Analytic Data

President's Christmas Tree

Farid MURTAZA

Kazakh citizens must have found it of great interest to learn from the reports of Khabar news agency that at the New Year matinee in Astana Nursultan Nazarbayev asked Santa Claus to light up the Christmas tree. Santa Claus considered the president's request and took a favorable decision. After that, the children, Santa Claus and Nursultan Nazarbayev danced a round dance.

This is the only Nursultan Nazarbayev's achievement in 2001 that one can enumerate, and now we can pass to the analysis of his failures. One thing is to light up a Christmas tree, and the other - to put out the corruption scandal in the U.S., the power struggle within his own family, or the never-ending criticism from different directions ranging from national opposition to international community. No spells can help here any longer.

Wishes that come true

In the life of any president, one year is a huge period comparable to a quarter or a fifth part of a president's average life. It is connected with the fact that in the civilized world a president's term of office is limited to four or five years. After that - a new election like a new life, where one has to start everything almost afresh - from public power struggle. A victory in the elections means a revival, a new youth, a sunrise after the sunset.

These political laws do not apply to authoritarian leaders. After waiving the democratic cycle, their political life turns into withering and melancholic waiting for the political demise. That's why their power struggle is so desperate and unsuccessful, why their authority and wealth do not please them.

In Nazarbayev's case, his sliding from the hights of power to the abyss has taken three years. In January 1999, he backtracked on the remaining democratic ornamental elements and imitated his re-election for another seven long years with a senseless margin of votes. What he dreamt of that New Year's night on the eve of elections, what he asked his friend Santa Claus of? Apparently, how to get hold of power, to get rid of his main challenger Akezhan Kazhegeldin, and to rule comfortably for the long years to come.

The recent New Year's night Nursultan Nazarbayev could have dreamt and asked of the opposite: how to get rid of his presidential authority and position and simultaneously save his face, freedom, at least a part of the wealth, and ensure his own and his relations' safety.

Knowing that Nazarbayev is like a child fond of holidays, matinees and balls, one could easily understand that he would also like to leave his post on a New Year's eve. At his own free will, at the hight of the glory and power, by transferring his power to the one, who in his opinion, has deserved it. However, that wish of his is unlikely to come true. Ahead for Nursultan Nazarbayev is lying the shortest year in his entire political life. Hardly anyone doubts that he will part with power in accordance with an unfavorable scenario. The matter is that there is hardly a person in the country interested in Nazarbayev's retiring from power in line with the law on the first president.

This law envisions an alternative of regency for life, the unrestricted influence of the former president and simultaneously his total irresponsibility. When this law was being adopted, the thoughtful political analysts pointed out to the fact that it is not just harmful, but frightfully harmful for Nazarbayev himself: it automatically makes the retired president another potential seat of power. For Nazarbayev's potential "successors" from his closest family circle - his sons-in-law, daughters and nephews - the living former president, enjoying many rights and powers, is even more dangerous than the most radical opposition.

Let's emphaze the word "living" and estimate the threat to the ex-president's personal safety. Anyone, who will receive power from Nazarbayev's hands for some time, will dream of his forerunner's "vanishing" from both the country and the memory of people. A new popularly unelected president will inherit from his "benefactor" the entire bunch of claims - unfulfilled promises and commitments, unpunished crimes, unfair judicial sentences and so on. To accuse of them Nazarbayev, who has collected tons of compromising materials against them all, will be dangerous. Not to accuse Nazarbayev of these sins will tantamount to assuming the responsibility for the "sins of fathers". Thus, it will be a perpetual torture for his own (to some extent) daughter to put up with Nazarbayev living side by side with her. Let alone any of his sons-in-law, each of whom has got his own "family", where he would like to be the only influential biological and godfather.

The radical democratic opposition does not recognize in principle a "dynasty model" of the transfer of power. They warn that when they come to power the law on first president will cost no more than the sheet of paper it is written on. Naturally, one of its first moves will be to request to study whether this normative document conforms to the Kazakh constitution. There is no need to be a prophet to forecast the decision. Even the present lunatic Constitutional Council out of fear will recognize the law on first president null and void. Let alone any Constitutional Court that will replace it.

