"Geopolitical
Setting"
Staff reshuffles are brewing in the Commonwealth
Will the 'integrators' and 'disintegrators' hold their seats by next CIS summit?
Alan Kasayev, Armen Khanbabyan
The Commonwealth of Independent States is approaching its 10-year
anniversary as amorphous and loose as it used to be at the moment of its almost accidental
birth in Belovezhskaya Pushcha. The current summit in Sochi, like dozens of similar
summits held before, will certainly change nothing. Regular vows that the Commonwealth is
capable of becoming and will eventually become an efficient mechanism that will
contribute, on the one hand, to the making of fragile sovereignty of new independent
states and, on the other hand, will help develop and subsequently extend civilized
European-type integration across post-Soviet territory have turned out to be just
high-flown wishes. Today, on the eve of the anniversary, nobody is sure not only that it
will be able to adequately meet current needs in the foreseeable future, but also that it
is really needed in its present form today.
Certainly, some objective socioeconomic circumstances have played a
major role here. But one should also admit that among the basic reasons behind the sad
situation, in which the CIS has always found itself, subjective factors were of great
importance too. Such a factor is, in particular, the obvious lack of certain political
impulses. In fact, except president Vladimir Putin of Russia, the Commonwealth member
state presidents have shown little interest in drastic modernization of its structure and
filling it with a new sense that answers the demands of the changing world. At the same
time the expanding of economic contacts has been certainly the most popular topic of the
multilateral and bilateral talk across all post-Soviet territory. However, in most cases
these initiatives have been largely limited to local interests and targeted to pursue some
concrete immediate: when a country needs to use the potential of the Commonwealth (or to
be more precise, the potential of Russia) to solve its current economic, or political and
military problems.
The examples are abundant (some processes that go on behind the scenes
in such bodies as the Eurasian Economic Community, Collective Security Treaty or
Russia-Belarus Union testify to this), but the main thing here is to realize: the majority
of CIS heads of states just can not be in the same company with the young and vigorous
Russian leader who combines the reinforcing of state authority (which is characteristic of
all the CIS presidents) with the economic liberalism, pro-European moods and nonstandard
initiatives on the international arena. Thanks to all this Putin and his strategies
distinctly stands out among the majority of his CIS counterparts and their approaches,
views, and mentality.
Clearly, this does not contribute to the confederation's progress. The
lack of progress renders the regress unavoidable. It is also clear that in view of this
Moscow is objectively interested in palatable staff changes in the Commonwealth. Moreover,
a common idea that the Kremlin's most important aspiration is to see a 'pro-Russian
figure' as a CIS partner is no longer true today. It goes without saying that loyalty to
Russia has always been and will always be an essential element in the relations of Moscow
with the CIS states, but this aspect can't be the only and predominant in the bilateral
relations. It's especially so as unlike the former Russia's leadership today's pragmatics
in the Kremlin are very well aware of the true value of the 'eternal friendship' vows and
the grandiloquent, gaudy professions of love for Russia. As the practice has shown, in
most cases this love has very much to do with prices on Russian energy resources and other
benefits.
Therefore Moscow seems to be carefully studying the political landscape
in the CIS countries in search for constructive and pragmatic politicians capable of
becoming a viable alternative to current leaders in due time. Of course, it has nothing to
do with any plan of intentional and quick replacement of the 'old guard' leaders in the
near abroad, or mass replacements there. The Kremlin today is not disposed to interfere
with internal processes in the post-Soviet states too much. However, it will hardly ignore
them completely either as Russia seeks to become a valuable and significant segment of the
modern world order, which is impossible if the neighboring countries serve not as a
bridge, but as a barrier between Russia and the rest of the world.
One can hardly assert that the post-Soviet territory outside Russia
abounds in experienced and highly professional politicians, since the long-standing and
intensive efforts of many CIS states presidents to "neutralize" every forces
capable to challenge them have really born fruit. General marginalization of political
life has also negatively affected the situation. The staffing 'landscape' has become
scanty, which sometimes has indeed prevented Russia from more active intriguing: there is
hardly anyone to pin serious hopes on. Of course, there are lots of those wishing to
become a 'Kremlin's protege', but there a few challengers who meet the requirements.
A recent deep political crisis in Ukraine and the run-up to the
elections in Belarus prove this only too well. In both cases Moscow had to take the side
of its tried-and-true 'archfriends', Leonid Kuchma and Alexander Lukashenka. It was caused
not by doubts about the pro-Russian moods of their political opponents (especially in the
case of Belarus), but largely by the vagueness of programs and prospects for cooperation
at a new level. By the way, the appointment of Victor Chernomyrdin Ambassador to Kiev
should be viewed through the prism of these approaches. Hardly anyone would suspect Victor
Chernomyrdin of being over diplomatic or tending to pursue a sophisticated international
intrigue, while his efficiency and pragmatism are beyond any reasonable doubt.
