• Forum

Silencing Central Asia: The voice of the dissidents
Testimony from US Congressional Hearings on Central Asia
Committee on International Relations House of Representatives

Subcommittees on International Operations and Human Rights, and Middle East and South Asia, House Committee on International Relations

1. MICHAEL E. PARMLY

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights and Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia

Madame Chairman, I am honored to represent the Administration here today, and I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you and your committee the state of democracy and political freedom in Central Asia. We share the concerns many of you have expressed about trends in the region.

As they approach their tenth anniversary of independence, the states of Central Asia continue to face difficult social, economic and political problems. In addition, the region is bounded by Russia, China, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran, creating an "Arc of Instability" that poses additional challenges. Against this backdrop, the five Central Asian states have made varying attempts at democratization and free-market economic reform, with varying results.

The overarching goal of U.S. policy in Central Asia is to see these states develop into stable, free-market democracies, both as a goal in itself and as a bulwark against regional instability and conflict. This broader goal serves three core strategic interests: regional security, political/economic reform and energy development. While our security and energy interests are important, in the long run none of these goals can be achieved until these governments undertake comprehensive reforms to enfranchise their people both economically and politically.

We have therefore encouraged, both through across-the-board political engagement and a variety of assistance programs, the formation of democratic civil societies and the development of free-market economies. We believe that such democratic values and institutions are the only real guarantors of long-term security and prosperity in this region and throughout the world. We have made this point repeatedly, both here in Washington, in the respective capitals and in other venues, such as the OSCE's weekly meetings in Vienna.

In some countries, particularly Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, there has been progress on economic reform. However, despite such efforts, progress towards democracy has been uneven at best, while in places like Turkmenistan, it is almost non-existent. Even more disturbing, however, has been the varying degrees of backsliding in countries like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan had been making progress but has recently chosen to retreat from that path by harassing NGOs and independent media. Growing levels of corruption have also contributed to reduced media and political freedoms throughout the region. We know these countries are capable of doing more and we want to help their societies make that leap to democracy. We need to help them by focusing on those elements essential for a flourishing democracy: political accountability, access to a marketplace of ideas, and an active civil society.

Political accountability, particularly as embodied by national elections, is the most obvious and well monitored aspect of democracy. In this area, the Central Asian republics have performed abysmally since gaining their independence. Each country recently has held two rounds of national elections, and all have been judged by the international community to be badly flawed. They have run the gamut from the problematic to the absurd. Turkmenistan's December 1999 elections were an utter farce, restricted to hand-picked government candidates and resulting in a Soviet-style turnout of nearly 99 percent. Tajikistan's elections, though flawed, were a major improvement over the previous round five years before; most significantly, they brought into office members of the Islamic Renaissance Party, the only openly Islamic party to participate in a Central Asian government coalition.

But of course, political democracy goes deeper than mere elections. Against all odds and despite the best efforts of these governments to suppress it, there are signs of a nascent democracy in much of Central Asia. Opposition parties proliferated throughout Central Asia in the aftermath of the break-up of the Soviet Union, and they continue to function in all but Turkmenistan, albeit under extreme pressure in most cases. Courageous political figures continue to speak out against government repression and corruption, facing personal risk of harassment, incarceration, and expulsion, not to mention the risk to their families, friends and associates. Nevertheless, such personal bravery can only go so far, and these democratic movements are in a vulnerable position. As a result of repeated manipulated elections, the Central Asian countries have only the faзade of representative democracy -- they have national legislatures not accountable to the people, which for the most part rubber stamp decisions by the executive.

The fate of the independent media in Central Asia is similar. Many independent newspapers, magazines, radio and TV stations sprang up over the last decade, some with broad news coverage and some with narrow target audiences. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan especially, these independent outlets flourished in the early years. However, they have come under increasing pressure of late, as their respective governments have conducted campaigns designed to eliminate and/or take over any news media that criticize or differ publicly with government policies. The governments have used various tactics: restrictive registration, frivolous or trumped-up tax investigations, criminal libel proceedings and withholding airwave frequencies or printing services, and orchestrating hostile buyouts of publishers or broadcasters by government surrogates.

Independent media face different challenges in the other Central Asian states. Media freedom is merely a footnote in Turkmenistan, where all outlets are government-owned and censorship is strict. The government of Uzbekistan allows private control only of local, non-political media outlets, and even they are coming under pressure in 2001. In Tajikistan independent media are an aberration from the situation in neighboring countries - the media thankfully survive because of government non-intervention. However, we were concerned by the recent efforts of the Tajik government to seek the extradition of Dodojon Atovulloev, an independent journalist who publishes a Tajik newspaper in Moscow. Fortunately, the reaction in Russia and abroad was strong and the Russian government released him shortly thereafter.

Finally, NGO activity has been perhaps the most impressive sign that while the governments of Central Asia often cling to autocratic traditions of the past, their people are truly beginning to understand the meaning of civil society. NGOs exist in all of the Central Asian countries and at all levels of society, even in Turkmenistan. Many of these organizations operate not only at the grass roots, but also take a leading role in advancing their chosen cause at a national level. They span such issues as health care & HIV/AIDS, environmental protection & resource conservation, women's and children's rights and faith-based organizations. NGO activities are not limited just to providing social services, but are increasingly taking on riskier issues, such as documenting human rights abuses and advocating peaceful political change and greater accountability of their governments.