To tell the truth, there is a special feature that slipped the attention of any Kazakh political analysts. In a bizarre way, the today's democrats from tough opposition could be interested in retaining Nazarbayev in the country - in order to ensure the fidelity of the broad bureaucracy and the support of traditionalistic groups in society.

As known, liberals in Chile did not exile general Pinochet and did not jailed him. They granted him the status of senator for life. This did not prevent them from condemning the ex-dictator for his violations of the law, and Pinochet - from reiterating that it had been impossible to act in a different way. Thus, democrats ensured the loyalty of the army, which in Chile played the part of the higher bureaucracy. With the help of Pinochet as a puppet figure, the new Chilean leaders baffled any possible criticism and mildly reminded the people that things had been much worse only recently.

However, Nazarbayev still should negotiate the "Pinochet status" with the opposition, and this will take an absolutely different law on guarantees, which has to be adopted in a different way. Does Nursultan Nazarbayev realize this? It's hard to say this for sure. From year to year, he demonstrates fewer capabilities to analyze the situation. Does he feel it? Absolutely. The Lord has generously granted this politician with instincts. As an old aging wolf, with whom Petr Svoik has compared him, he does feel the danger. Nazarbayev won't remain in the pack led by another wolf, he would have to go. Apparently, the problem is not when, but where to?

The last track

The events of the past year have convinced even the most ardent Nazarbayev's adherents that the launching him onto the international arena is practically ruled out. The clearest testimony to that has become his trip to Washington.

Not only Kazakh observers, but also journalists in the U.S. capital have figured out that for the second time Nazarbayev comes here on the eve of Christmas because he is afraid of a protest campaign and a wave of criticism. After December 20, the political life is at standstill in all western capitals, and the press switches to the celebrations subject. It was so in December 1999, it was so last year. Not for a single time has ventured the Kazakh president on a news conference, being sure that he would have to answer questions about the frozen bank accounts, violation of human rights and election manipulations.

However, even such ingenuous trickery has not saved Nazarbayev from humiliation. Right after his departure The Washington Times, this clearly republican publication and the "mouthpiece of the Washington regional committee" of the ruling party, indignantly told off the US president and his administration for their welcome for "the corrupt dictator" in the White House.

Special attention deserves the tone in which the Washington Times editorial describes George Bush's actions: "Perhaps President Bush thought that on the last working day before Christmas, no one would be watching the White House. He was wrong…Not only has Mr. Nazarbayev shown no tangible evidence of how he will support the war on terrorism, but he is currently being investigated by the Department of Justice for his role in money-laundering and bribery. He has repressed his country's media and trafficked arms to rogue states. He has allowed increasing human rights abuses in Kazakhstan… Most Kazakh media outlets are controlled by the president and his family and friends, and those that offer any criticism may be subject to harassment or having their offices raided…"

The editorial said that Nazarbayev took bribes from oil companies and was under investigation by the US Justice Department. It also describes the case of a businessman from South Korea, who testified that he gave Nazarbayev a bribe, the latter's arms-trafficking to rogue states, and so on and so forth...

Frankly speaking, at first the wording and the wave of protest statements on the part of influential Congressmen that proceeded the president Nazarbayev's visit, was a surprise. Why so much attention should be given to Kazakhstan, a large and potentially rich country, but no more than that. Brazil, for instance, is much larger and richer, but its problems do not receive a tenth part of the attention, which the American press and politicians have been giving to Kazakhstan. In addition, violations of human rights in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are by far more massive.

Apparently, the matter is in Nazarbayev himself. He genuinely irritates and disappoints the western establishment, and from this point of view he resembles Yassir Arafat, the leader of Palestinian autonomy, on whom so many hopes for resolving the Middle Eastern crisis were pinned on. Arafat has also promised much and readily to the West. Against these promises they lent him huge sums of money and provided broad political support. Eventually, the Palestinian crisis has aggravated and turned into a war, the money has been stolen, and the promises have proved to be a lie.

