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duvanov.gif (9690 bytes)Eurasism as a philosophy of justifying inferiority
Central Asia Bulletin, 29 November 2001

Sergei DUVANOV

This article has been inspired by an interview with Mr. Dugin, the ideologist of eurasism, published in the Megapolis newspaper. The interest that Megapolis takes in the ideas of Eurasian originality and reluctance to accept western values are not accidental. This is a sort of a visit card for its editorial board members who do not conceal their pro-russian and anti-western sentiment. In this view, the text that follows is a continuation of the debate that started on the late web site Turan.

"A war is waging, a war of two continents, two civilizations: the war of the mainland against the sea, atlantism against eurasism, a tough war. Every effort is accompanied by struggle, everything is being attained with great strain". This is how the eurasism ideologist describes things currently stand. Setting aside his allegories, one could agree with the above. The struggle was going on, is going on and will be going on. The only question is who are fighting against whom. Let's consider this later.

What the eurasism advocates wish to fight with the Atlantic world for? Brush aside the lofty political worlds and demagogy and you will see that at the bottom of it is their protest against the principles widely accepted by most developed nations.

Eurasists do not like those principles. They do not want people to elect leaders and change governments. They do not want to see free press that writes without any ideological and political constraints. They do not want the state to serve its citizens, not vice versa. They do not want people live as they please instead of living as the "national history" and "national identity" dictates them.

The eurasism ideologists are far from presenting this as a conflict between the East and the West. Geography does not play any significant role here. "If to regard eurasism as a philosophy, ideology, there are Eurasian trends in America itself. Latin America, for instance…"

What does those trends look like that exist in all parts of the world but are widespread in the most politically and economically backward countries? What is the philosophy that is shared mostly by citizens in these countries?

This philosophy stems largely from the inferiority complex suffered by some members of less developed societies lagging behind the more civilized nations.

The mechanism that triggers this philosophy is simple and stems from the need to explain its backwardness and inability to organize political life in their countries in a sensible and reasonable way. It's beneath their dignity to admit that the main reason here is the weakness caused by history's twists, bad luck and bad leaders, and trivial intrinsic sloth or people's indifference.

The need to justify this weakness and backwardness gives rise to a theory that says that there is no single history of civilization where some nations have progressed in their development while others have been lagging behind. It says instead that there are several civilizations, which develop simultaneously in accordance with their own rules. In our case, they are the Atlantic and the Eurasian civilizations.

In which case they can not be compared at all. It's impossible to compare absolutely different civilizations, they say. That is why it's impossible to speak of the advanced Atlantic and backward Eurasian civilizations, which means it's impossible to compare their democracies. We are SPECIAL – that's the quintessence of the eurasian philosophy.

 

This false thesis has become the basis of a theory of ŕ) inability to accept western political principles, b) justification of authoritarianism as a specific character of eurasism; c) antihuman character of western civilization; and d) individualism impairment and collectivism advantages.

Eurasists present their collectivist psychology as an undeniable advantage opposed to the individualist psychology of the Atlantic civilization. The method they have chosen assumes that individualism and collectivism are parallels that never cross and from the very beginning exist as a substantial element of social psychology.

Both collectivism and individualism are in fact stages in the making of human social psychology. From a certain point of view, the collective psychology stems from our predecessors’ herd instinct. As our race developed and civilization progressed, individualism changed to individualism. The man gradually developed into an individual with less heard instinct.

Transition from collectivism to individualism represents social progress. Individualism as a manifestation of self-sufficiency, independence, and personal freedom is the highest form of civilization.

To be proud of a collectivist psychology is like being proud of the fact that you live in a hostel instead of your own personal apartment.

The same goes for the Eurasian model of democracy.

 

"Each civilization type gives rise to its own democracy or its own totalitarianism. There is no purely democratic or purely totalitarian, authoritarian society", Dugin writes.

The main thesis here is that human rights and freedoms in the West and in Eurasia can't be compared because of their different models of democracy. "…each society creates its own type of democracy".

The myth about different types of democracy makes it possible to explain why human rights and civil freedoms are constantly violated in CIS and some other backward countries, why their rulers keep abusing their people. The Eurasian specific character is to blame. Thus, there is no need to go out of our way to try to meet western standards.

 

"We have declared freedom, equality and democracy too, Dugin says. In fact, they have been limited and specific. The West does the same, and we see many elements of backdoor totalitarianism and authoritarianism in western societies …"

Hence, a second thesis follows: western democracy can't be regarded as a model since it is as flawed as Eurasian.

And the last thesis, which methodologically cements the structure: "… liberal democracy is in congruence with the historic experience of western nations based on such values as pure individualism, material and atheistic approach in line with one man - one vote principle".

Therefore the societies based on collectivism and religiousness principles reject a liberal democracy. That's why Eurasia must have its own "Eurasian democracy".

"Eurasian democracy": What does it look like and in what way does it differ from a traditional one?

The ideologist of eurasism answers this question as follows: "Participation of a nation in its own fate, active involvement in the process of political consciousness and choosing of an original historic path from the point of view of those crucial elements that truly link them to the nation's history, identity, and culture. All this is democracy. A Eurasian democracy".

I believe that if one attempts to explain how a Russian pregnancy differs from, say, a French one, the effect would surely be the same. There is a certain rational idea in this revelation - that democracy a la Eurasia grows from the national history and should conform to the nation's culture and identity. Not too much. If applied to pregnancy, it should sound like that: "a Russian pregnancy develops in the spirit of national history and should correspond to the Russian culture and identity of its people".

