security could not be guaranteed and were forced to leave the District Election Commission session before the tabulation of the results.

In one district of Almaty, District Election Commission members were in a meeting with the Akim shortly before the tabulation of results started. Individuals with no apparent official function in the electoral process, often identified as representatives of the Akimats, were again present during polling, vote count, and tabulation of results, frequently giving instructions.