Kazakhstan's upcoming plan for electing local administrators assessed unfavorably
as politically meaningless from the viewpoint of democracy and local self-government

Andrey Chebotarev

"The Upcoming Elections of Rural Akims Will Be Politically Meaningless From the Viewpoint of Democracy and Local Self-Government"
Almaty Agentstvo Politicheskikh Issledovaniy WWW-Text in Russian 06 Jul 01

There has long been talk in the Kazakhstani community about the need for elections of akims [chief executives] of all levels. This issue is being raised particularly by representatives of political parties and movements in opposition to the official policy line and also of other nongovernmental organizations. The supporters of the introduction of the institution of the electivity of akims invoke in defense of their positions on this issue two main arguments, as a rule:

the imperfect state and undemocratic nature of the system of local administration in effect in Kazakhstan, which is in need of fundamental reorganization;

the positive experience of this foreign state or the other, where the local authorities are elected by the citizenry itself.

It should be noted in respect to the first of these arguments that the authority of the akims is characterized by a concentration of very considerable executive powers with an absence of responsibility to the people and the maslikhaty [local councils]. The same may be said about the absence of effective mechanisms of control of the activity of the akims on the part of the center since the vertical position of executive power is supported mainly by the mechanism of appointment to office and dismissal therefrom. As a result, an increase in tendencies of nonsubordination to the center, primarily the government, on a number of issues and a growth of the abuse of office, corruption, protectionism, nepotism, clan preference in personnel policy, and so forth are observed on the part of local akims.

The national leadership is no longer comfortable with this situation either, by all accounts. At a meeting of Nursultan Nazarbayev, president of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and akims of all levels held on 29 January of this year in Astana the head of state announced that elections of akims of the rural level would be held in the country before the end of 2001. Akims of all levels would, according to him, be elected in the future. The president spoke about the need for this back in 2000 in his annual message to the people of Kazakhstan. Specific action to introduce the institution of the electivity of the akims had been taken much earlier, though.

One of the first steps in this direction were the republic parliament's revisions and addenda to the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 7 October 1998. Clause 4 of Article 87 of the country's basic law, according to which the akims of administrative and territorial units below provinces, cities of republic significance, and the capital should now be appointed or elected in a procedure determined by the president, was revised specifically.

Another step was the adoption on 23 January 2001 of the law "Local State Administration in the Republic of Kazakhstan," which defined the status in constitutional law, competence, organization, and procedure of activity of local representative and executive institutions of power, including akims of various administrative and territorial units.

Finally, on 23 June 2001 the president of the Republic of Kazakhstan signed the edict "Elections of Akims of Aul (Rural) Okrugs [Counties], Auls (Villages), and Townships". According to this act, the elections of akims of this level are scheduled for the fourth quarter of 2001. The actual date will be coordinated with the oblast akims. The edict also approved the Rules of Elections of Akims of Aul (Rural) Okrugs, Auls (Villages), and Townships determining their specific procedure.

It is obvious that the introduction of the electivity of akims in the republic is a necessary condition for the advancement of democracy and the creation of an effective system of the management of affairs at the local level. As the experience of many overseas countries shows, the head of the local executive institution, obtaining his mandate directly from the people, feels greater responsibility to his constituents, which has a positive effect on his day-to-day work. Specially since his possible reelection to a new term depends on this. The citizenry, on the other hand, increases its civic assertiveness, recognizing that the quality and effectiveness of the resolution of the most urgent problems of the given local community depends on its direct involvement.

At the same time, on the other hand, a detailed analysis of the above-mentioned documents shows that the introduction of the institution of the electivity of akims in Kazakhstan will not for a number of reasons correspond to the above-mentioned principles of democracy and local self-government.

First, the fact that the decision on such an important matter as the establishment in legislation of all the points concerning the election of the corresponding akims passed without the participation of parliament is somewhat disquieting. The procedure of the election of akims of the rural level will in this way depend entirely on the executive, which will undoubtedly avail itself of this for the realization in the process of these elections chiefly its own interests.

