"Geopolitical
Setting"
Russia rethinks its Central Asia strategy
Under President Vladimir Putin, Russia’s foreign policy establishment
is rethinking the concept of empire. In the case of Moscow’s approach towards Central
Asia, ideas about territorial domination no longer play a significant role in the
formulation of strategy, according to a source with access to Russia’s policy-making
mechanisms. While the aim in Central Asia remains the maintenance of stability, foreign
policy shapers are accepting of the notion that Russian national interests are best served
by the exploitation of economic levers of influence.
For the new Kremlin strategy to be effective, the source says, Moscow
needs to address a number of related security and social issues. Accordingly, Russian
leaders are determined to combat the spread of Islamic radicalism into Central Asia, and
are acting to prevent the penetration of Western business interests.
At the same time, the Kremlin is seeking to persuade ethnic Russians
living in Central Asia to remain in the region, rather than emigrate. Ethnic Russians in
Central Asia are now viewed by the Russian foreign policy establishment as a key asset in
the attempt to tie Central Asian economies to Russia’s. Since the Soviet collapse the
number of ethnic Russians living in Central Asia has fallen from about 9.5 million, or
19.3 percent of the region’s overall population, in 1989 to approximately 6.9 million,
or 12.4 percent, today.
There are many strategic interests that compel Russia to seek to retain
a sphere of exclusive influence in Central Asia. Perhaps most importantly, the region is
seen by Moscow as a bulwark against undesirable radical Islamic influences emanating from
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Thus, Moscow is willing to commit a considerable portion of its
resources to securing the southern border. The Kremlin also views Central Asia as an
important market for its industrial output and a reliable source for raw materials,
especially cotton and minerals. In addition, Central Asia is seen as a springboard for
trade with Iran and China. Another factor in Russia’s thinking is that Kazakhstan’s
Baikonur cosmodrome is responsible for launching upwards of 70 percent of all Russian
space missions, and serves a potent symbol for the country’s past technical and
scientific achievements.
Despite an intense desire to secure Central Asia’s southern flank,
Russian policy makers recognize the enormity of the task may be beyond their means. Cost
estimates for securing the border with Afghanistan and Iran range around $1 billion.
Alternately, Moscow has attempted to establish closer military cooperation with Central
Asian states, with mixed results. The withdrawal of Russian border guards from Uzbekistan
and Turkmenistan has greatly hampered the effectiveness of this policy. As a result,
Russian officials are now studying the feasibility of establishing a secure border regime
along the Russian-Kazakhstan frontier, an idea that had previously been shunned by Russian
policy makers.
To prevent any further erosion of Russia’s military capacity in
Central Asia, Russia is willing to exert considerable pressure on Central Asian nations
not to interact with Western security organizations, in particular NATO. Russia
additionally views it as a matter of vital national security that Central Asian states
remain within CIS common military operational and technical standards: planning, codes,
service regulations, military equipment and arms.
Russian-Central Asian trade turnover was estimated at USD $7 billion in
2000, comprising only about 5 percent of Russia’s overall trade. However, Russia depends
on reliable grain imports from Kazakhstan, and uncombed cotton fiber mainly from
Uzbekistan. Moscow also views Central Asia as the principle source of strategic raw
materials, including such ores as lead, zinc, copper, cadmium, bismuth and boron.
To expand its economic position in Central Asia, policy makers are now
actively promoting the Eurasian Economic Community, as well as Russian participation in
the privatization of strategic sectors of the regional economy, including hydro-electric
power stations in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Russia will also aggressively seek to secure
a dominant role in the development and export of Central Asian oil and gas resources. [For
additional information see EurasiaNet’s archives]. A key element in Russia’s energy
strategy is securing a satisfactory agreement on the division of the Caspian Sea [For
additional information see the Eurasia Insight archives].
In pursuing its strategic aims, Russia is willing to offer virtually
unconditional support to incumbent Central Asian leaders. The Russian foreign policy
establishment considers the existing regimes to offer the greatest chance for the
maintenance of stability. There is also a greater willingness on the part of Russia to
implement policy on a bilateral basis, and not through multilateral organizations such as
the CIS.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian policy towards Central
Asia has moved through three distinct phases. The first, which lasted from 1991-95, saw
Russia disengage from Central Asia, as Moscow grappled with domestic upheaval. From
1996-2000, Russia sought to restore its once uncontested military-political position in
Central Asia, but various instruments designed to promote reintegration, such as the
Collective Security Treaty, proved ineffective. Since Putin’s ascendancy in 2000, Moscow
has pursued economic avenues of influence, which had until that point played a secondary
role in the thinking of policy planners.
Throughout all three phases, the biggest obstacle to the achievement of
Russia’s strategic goals has been perhaps Russia itself. Member of the policy-making
apparatus admit privately that the competing agendas of Russia’s various power centers
--including the Kremlin, the ministries of foreign affairs and defense, the Parliament and
business leaders – were responsible for the inconsistent implementation of policy.
However, under Putin’s leadership, Russia’s policy elites appear to
be more flexible in their strategic thinking and more willing to embrace trade as a tool
to promote the country’s goals. As for Central Asian leaders, they are finding that,
despite an ingrained suspicion of Russian motives, Moscow may be their only viable partner
in the quest for regional stability. Thus, policy makers in Moscow feel they have every
ability and opportunity to overcome past inconsistencies and implement effective policies
in Central Asia that protect Russia’s national interests.
Eurasianet, 20 March 2001
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav032001.shtml
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