Nazarbayev promised to the West to provide a pattern of a transfer from the Soviet-era social system to the traditional democratic one. However, to the accompaniment of his liberal rhetoric he has followed the same path as Turkmenbashi (father of all Turkmen - the leader of Turkmenistan) or Lukashenko - towards the authoritarian dictatorship. If the investment in Kazakhstan are bigger than in Belarus, it is not because Nazarbayev is better than the "batka" (president Lukashenka). It's because Kazakhstan has more oil. The West has invested much more in Libya than in Kazakhstan, however nobody would connect this with the highly unpredictable figure of Colonel Qaddafi, who has turned into an "invisible president".

In this light it is difficult to imagine that Nazarbayev will manage to enlist the support of even a limited circle of western leaders and be appointed to any significant international post, for example, as a UN commissioner on refugees or a special envoy to Afghanistan. Any OSCE position is ruled out for him because not but once he has publicly humiliated this organization and violated his OSCE commitments. In any regional organization, including the Shanghai Six, Uzbekistan and Russia will block the appointment of Nazarbayev owing to the "political allergy" the leaders of these two states have developed to him.

In not so distant past a sort of a "union state" between Kazakhstan and Kyrghyzstan like the one established by Russia and Belarus could have become an ideal escape for Nazarbayev, but the ill-starred presidential advisers insisted that he pursue a "bird in the bush" in the form of a UN or a CIS chairmanship. So, the president's geography has shrunk to the boundaries of his native Kazakhstan. Here he should search his future.

Without the right or the left

I do not belong to those critics of Nursultan Nazarbayev who hold him responsible for everything. It was he who wanted to appear at the start of his career as an omnipotent and omniscient "president and wizard". A new fountain of oil or a new road - everything happened as if by his wise order or, at least, with his benevolent consent. His verbose and full of suggestion messages to the government, businessmen, women, investors, public prosecutors, deputies, students, and all other groups of population were drawn up in such a way that nobody doubted that even the sun rises exclusively by personal order from the president. At the same time, any natural success of each of these groups would appear the "fulfillment of the leader's orders", the fruit of his insight and determination.

Three years ago in a talk to the then closest advisers to the president I forecast a possible reaction to such irrepressible and stupid propaganda: with time the president would be held responsible for the any lack of oil in the fountain or water in the tap, for a poor state of roads or an outrage of the policeman. This forecast has proved true not thanks to anyone's sagacity, but to the natural course of events. Nazarbayev should have avoided this trap, however, he has failed to do so. The consequences appear to be more dangerous for him, than popular anger.

By assuming all the national achievements that objectively and somewhat automatically have taken place under his rule - from obtaining independence to the reserves of oil on Kazakh shelf - Nazarbayev has committed a crime against his own entourage: he has given no one a chance for success or public recognition. As a result, no members of his administrative team have got any positive public luggage, citizens can pin no hopes for a change for the better on no one of them. Tokayev, Balgimbayev, Tasmagambetov, Akhmetov, Khrapunov, and their colleagues – they all are just shadows of the president, humble performers of his will, or, as they say, the "products" of his activity. Nazarbayev seems to have emasculated them politically.

The only exception to this dull line of humble officials has become Akezhan Kazhegeldin. His attempt to challenge Nazarbayev in 1997 seemed then almost lunatic because of its recklessness and determination. I presume, the then head of government felt that to stay under Nazarbayev's authority meant to deprive himself of the future. For the young, well-educated and charismatic leader, this was an unacceptable perspective.

The majority of political analysts explain the move made by the young government bureaucrats in last November and the setting up of an obscure Democratic Choice by their desire to protect against Rakhat Aliyev their businesses that this administrative growth have been doing along with and thanks to their involvement into government activities. This is part of the reason indeed, but just a part of it. These not-so-young people have felt that they would also miss the last chance for political future if they don't emphasize their opposition to the existing system. They have fulfilled this clumsily as usual, with no clear understanding of the problem. One way or the other, they have made this move, and this should be appreciated.

