A peaceful jihad, but there will be war
Ahmed Rashid
Central Asia is reaching boiling point as Islamic fundamentalists clash
with corrupt, anti-Muslim regimes. In our final extract from his new book, Ahmed Rashid,
the world's most influential war correspondent, explains how one extremist organisation
plans to spread its message to the entire Muslim world and establish a powerful, unified
Islamic empire.
In the Central Asian republics of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, militant Islam is gaining popularity. Little is known about
the new extremist movements, but rumour, myth, and the ancient Central Asian tradition of
storytelling have added to their mystique. In the villages of Central Asia, people speak
of how the advance guard of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan guerrillas consists of
beautiful female snipers who, armed with the latest scopes and night-vision goggles, can
either seduce or kill a soldier from a long distance; or of how guerrillas have been
blessed by Muslim saints to make their bodies impervious to wounds.
While poverty and unemployment increase across Central Asia - and
economic opportunities decrease - its debt-ridden societies are ripe for any organisation
or party that offers hope for a better life. More than 60 per cent of the region's 50
million people are under the age of 25. This new generation is unemployed, poorly educated
and hungry - how long will it continue to tolerate the decline in living standards and the
lack of rudimentary freedoms? It is, perhaps, unsurprising that underground, extremist
Islamic groups are flourishing.
In addition to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), an even more
widespread Islamic movement, the Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (the Party of Islamic
Liberation), has taken root in Central Asia. If the IMU says little about its ultimate
aims, the HT produces an abundance of literature about its goals, including a website
(www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org). Its aims are probably the most esoteric and anachronistic of all
the radical Islamic movements in the world today.
The HT, which, like the IMU, has declared jihad in Central Asia, seeks
to unite Central Asia, the Xinjiang Province in China and, eventually, the entire Islamic
world community under a caliphate that would re-establish the Khilifat-i-Rashida, which
ruled the Arab Muslims for a short time after the Prophet Mohammed's death in 632. This
period is revered by many radical Islamic movements, including the Taliban, as the only
time in Islamic history when a true Muslim society existed.
In the scenario envisaged in HT literature, one or more Islamic
countries will come under HT control, after which the movement will be able to win over
the rest of the Islamic world. HT leaders believe that Central Asia has reached what they
call "a boiling point" and is ripe for takeover. As Sheikh Qadeem Zaloom, the
current HT leader and one of its most prolific writers, describes the situation: "The
issue of transforming the lands into the Islamic homeland and uniting them with the rest
of the Islamic lands is an objective which the Muslims aim to achieve, and the method
which ought to be undertaken to achieve this objective is that of re-establishing
Khilafah."
The HT has become the most widespread popular underground movement in
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and its utopian aims are growing in popularity among
college and university students throughout the region. The challenge that the HT poses to
the regimes of these countries can be judged by the fact that there are more HT prisoners
in Central Asia's prisons than those of any other movement, including the much better
known IMU (the HT claims that there are more than 100,000 political prisoners in
Uzbekistan alone, but this figure is highly inflated).
The HT was founded in Saudi Arabia and Jordan in 1953 by diaspora
Palestinians led by Sheikh Taqiuddin an-Nabhani Filastyni. A graduate of Al Azhar
University in Cairo, an-Nabhani was a schoolteacher and a local Islamic judge before he
was forced to leave Palestine to make way for the new country of Israel. He settled in
Jordan in 1953, and there set up the movement.
An-Nabhani wrote many books and leaflets during his lifetime, which
form the core belief of the HT. "The point at hand is not establishing several
states, but one single state over the entire Muslim world," he wrote in 1962.
The HT believes in jihad as a means to mobilise supporters against
non-Muslims, but it does not advocate a violent overthrow of Muslim regimes, as do other
extremist groups, such as Osama bin Laden's al-Qa'eda. It may sympathise with the IMU, but
it does not believe in guerrilla tactics.
Instead, the HT envisages a moment when millions of supporters will
rise up and topple the Central Asian governments - particularly the Karimov regime in
Uzbekistan - by sheer force of numbers. In the repressive climate of the region, this -
combined with the HT's growing popularity - is enough to ensure government crackdowns
against the movement, particularly in Uzbekistan.
An-Nabhani's concept of the future Islamic state envisages a political
structure in which a caliph (civil and religious ruler) elected by an Islamic shura
(council) would have dictatorial powers in a highly centralised system. The caliph would
control the army, the political system, the economy and foreign policy. Sharia (Islamic
law) would prevail, Arabic would be the language of the state and the role of women would
be severely restricted.
