4. PRE-ELECTORAL PHASE

4.1 Political Party and Candidate Registration

An amendment to the Election Law that reduced the registration fee for candidates by 75% was seen as a positive change. The fee that had been equal to 100 times the minimum monthly salary was simply out of reach for many citizens and had been criticized.

Candidates to the Single-Mandate Election Districts

The total number of candidates for the Majilis represents a strong plurality of voter choices on most ballots. The average number of candidates was eight, with a range from two through 16. Not surprisingly, totals closer to the former occurred in the rural areas whereas those in urban areas, particularly Almaty, were closer to the latter. A large number of the “self-nominated” candidates were either claimed by or loyal to political parties had links with the executive branches of local Governments.

Candidates to the Party List Ballot

The process for the registration of political parties had been eased considerably compared to prior parliamentary elections. In order to register for the party-list ballot and thereby become a “party of republican status”, a party had to establish a minimum number of members and regional branches in at least nine of the 16 administrative districts in Kazakhstan (14 oblasts plus Astana and Almaty).

On Election Day, nine party lists were registered with 64 candidates.

4.2 The Political Parties

Most political parties are fairly recent creations that do not have significant organizational structures or the membership in both rural and urban constituencies to provide support for their local candidates. They are largely outgrowths of public associations, trade unions or other social movements.

The third main grouping is the “hard” opposition parties that seek to replace the current presidential system of power. This grouping includes the Communist Party and the Republican People’s Party (RNPK). Although running separately on the ballot, these two parties joined forces with three smaller organizations -- Orley, the Officers’ Union, and the Association of Russian and Slavic Organizations -- to form the “Republican Bloc”. In practice, this bloc served as a campaign strategy coordination body for its members.

Table of the Political Parties with Republican Standing

** Many of the parties claim a higher number of party single-mandate candidates than are actually nominated by the party. This is a common phenomenon that indicates that a number of apparently “independent” or self-nominated candidates are in fact supported by parties.

The Case of the RNPK

The leader of the RNPK, former Prime Minister Mr. Akezhan Kazhegeldin (During the January 1999 presidential election, Mr. Kazhegeldin, a challenger to the incumbent President, was disqualified as a candidate on the basis of a conviction for an “administrative penalty”.), was disqualified from the party list for the Majilis elections. This was due to a deficient appeal for a contempt of court conviction based on an earlier “administrative penalty”, which was later dropped from the list of penalties barring the registration of candidates. One day after the disqualification, Mr. Kazhegeldin was detained in Moscow, based on an unrelated arrest warrant issued by Kazakhstani authorities. Notwithstanding Mr. Kazhegeldin’s subsequent release, these developments had an unfortunate chilling affect on the election campaign. Following the developments, the RNPK withdrew from the party list election, citing a prior decision taken by the party congress not to run if Mr. Kazhegeldin was not registered. The party also alleged that 13 firms, some of which are under State control, had refused to print its campaign material. The party remained involved in supporting its candidates for the single mandate elections.

Under the Election Law, if a candidate has been convicted by a court for an “administrative penalty” within the year prior to applying for registration, his or her candidacy must be rejected. “Administrative penalties” include a number of violations that have specific relevance in the election environment. Examples include violations of laws on mass media, violations of rules for organizing and conducting public meetings, marches and demonstrations, participation in an unsanctioned meeting, and petty hooliganism (misbehavior). The OSCE/ODIHR has recommended the removal of some of these vaguely defined provisions from the list of “administrative penalties” disqualifying candidates. The only legislative action taken by the government of Kazakhstan was to eliminate participation in an unregistered organization as grounds for disqualification. According to the Ministry of Justice, lawmakers agreed that this particular provision was in conflict with the constitutional right of freedom of association. Approximately 40 other offenses remain as grounds on which a candidate can be rejected.

4.3 The Pre-Election Campaigns

One of the major debates surrounding the campaign was the use by several parties, most distinctly the Civil Party, of “charity” as a means of obtaining support. Panorama newspaper (“The Civil Party Has Rendered Support to One of the Frontier Outposts”, Panorama, 24 September 1999.), and subsequently the commercial television channel KTK reported that the Civil Party was distributing gifts, including major electrical appliances, televisions, and VCRs to servicemen at a border patrol post. Despite substantial and public evidence of this case, the CEC chose only to warn the Civil party perhaps due to an ambiguous provision in Article 16.4 of the Law on Political Parties that permits them to “spend their funds on charity.” No further action was taken.