Some conventional opposition journalists would find detestable the subservience with which some Kazakhstan's Democratic Choice leaders address to Nazarbayev. They seem to be looking into his eyes in the attempt to convince him that for him personally they feel nothing but admiration. Neither the opposition members nor Nazarbayev should believe these assurances are sincere. At first, the pre-Revolutionary French parliament also humbly turned to the king with requests, and after that ordered to behead him and the consort. Only a step does separate the subservience from the wild rage.

Certainly, those cynical young democrats dream of nothing else but to occupy the Nazarbayev's post and those of his entourage, to become presidents and premieres, ministers and deputies. It is quite natural, as political competitiveness is based on this desire. That is why the Kazakh president, trying to look pleasantly, but with a threatening note in his voice said that the young reformers should focus on economy, not on politics. Hardly the new opposition members would follow the their "patron"'s advice. In politics, there works a principle of the bicycle: only the person who pedals has a chance not to fall down.

The former Pavlodar akim (head of administration) Zhakiyanov seems to pedal more intensively than anyone of other government "rebels". He can choose from a limited number of actions. He can either become a critic of Nazarbayev, which means he will reject the title of a product of president's activity, and join the ranks of the consistent opposition that demands that Nazarbayev and his family give up power. Or he remains a "bad sheep" in the president's herd, and will become a target for the official president's watch-dog – Rakhat Aliyev.

Against the background of other young reformers' consternation, Zhakiyanov's activity has caused western press to use its discretion and name him the leader of the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan. His colleagues in the new movement would hardly agree with such casting. Especially as one of them has been delegated to the new movement by the president administration with the purpose to eviscerate the Democratic Choice and turn in into another democratic dummy like the Liberal Democratic Party or Civil Party, for example.

The logic of the struggle for leadership role and natural political ambitions will inevitably force other young democrats to demand radical reforms too, to act jointly with the United democratic Party's opposition members. Any attempts to simulate opposition views and confine demands to regional elections will hardly be a success for the opportunists and "planted informers" in the Democratic Choice leadership. Very soon, their ranks will clearly divide into those for Nazarbayev and those against him. Those acting in his favor will soon quickly and quietly die politically - very much like Yertysbayev or Suleimenov were removed from politics. Those who choose to fight are likely to have a hard but long life in politics.

However, what does a "hard lot" mean? Speaking about politics, the lot has to be hard. If it is easy, it has nothing to do with politics. Three years ago, Akezhan Kazhegeldin's lot was viewed with concern by his friends and gloat by his enemies, because it seemed hard. Especially compared to the life of the loyal Kazakh grandees. Today he is the only person who could expect to be recognized at home and in the world as a democratically elected leader.

Not in a distant past, opposition members had to struggle for decades with dictatorships. The pace of changes in today's world is incredibly fast. Now democratic governments are not ready to wait for years for the opposition to win, they resolutely help those on whom they can pin their hopes for stability and democracy. The West has demonstrated this in Yugoslavia, the international coalition has performed this in Afghanistan. This experience will help the world to assist democracy in Kazakhstan.

Two out of three

By the end of Nursultan Nazarbayev's decade-long rule, a three-element political system has been formed in Kazakhstan. In a sense, it resembles the historical Kazakh zhuzes (tribes). This division is conditional and rough, however, it enables to reveal the three forces that have formed, realized their interests and are ready to defend them. First, it is the bureaucracy that has declared itself a new national bureaucracy, but has remained post-communist from the point of view of its content and the type of relations. Secondly, it is the national business, which has realized the need for political representation and is not inclined to attend to the bureaucracy anymore in exchange for protection. Thirdly, it is the western-style democratic public, which possesses the intellectual and moral potential and expresses broad public concerns. Nazarbayev and members of his "family" will inevitably have to abandon the historical scene, but those three forces will stay in the game. Only they will be able to determine the nation's nearest future.