As for the part regarding the "involvement in the process of political consciousness and choosing of an original historic path", it's not even demagogy. It's the stream of consciousness in an air-hole. However, the eurasists draw a conclusion that it's impossible to compare different models of democracy.

I would reiterate, we are speaking now about Dugin's methodology and the idea that we are SPECIAL. If we set aside the myths about the Eurasian originality and proceed from the fact that CIS countries had been taken out of the civilized process for 70 years and as a result fell behind the leading nations, we would have to admit that the problem is not in the specific character of the Eurasian community but in its ultimate backwardness.

If we return the situation to its original position, that is back to normal, we would have to admit that there is no democracy on the vast CIS territories like there is no democracy in other authoritarian countries, or it is greatly flawed. Eurasists do not nave a different democracy, they do not have a democracy at all.

If so, we are facing quite a different challenge: not of justifying our problems by our specific character but trying to overcome our weakness and build a truly democratic political system … like those that exist in the civilized countries.

In fact, Dugin suggests that all those who can't accept western democracy principles unite under the Eurasism flag in order to: ŕ) oppose the advance of western liberal and democratic values; b) create their own special "Eurasian" values (unknown so far).

According to Dugin, there are two enemies of the eurasian theory. Besides the dangers from the the cosmopolitan West, we are facing a danger of ethnocentrism. Understandably, the atlantist ideas are dangerous because of their progressive attractiveness to people, while the ideas of ethnic self-sufficiency rule out a possibility of accepting any Eurasian unification principles. That's why he believes that "… copying a western liberal model can't be accepted as a national idea, it is unreasonable and lacks perspective like the ethnocentric ideas".

Speaking about Kazakhstan, the recipe is quite clear: you should not go West, you should not go East, you should go to us and join the Eurasian club (read Russia).

Kazakhstan's exodus to eurasism guarantees solution to many problems including ethnic. "If Kazakh democracy do not become ethnocentric, argues Dugin, but see and perceive itself within the context of Eurasian democracy, it would quite naturally create the conditions for its ethnic Russians, which would go against the interests of Russians neither ethnically nor historically".

The eurasism ideologist sees opposing atlantism and ethnocentrism not just as an ideological battle. It's activity aimed to stamp out the schism by all available means. When his interviewer, Mr. Misinov (by the way an eurasist himself), complained that the enemies of eurasism unite in Kazakhstan to fight against Eurasia, the answer contained a constructive piece of advice.

 

"They are Kazakhstan's enemies (pro-westerners and national patriots), Eurasia's enemies, individuals involved in subversive activities... If they unite, this is a job for national security service as such a synthesis trend, the trend of uniting atlantism and ethnocentrism is a direct threat to the very existence of Kazakhstan, its historic perspectives, and should be regarded as subversive activities."

This is how the ideological fuhrer recommends to deal with the dissent. It turns out that the "Eurasian democracy" regards freedom of opinion as ideological sabotage.

 

"…I believe that the day will come and the existence of the "Atlantic" lobby would become not a problem of politics but a national security problem, argues Mr. Dugin,… it is not a freedom of opinion problem, it is an ideological sabotage against the President (i.e. Nazarbayev)".

Here it is, the Eurasian democracy in its concrete form: everything that contradicts the eurasian principles is heresy. The authorities should outlaw it and reciprocate accordingly.

 

"Advocating atlantism in the historically Eurasian structures should be made tantamount to political indecorum… Atlantists have the absolute freedom to exist in Russia in subways only. They can feel free to waul in the subway. We will wait and see what would happen to them then."

No need to wait, it's already clear enough that if persons like Dugin come in, it would be dangerous to speak of the bourgeois West and the national identity not only in subway and gateway but also in the kitchen.

So, this is what the Eurasian democracy is like.

Clearly enough, Mr. Dugin and the Megapolis newspaper which disseminates his views are playing into the hands of President Nazarbayev who presumes that we should not hurry headlong to America asking for democracy. Generally speaking, Nazarbayev does not need this western democracy at all. Not only does it prevent him from fully enjoying his authoritarianism, it constantly threatens his prosperity.

If true democratic principles prevail in Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev would loose his power. The first fair election would cut him out. The President and his entourage realize this quite well. Mr. Dugin and the ideologists from Megapolis are also aware of this.

Everyone realizes this. The former desperately cling to power in fear to loose their ill-gotten capitals and stand trial. The latter help the former justify the lawfulness of their authoritarianism and hint how to ground the need for a SPECIAL path for Kazakh state ideologically. They all do their job. A trifle is missing: now the former should formally acknowledge the efforts of the latter and thank them for the zeal they show in substantiating the ideology so near and dear to every dictator.

It's time to return to the point we discussed at the very beginning – to the struggle that is going on between the two civilizations: the atlantism and eurasism.

It's true, this war has been waging for over 2 thousand years already. The war between those who wish and can work and those who can't and do not wish to do so, between the rich and the poor, between those are eager to learn and those complacent in their self-sufficiency, between the rational oriented towards progress and the irrational based on credence or a cult of authority and traditions. If anyone wish to call these poles eurasism and atlantism, I won't line up in opposition. It's important to be aware of such a process and know that it develops in one direction: from inferior to superior.

 

Central Asia Bulletin, 29 November 2001

 

 

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