A second major debate was the potential for electoral falsification. The main opposition parties separately provided the EOM with a list of prominent opposition candidates whom they suspected would be subject to fraud (The leadership of the Communist Party is notable for its pre-election comments of being “99% sure” of electoral fraud in selected races where opposition parties were challenging the pro-presidential parties. Nevertheless, they freely admitted that they saw it as necessary to participate in the election so as to ensure, as much as possible, the propagation of their party’s message and the presence in the Majilis of advocates for their position) . Of that list, with an overlapping core of five/six candidates from different parties, none were elected, and one candidate, leading after the first round, was reportedly leading in the run-off when the CEC declared this district results invalid. The EOM received reports concerning possible falsification of results in each of the constituencies in question and indications from government sources prior to the election that one of the most prominent candidates in Almaty City “would not be allowed to win”. A number of court cases regarding the outcome of the elections are believed to be still outstanding.

Most importantly, these tactics arise from a fundamental lack of trust by complainants in due process of law in Kazakhstan, specifically in the independence of the justice system from the will of the government or local authorities. This pattern of lack of faith was most pronounced in the “hard” opposition, but was also a strong theme in discussions with nearly every party except OTAN and, in relation to some specific items, Azamat.

4.4 Interference by Executive Authorities

During the pre-electoral period, voters, political parties, and candidates raised a number of serious concerns about illegal interference that undermined the fairness of the election environment. The EOM received documented reports from several regions regarding: (1) illegal interference by local authorities in the election process with the intent to influence the outcome; and (2) the abuse of power to obstruct the independent media and the campaigns of opposition parties and candidates. These reports include a significant number of complaints that voters were threatened with job loss for their support of opposition candidates. Reports were also received regarding: (1) campaigning by local government officials for “favored” candidates; (2) co-mingling of official election activities with distribution of campaign materials for the OTAN party; and (3) intimidation against opposition parties, candidates, their supporters, and the media by tax inspectors and officers of the Committee for National Security (KNB).

4.5 The Media Environment

At the beginning of 1999, Kazakhstan had approximately 50 electronic and over 300 print media companies operating. (Monitoring the Media Coverage of Kazakhstan Presidential Elections, Preliminary Report, European Institute for the Media, 11 January 1999) Television is the most widely accessed media outlet for average citizens. In the ten largest cities, 93% of Kazakhstani citizens have at least one television. (BRIF/Gallup Media Asia Survey (BRIF/GMA).)

Several stations have the capacity to reach major portions of the country, including Kazakhstan-1, Khabar, KTK, NTK and ORT, the predominant Russian Federation television station that is taped and rebroadcast in Kazakhstan. Khabar, a state-controlled station with private shareholders owning 49% of its stock, was the most important player in the broadcast of campaign materials. The station’s president is Dariga Nazarbaeva, the daughter of the country’s President.

The Laws and Their Impact

The mass media commonly engages in “self-censorship” as a result of fears that they may “cross a line” that is often blurred and subject to “selective enforcement.” With regard to media in the regions, the EOM received reports that authorities often made “recommendations” on which candidates and parties were to be covered. Also, the media were severely impeded by implicit threats regarding suspension, legal actions encumbering media enterprises with legal fees and substantial fines, tax audits, and loss of employment. Printing houses, many of which are State controlled, often refused to print campaign materials for certain candidates or parties. This was ostensibly done in order to avoid falling out of favor with authorities that maintain leverage over their existence.

Administrative Obstacles

Such complaints were more often exposed through the media as public events than through institutional channels like the Sub-Commission on Media Complaints established by the Central Election Commission

Media Coverage of the Election Campaign

See Annex 1 for a full analysis of media coverage of the election.

4.6 The Senate Elections

Long-term observers of the EOM were present during the 17 September 1999 Senate elections in several regions including Almaty City, Almaty Oblast, East Kazakhstan Oblast and Astana. Although observer reports were generally positive, circumstances witnessed during the Senate elections in Almaty City foreshadowed problems on issues of transparency, particularly during the vote count, and electoral appeals that would resurface in the Majilis elections. (See Annex 2 for an analysis of the candidates and results of the Senate elections.)

Key Issues Exposed by the Senate Elections The Central Election Commission’s position that the Chairman of the Almaty City Commission had flagrantly violated the election law, its procedural regulations and, in fact, a direct order from the Secretary of the CEC, bore no consequences. The immunity of election officials, even in the face of hard evidence of illicit behavior in the discharge of their duties, characterized the response of the CEC and the courts throughout the election cycle.

A serious question also arises as to timing of the Senate elections relative to the conduct of the Maslikhat elections. The Senate members elected on 17 September were chosen by the outgoing deputies of the Maslikhats whose own elections were due to follow less than one month later. Critics suggest that having the Senate members elected by the outgoing Maslikhats was another mechanism to preserve the existing power structure. The terms of the newly elected Senators will exceed those of the members of the new Maslikhats elected on 10 October 1999.