Second, pursuant to clause 2 of the edict of the president of the Republic of Kazakhstan "Elections of Akims of Aul (Rural) Okrugs, Auls (Villages), and Townships," the elections of these akims will be conducted by way of an experiment and, consequently, not throughout the republic but merely in individual administrative and territorial units. The list of the latter, though, will be determined by the Central Election Commission following coordination with the akims of the pertinent provinces. This limitation suggests that the republic's authorities are not yet ready for the full-fledged introduction of the institution of elective akims even at the rural level. Politically, this may be understood as a reluctance to expand the degree of the citizens' participation in important political decision-making locally. Economically, though, it is evidence of the authorities' incapacity for shaping the financial and economic base for the independent activity of the elected akims.

Third, the elections will be held on the basis of indirect suffrage--via electors (clause 1 of the Rules). The participation of the rural population in the shaping of the institutions of local power will once again be appreciably limited, therefore.

Fourth, even the established procedure of the elections of the electors itself is far from perfection and democracy. Specifically, assemblies (village meetings) of citizens at the place of residence (clause 12 of the Rules) will be held for the election of the electors within the framework of given localities and also their streets, neighborhoods, and so forth. These assemblies and village meetings will be convened by the okrug election commission (clause 13).

On the whole, however, the number of electors for this locality or the other from 15 to 50 persons will be established on the basis of data on the overall numbers of its residents by the Central Election Commission (clause 17). The drawback here is the fact that the Rules do not stipulate the procedure by which this figure is established. This approach could perfectly well permit the Central Election Commission to manipulate the figures and determine on this basis the number of electors of local akims in specific villages, auls, townships, and aul (rural) okrugs exclusively at its discretion.

But what is most interesting is that, based on the above-mentioned determination by the Central Election Commission concerning the number of electors, the okrug election commissions will establish the requisite number of residents of a given locality for the election of one elector (clause 16). This provision could be understood such that far from all residents will be included on the elector electoral rolls. The whole question is merely the criteria by which the okrug election commissions will be guided in determining the composition of the persons admitted to the participation of the electors. It is not inconceivable owing to this vagary that the election commissions will on this issue rely entirely on the opinion of local akims that wish to retain their office by means of election. The latter will most likely proceed in the screening of "voter candidates" from the degree of their personal like or dislike of this person or the other.

Another notable feature is the fact that the electors will be elected by way of a show of hands (clause 18). Knowing the mentality of the rural population, the majority of which is of a paternalist frame of mind and ingratiating toward any superiors, and also the practice of a show of hands on the kolkhozes and sovkhozes in the Soviet period, which has hardly fully disappeared today, precedents of the pressure of "public opinion" on the position of the voters may be expexted in the process of election of the electors. This would enable interested parties, as which the local akims and their relatives and their office associates may be classed, to have themselves or other of "their" people elected as electors. That would leave little still to do--just to elect the right akim through the agency of these people of "theirs".

In the event, on the other hand, of the populace suddenly electing as electors persons other than those that the local akim and his team might want to see as such, the latter could avail themselves of the "evasive" provisions of the Rules in question for elections of akims of the rural level in order to reduce the electors' influence on their interests in the process of these elections.

Specifically, clause 23 of the Rules accords all electors without exception the right to appeal their noninclusion and incorrect inclusion on the list or their exclusion from it to a superior election commission. Despite the validity and democratic character of this approach, the Rules at the same time in fact permit the okrug election commissions' creation of such precedents. And they do not specify, what is more, the grounds on which the election commissions may not include on the lists or exclude from them particular electors. Consequently, they themselves would think up the arguments and reasons for this. So that, despite all this, there would either be no "undesirable" electors at all or they would constitute a minority that decides nothing.