Most likely, the already palatable aspiration of Moscow to see new
figures on the CIS playing field will result in its cautious looking for alternative
options, and a possibility that it will be the long-forgotten old alternatives is not
ruled out absolutely.
For example, the intention of Azeri leader Heidar Aliev to transfer his
power to his son Ilham could force the Kremlin to consider bringing Ayaz Mutalibov back to
politics. Perhaps, sensing that such development of events is possible Ilham Aliev has
recently made a series of pro-Russian and antiNATO statements that differ from those of
his father and president. But it will hardly help, we have to reiterate, as sympathies of
the Russian side will depend on business aspects only.
The problem of 'changing benchmarks' is of no less importance in
Georgia, whose politics clearly irritate Russia. The desire of Eduard Shevardnadze, who
did not attend the Sochi summit, to see a 'pure politician' - parliamentary speaker Zhurab
Zhvania - as his successor could hardly find understanding in the Kremlin. Moscow would
rather approve the candidacy of a 'good administrator' like minister Georgy Arsenishvili.
But from every viewpoint the most acceptable alternative for Russia would be the leader of
Adzhar autonomy Aslan Abashidze, who not but once has proved his ability to solve pressing
and intricate political and economic problems, who objectively enjoys support of his
constituency.
In Armenia there are no very bright or independent figures either among
those in power or in public and political organizations who are capable to challenge
president Rober Kocharayn after terrorist act committed in parliament two years ago which
killed charismatic speaker Karen Demirchan and powerful prime minister Vazgen Sarkisyan.
However, it's symptomatic that former Soviet mayor of Yerevan Artashes Gegamyan has become
significantly more active on the political arena. He has announced that a 'third force' is
being formed equally opposed to both the former and current authorities. Simultaneously,
former prime minister Armen Sarkisyan has been spoken of here more and more often. Armen
Sarkisyan is currently living in London as 'honorary ambassador' of the republic and has
shown himself a quite successful businessman and scholar. Both Gegamyan and Sarkisyan are
known as pragmatics, who are not inclined to place ideological considerations above all,
which alone brings them very close to today's Kremlin's concepts. It is especially so as
Russia expects all sides to show pragmatism in solving the long-standing confrontation in
Karabakh.
Recent elections in Moldova seem to have pushed the problem of the
transfer of power in Kishinev to a distant future. But it can happen so that the apparent
disruptiveness in the relations of new Moldavian authorities with Transdniester will
aggravate the situation in the region, in which case events are known to begin developing
very fast. That's why even Pert Luchinsky's getting back to the steering wheel does not
seem so improbable.
In Central Asia Moscow possesses certain staff resources too. If in
Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan and Turkmenistan there hardly will be any changes in the
foreseeable future (if, certainly, not to mean Islamic rebels, but Moscow will cooperate
with them in no way), the situation in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan is different.
Former Kazakh prime minister and main president Nazarbayev's rival
Akezhan Kazhegeldin, understandably accused of all deadly sins, has proved to be a rather
constructive leader and, which is important, an up-to-date politician 'not alien' to the
European way of thinking. From this point of view he has obvious advantages over the
'integrator' Nazarbayev, inclined to resort to (to put it mildly) traditional Central
Asian ways of control and economic development. Therefore any further advance of Russia on
the path of economic liberalism will mean that either the Eurasian Economic Community
would turn complete fiction (for the Soviet-type integration potential has already run
out), or there will be the need for drastic economic reform in the participating states.
It's highly improbable that the current authorities can implement such reform in
Kazakhstan. The potential consequences are obvious and there is no need for further
comment really.
For a long time Kyrgyz leader Askar Akaev was hailed by both Russia and
the West, however his democratic image has eroded after the president's crackdown on his
former colleague and prime minister Felix Kulov in a deadly fight. As a result, many
people have started to regard former law-enforcement officer Kulov who had headed Kyrgyz
national security bodies, almost the only beacon of democratic values in the country,
while the educated and intelligent president Akayev has
turned into the oppressor of freedom. But this does not matter, however. Feliõ Kulov has
gained considerable experience in carrying out concrete serious operations, including
those in cooperation with Russian secret services. In view of this his image of a
democrat is very useful - it meets most recent 'Moscow's standards.'
Thus, 'various scenarios are possible' across the post-Soviet
territory. Such a possibility will become the more probable, the more stable Russian
authority would find itself and the more defined its course towards getting closer to the
'European civilization' will be. It would be naive to presume that the Kremlin, being
rather passive now, is not carefully studying the processes, figures and faces in the
satellite states at the same time. This guarantees that certain policy towards Central
Asian states and plans are being devised in Moscow, and they could be realized 'in due
time convenient for the sides.' Which guarantees some amazing twists in relationships with
the neighboring states and some surprises for individual politicians.
http://www.ng.ru/cis/2001-08-01/1_revolution.html
"Nezavisimaya Gazeta", 1 August 2001 |