Islamic Studies
Bin Laden's Army
Osama bin Laden has established an international Islamic army in Afghanistan.
Arkady DUBNOV
In the wake of the massive terrorist attack on the United States, the
chief suspect, Osama bin Laden, and the radical Muslim Taleban movement that harbours him
in Afghanistan, may be in line to experience the full might of America's retaliation.
Bin Laden appeared on the scene in Afghanistan in the 1980s, when the
CIA needed him and his extensive connections in the Arab world to co-ordinate military aid
to the Afghan Mujahedeen in their fight against Soviet intervention.
On returning to his native Saudi Arabia, bin Laden, who comes from one
of the many offshoots of the Saudi royal family, reincarnated himself as a hard line
dissident, lambasting the Riyadh authorities for their ties to the United States.
He insisted the presence of US military bases in Saudi Arabia was
against the interests of the Muslim peoples. The Saudi authorities eventually exiled bin
Laden, after which he moved to Sudan, where government is in the hands of Muslim
fundamentalists.
When the United States went after him in September 1998, following the
bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, for which he was held responsible, bin
Laden fled back to Afghanistan.
By then, the Taleban movement had captured the capital, Kabul, and
secured most of the country. Bin Laden's stay in Afghanistan became possible after the
Taleban leaders and Riyadh struck a deal. The latter recognised the former in exchange for
a guarantee that bin Laden cease his public criticism of the Saudi royal family.
In summer 1997, Saudi Arabia, along with Pakistan and the United Arab
Emirates, recognized the Taleban as Afghanistan's legitimate government. Bin Laden kept
his side of the bargain. The Saudi authorities have not heard a single word of criticism
from him.
Bin Laden was a welcome guest in the Taleban-controlled areas of
Afghanistan. The movement needed his money, strategic management skills and his
connections with radical Islamic movements elsewhere to bolster their military power.
His presence did, in fact, help the Taleban to emerge as leader of an
international Islamic struggle against both "infidel" countries and those Muslim
states which the Taleban reckoned had abandoned the "true" Islamic way.
The Taleban's reasons for not extraditing bin Laden to the United
States, in spite of convincing proof that he was behind several major terrorist attacks on
US interests, sounded convincing to the world's Muslim community.
According to religious tradition, they said, a Muslim could not turn
out a guest. "Even an enemy seeking refuge should feel safe in a Muslim house,"
the Taleban leaders said, in a gesture that only raised their stock in the Muslim world.
To the rest of the world, the Taleban's explanation sounded ridiculous,
proof - if any was needed - that the authorities in Kandahar (the Taleban's powerbase) had
little understanding of the rest of the world's values.
On September 12, Kandahar denied US allegations that bin Laden had
masterminded the previous day's terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, claiming the
Taleban had already deprived him of all means of communicating with the world outside. On
the same day, bin Laden appeared in a television broadcast to praise the heroism of the
suicide bombers, while denying his own involvement.
The Taleban leaders appear genuinely to believe their historic mission,
which is understandable given their faint knowledge of the world outside and their often
low educational level.
The background of the Taleban strongman, Mullah Mohammad Omar, sheds
some light on the character of the movement he leads. His education consisted of only a
few years spent at a village school near Kandahar. He was wounded in the head and lost an
eye taking part in the religious war, known as a "Jihad", against Soviet troops
in Afghanistan.
On occasion, I have accompanied foreign diplomats to Kandahar to meet
Mullah Omar and have talked to diplomats who also met him. Many question his mental
balance and say his reaction to information depends on his changeable moods. Such is not
the case, however, with other Taleban leaders, such as the foreign minister, Mullah
Mutawakil.
Today, bin Laden runs numerous training bases in Afghanistan for Muslim
mercenaries from Egypt, Yemen, Iran, Syria, Algeria, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, Bangladesh,
Pakistan, Central Asia and Chechnya. There are 30 to 40 such bases over Afghanistan. A
discreetly named Pakistan-based organization, Maktab-ul-hadamat (Services Bureau), is in
charge of enrolling trainees. Training is sponsored by the Saudi Arabian and Kuwait-based
Tarik-ul-Islam organisation, which bin Laden co-founded.
Who are Islamic militants, and what motivates them to fight for the
Taleban? On a visit to Afghanistan late in August and early in September, I talked to
numerous contract soldiers who had been captured by the anti-Taleban Northern Alliance.
These conversations revealed that these Muslims had been indoctrinated to believe that
their paramount mission in life was to join a holy struggle against infidels.
They were told it was the only way to become a true Muslim and that if
they were lucky enough die in the struggle, they would be admitted to paradise like
Shaheed, the hero who sacrificed his earthly life for the Prophet's cause.
There are articles on precisely this subject in the magazine
Fat-ul-mubin (The Holy Victory of Islam), which the Taleban tried to deliver via the Red
Cross to fighters held by the Northern Alliance. The prison authorities refused to
distribute the magazines to the inmates. But most of them remained faithful to the ideals
they had been taught, in any case. In one cell containing 25 men, no more than five
appeared ready to give up their armed struggle.
One Pakistani prisoner, aged 27, who had been in fail for five years,
told me he had come to Afghanistan to help the Taleban capture it and turn it into a truly
Muslim country, where the Muslim Holy Law, or Shariat, would enjoy ultimate authority.
When I answered that in northern Afghanistan, Pakistan is considered an aggressor, he
replied that this was unimportant. "After we help the Taleban here, they will help us
establish a truly Muslim order in Pakistan. Pakistan is not a true Muslim state now,"
he said.
I heard the same reasoning from a Burmese prisoner. He said his
country's 30 per cent Muslim minority was persecuted and even exterminated by the
government, which represented the Buddhist majority. His hope was that once Islam
triumphed in Afghanistan, Burma's turn would come.
Some Uigur prisoners from China's Xinjiang province, by contrast, had
come to Afghanistan almost by accident. They had gone to Pakistan to study Islam, as they
said this was impossible in China. Their instructor at the Madrasah, or religious academy,
had told them to begin their Islamic education by joining the "Jihad" in
Afghanistan. One of the Uigurs had been captured the morning after he came to the
frontline.
The guerrillas of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, IMU, headed by
Juma Namangani and Takhir Yuldashev, are a different matter. None of these experienced
warriors has yet been captured. Namangani is a respected field commander, well trusted by
bin Laden. Ideologically they are almost impregnable. Unlike many volunteers from Pakistan
and elsewhere, IMU fighters are "professionals", paid for their
"work".
Along with the Arabs, they form the core of the international Islamic
army that bin Laden has established in Afghanistan. Their numbers are sometimes
overestimated, with figures of 5,000 or more appearing in the media. This seems excessive.
A more realistic number is 700 to 1,000.
Recently rumours have circulated that the Taleban had appointed bin
Laden as its defence minister. These are unlikely to be true, as Kandahar would not do
such a thing unless it wanted to senselessly enrage the United States.
Arkady Dubnov is a correspondent with the Vremya Novotei newspaper in
Moscow.
IWPR, September 14, 2001
http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/rca/rca_200109_69_2_eng.txt
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