Of course, the analogy with the zhuzes is not absolutely correct: a persons belongs to a certain tribe due to his origin, while his political place is not so categorical and in many respects is a result of a person's personal will. For example, Gaziz Aldamzharov (before his forced transfer to civil service recently) exemplified a perfect former communist bureaucrat who has joined democratic ranks. On the contrary, the fruity president's biographer Yermukhamet Yertysbayev was a democrat by public origin, but has chosen to "change the sex" deliberately and for understandable reasons. Besides, within the new three-chain system a subjectively separate person can simultaneously belong to two different categories. For example, many businessmen feel themselves to be democrats, while many bureaucrats are engaged in business behind the scenes. Such a "dual personality" is possible only until their basic interests are safe. In a crucial moment, the person's behavior is governed by his basic instinct. It's this crucial action of a person that influences his classification. Bulat Abilov is clearly undergoing the process of self-determination in his transfer from the business guild to the guild of democratic community. Akezhan Kazhegeldin has also quickly and unequivocally rejected a government career in favor of the democratic community.

These are more examples of this, though the list is not too long. The matter is that the majority of people remain in power by force of habit. In fact, this is not bad at all, as this ensures social stability. Therefore, the political struggle in Kazakhstan focuses not on the number of people whom the one camp could managed to win over to their side. No forces in Kazakhstan will be able to win in isolation for a long period. Those who intend to struggle for power in earnest should build such a coalition, which will allow, on the one hand, to occupy the command hights, and on the other - to achieve the basic purposes of the community.

Naturally, each of these forces actively mutates under the influence of a number of factors. The experienced Soviet-era bureaucracy is aging and is prone to natural drop out. For ethical reasons it's inappropriate to give examples. The old "party and economy staff" is being replaced by university graduates who prefer jeans to black suits, and whisky to vodka and beer. Business undergoes transformation in the process of cooperation with foreign partners and the use of civilized financial instruments. There are less picaroons and swindlers in their ranks, whom the post-Soviet Alma-Ata abounded in. For some time already, the democratic Kazakh elite no longer resembles the dissidents of the past, who would prefer prison to any compromise with the authorities. The nowadays elite is accepted in western capitals and demonstrates constructive approaches not burdened with the ideology.

The post-Nazarbayev Kazakhstan will be lead by a coalition of these forces. Only this coalition could with time be replaced with a multiparty system, and there will be no need for the "political zhuzes" in this system. It's easy to name the available options thanks to the arithmetical simplicity of the task. The union of the three forces is impossible in principle, unless the nation face a significant outside threat. Out of the three options, there remain options two by two.

The union of business and bureaucracy practically exists in power already, though its form is ugly and the businessmen are subordinate to the officials. The fact that someone else would head this union instead of Nazarbayev does not make this mechanism more efficient. If they are fortunate, something will stay put, but the system is most likely to collapse due to internal conflicts that until recently the old president managed to resolve.

The two other alternative versions - the union of democrats and business, and the union of democrats and bureaucracy - are potentially productive in principle, though to a different degree of probability. Speaking about the first option, which is not so rare in modern history, it would represent a decisive step towards the western pattern, where the bureaucracy plays a relevant, but secondary and technical role.

The second option suggests that bureaucracy would be able to use the potential of democrats to rapidly modernize itself and occupy a place outside the fledgling political forces, above their future fight. Similar events took place in those countries, where the army took power to maintain the stability and later rejected it in exchange for guarantees of personal high status and prosperity.

The model of further development will be chosen this year, perhaps, in the first half of it. It no longer depends on the will of Nazarbayev or his entourage. Their future would be determined by what coalition will be formed in Kazakhstan in the near future. If Nursultan Nazarbayev had been able to analyze these schemes, he should have asked Santa Claus to take him to Lapland after the Christmas matinee was over.

Central Asia Bulletin, January 8 2002