Fifth, however crystal-clear honest and independent the electors may be, it is ultimately not they that would decide who is destined to be the akim of a given village, aul, township, or okrug. Their job is to ensure observance of all the requisite formalities and to create the appearance of the legitimacy of the elections of the local akims. The real "election," on the other hand, will be the business of the election commissions, via which the executive controls and regulates the course of the electoral process and has unlimited opportunities for pressuring it, up to and including an "adjustment" of the results of the elections, in its own interests. This was shown graphically by the practice of the parliamentary and presidential elections held in 1994-1999. This being the situation, the rural akims will, in fact, be elected not by the people but by power itself.

Sixth, neither the constitution nor effective legislation of the republic defines for elective akims status and powers that differ from those of their appointed counterparts. Pursuant to clause 4 of Article 87 of the republic's basic law, all akims exclusively are part of the unified system of executive power, are representatives of the president and the government of the republic, and may, regardless of the level they occupy, be dismissed from office by the head of state at his discretion. According, though, to the law "Local State Administration in the Republic of Kazakhstan," the akims of townships, auls, villages, and rural (aul) okrugs are officials of the local executive institution of power, in this case of the akimat [local government executive office] of a district of oblast subordination, and are responsible for their activity to superior akims (para. 1 of clause 1 and clause 3 of Article 35).

No less material also is the fact that legislation makes no provision for municipal property and the local budget being at the disposal of akims of the rural level. All the funds for needed expenditure are allocated them by the district akimat. Although, on the other hand, under modern socioeconomic conditions local authorities, whatever their situation, can hardly independently resolve all urgent problems on the territory entrusted to them without financial appropriations from the republic treasury.

Based on what has been stated above, the following conclusions may be drawn:

1. The involvement of the population of administrative and territorial units of the rural level in the elections of the corresponding local akims has been limited to such an extent that it cannot, in fact, be called such. The akims will essentially be elected by a small group of interested parties without regard to the express will of the bulk of the residents of the given townships, villages, auls, and rural (aul) okrugs.

2. Regardless of the procedure of their election, the akims of the rural level shall report to superior authorities, up to and including the president, but shall be in no way accountable to the local population here. Mechanisms of this accountability are altogether absent from effective legislation.

All this is borne out by the elections held in May 1999 and the subsequent practical modus operandi of the akim of the Chemolgan Rural Okrug of Almaty Oblast's Karasay District. Like the coming elections also, these were of "experimental" status. The sponsors of this experiment were the Central Election Commission and Zamanbek Nurkadilov, akim of Almaty Oblast at that time. According to the testimony of eye-witnesses, these elections were conducted under the strict control of the oblast administration, as a result of which their outcome was predetermined in favor of a person convenient for the authorities. No one, virtually, paid any heed to the opinion of the majority of residents of Chemolgan. Many of them were not even included on the electoral rolls, what is more. The candidates for akim also were for some reason or other forbidden nomination from public associations. In addition, these elections were formally conducted in violation of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan since they were held on the basis of a decision of the Central Election Commission, not an act adopted by the president. But what is most important is that the people of Chemolgan, like many other citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan also, see no difference whether this akim was elected or appointed. What happened for them in practice was the customary substitution "from above" in the post of akim of one person for another. The anticipated elections of rural akims also will undoubtedly be conducted similarly.

On the whole, though, one thing is clear: with this electoral system and the system of local state power the introduction of the institution of the elections of akims of all levels will have no political meaning. Nor will it become the embryo for local self-government, whose formation the authorities have dragged out very considerably. Considering what has been stated above and also the traditional passiveness of the majority of Kazakhstanis in the realization and defense of electoral rights, it may be expected that purely formally elected as the akims of rural localities will be the nominees of superior executive institutions of power and, most likely, the akims who are already in office, in the main. So no essential changes in the country's politico-legal system, primarily at its local level, are to be expected. It is no accident, evidently, that neither on the part of power itself nor the opposition is any stir in regard to preparation for participation in the rural akim elections to be observed.

"Agency for Political Studies", 1 August 2001