The defence minister, whose title would be amir of jihad, would prepare
the people for jihad against the non-Muslim world. Military conscription and training in
preparation for this jihad would be mandatory for all Muslim men over 15.
The HT's popularity is stretching beyond Central Asia. Some of its
leaders have set up offices in Europe, especially Germany and England. London is now
believed to be a major organisational centre for the movement. There, the HT raises funds
and trains recruits to spread the movement in Central Asia.
The HT has become extremely popular among Muslim students on the
campuses of British universities. When it held a conference in the Docklands area of
London on August 26, 2001, to debate the political crisis in Pakistan, busloads of HT
supporters arrived from all over Britain and there was a live webcast on the internet.
Sheikh Zaloom, the present leader, probably lives in Europe, but his
exact location remains a secret. There are no photographs of Central Asian HT leaders and
no hint of who the other leaders are, how the chain of command works or where they are
based.
In autumn 2000, I met, secretly, an HT leader in Uzbekistan, whom I
shall call "Ali". He explained to me that the HT operates secret, decentralised
five to seven-man cells throughout Central Asia, making it extremely difficult for the
authorities to penetrate the organisation. The cells, called daira (circles), are study
groups dedicated to the spread of Islam and the HT message. The cell chief, the only
person who knows the next level of the party organisation, sets out weekly tasks for his
members, who are expected to go out and create new cells.
The HT is starting to cause concern in Western capitals, even though
little is known about the movement. During late 2000, an intense debate took place among
Clinton administration intelligence experts about whether officially to declare the HT a
group that supports terrorism. Washington finally decided against making such a statement
because the HT had never participated in guerrilla activity, kidnapped people or set up
armed training camps; in fact, it had always advocated peaceful change. But the fear is
that young HT militants, who now face the same indiscriminate repression and poverty at
home as IMU militants, may soon ignore their elders' advice and turn to guerrilla warfare.
Though the HT has still not taken the path of violence, "Ali"
is not averse to issuing a dire warning: "The HT wants a peaceful jihad, which will
be spread by explanation and conversion, not by war," he says. "But, ultimately,
there will be war because the repression by the Central Asian regimes is so severe, and we
have to prepare for that. If the IMU suddenly appears in the Fergana Valley, HT activists
will not sit idly by and allow the security forces to kill them." The fear that the
HT will move from an educational to a militant jihad may well become a self-fulfilling
prophecy.
But neither the HT nor the IMU has the power, the popularity, nor the
military force to emerge as a victor in Central Asia. Their present success is due
primarily to their repression by the Central Asian states, which turns them into martyrs,
and the incompetence with which this repression is carried out. It is also the result of
external sources of instability, such as the war in Afghanistan.
Moreover, the secretive leaders of these organisations cannot pose as
alternatives to presidents such as Islam Karimov without first disclosing themselves and
then spelling out what they have to offer the people of Central Asia. The best way for the
Central Asian regimes to destroy the influence of these groups would be to bring them out
into the open; to allow Islamic practice in their countries and to institute reforms that
would leave the movements with only their alien ideologies to sell.
Under better economic and social conditions, such movements would have
had little public appeal or impact and would have remained on the fringe of the Central
Asian Islamic world, just as the HT remains marginalised in many other Muslim countries.
It is the particular circumstances of the crisis in Central Asia that have pushed the IMU
and the HT to centre stage and provided young people with alien role models.
Yet, as the threat increases, the Central Asian regimes have become
more intransigent and less willing to address the pressing needs of their people. As the
public becomes more angry and frustrated, the ruling elites continue to ignore the need
for change.
The crisis that has blown up since the September 11 attacks is fraught
with danger, but it also offers an enormous opportunity for change. By joining the Western
alliance against al-Qa'eda, the Central Asian states have made a commitment to the
international community's war against terrorism and Islamic extremism.
In so doing, they cannot afford to ignore the long-term consequences of
their actions. If the American-led alliance succeeds in removing the threat of groups such
as the IMU, the international community will be in a position to insist that the Central
Asian regimes conduct themselves in line with international standards of democracy
building, economic development, and social responsibility.
The Central Asian regimes are at a critical crossroads. They can ignore
the lessons from Afghanistan and the collapse of the Afghan state and watch terrorism,
instability and famine increase in their countries. Or they can take advantage of the
global community's new engagement with the region to rebuild their countries. The real
crisis in Central Asia lies with the state, not with the insurgents.
The Daily Telegraph, 24 January 2002 |