For the most part, the Central Asian governments do not harass NGOs which do not engage in political activity and which avoid criticizing official policies. On the other hand, they often crack down on those NGOs that are politically active. NGOs involved in electoral education, election monitoring, and support for political party formation suffer badly under government restrictions.

In Kazakhstan, for example, the government continues to harass those NGOs and independent media outlets that recently lobbied against the draft media law. Tax police seized financial records and computers and asked the NGOs about "foreign financing" and their ties to the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the OSCE. The government claimed the NGOs broke the Law on Public Associations by accepting foreign funding of their activities, even though this law applies only to political parties and labor unions. We are concerned that this kind of harassment hampers the legitimate efforts of Kazakhstani citizens to exercise their rights to petition parliament.

Even more disturbing in Uzbekistan has been the recent death of Shovrik Ruzimuradov, head of the local branch of the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan (HRSU). We were deeply dismayed to learn that Ruzimuradov died in police custody only two weeks ago, possibly as a result of ill-treatment. He had been held incommunicado, unable to see any of his family members or colleagues. His body was turned over by the police July 7, less than three weeks after his arrest. The Government of Uzbekistan maintains it is conducting a thorough investigation into Mr. Ruzimuradov's death. Nothing less would be acceptable. Ruzimuradov, who once served as a deputy in the Uzbek parliament, had spoken out against government actions in recent months. Unfortunately, our most recent reports indicate increased pressure by Uzbekistan law enforcement agencies on members of NGO human rights groups.

Diplomatic Initiatives and Assistance Programs

In the face of such adversity and hardship, courageous men and women throughout Central Asia are risking their careers, their safety and, in the case of Mr. Ruzimuradov, their very lives, to bring democratic change to the region. We cannot abandon them in their struggle.

Against this backdrop, what can we do to help the people of Central Asia to achieve the dream of democracy and create for themselves a truly civil society, where political activists, independent journalists, and NGOs can operate freely and without risk to their livelihoods?

Over the past decade, we have given the Central Asian governments advice on constitutional and legislative reforms to create freely elected democratic political institutions. We have helped them create electoral commissions and the infrastructure necessary to administer free and fair elections. We have regularly reminded them of their obligations, as OSCE- participating states and members of the international community of nations, to respect and guarantee the fundamental human rights of their citizens. We have raised these issues at every level, from presidential meetings right down to daily embassy contacts both here in Washington and in their capitals abroad. Sometimes we succeed. Last month, the government of Kazakhstan withdrew from parliament a troubling draft law on religion, after consultation with the OSCE and others. Similarly, the Government of Uzbekistan released human rights activist Ismail Adylov after senior U.S. officials repeatedly raised the case during Foreign Minister Kamilov's visit to Washington last month.

We have also emphasized to these governments that it is very much in their own best interest to complete the transition to a free-market democracy, as the only final guarantor of security, stability and prosperity. We remind them that their policies of repressing political ideas and restricting economic opportunity will only increase dissatisfaction among their population.

Even more topical is the problem of Islamic extremism. We have repeatedly expressed our view to Uzbekistan's President Karimov that his persecution and repression of legitimate, peaceful practitioners of Islam is counterproductive. Rather than lessening the threat, he is actually radicalizing Uzbekistan's disaffected and disenfranchised youth and driving them into the arms of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and its radical allies. We have seen signs that the governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan may soon escalate their own campaigns against peaceful Islamic activities, and we have cautioned them against such steps.

Unfortunately, our efforts to promote democracy and respect for human rights in Central Asia have not been enough. Indeed, these governments seem to be giving up on the reality of democracy (though they cling to the rhetoric). As a result, we have altered our approach. Democracy and human rights issues take up more of the agenda in our bilateral discussions. We raise general problems and individual cases ever more frequently in public statements or at the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna.

In addition, we have reoriented our assistance programs to these states, shifting our democracy, economic, and humanitarian assistance more toward direct grants to local communities or via local NGOs, and rely less on government-to-government aid. We can point to rays of hope where targeted assistance has made a difference. For example, some communities have greater access to fresh water as a result of their use of citizen advocacy skills nurtured by U.S.-funded NGOs. Independent newspapers in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have been able to fulfill their important function as watchdogs by trying to hold governments accountable, albeit at the local level. With U.S. support and training, newspapers regularly report on such issues as local corruption. In the case of Mr. Ruzimuradov's recent death, his courageous colleagues at the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan were able to immediately inform the world of his tragic demise because it has a website and internet access, made possible in part by U.S. assistance.

Lest the governments misunderstand, we have made clear the central tenet of our assistance programs: "Aid Follows Reform." We do not seek to subvert these governments, nor undermine their authority. However, we will not allow our assistance to contribute to activities inconsistent with our own core values and beliefs.

As long as the Central Asian states remain unwilling to create democratic and market economic institutions and are unable to set aside ethnic and national rivalries to work together, they will be vulnerable to internal instability and/or external threats. The United States is trying to help these countries integrate into the Euro-Atlantic community of nations, to deepen their commitment to democratization, the rule of law and the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, the Copenhagen Document and other OSCE documents their governments have all signed. We hope that these nations, at a crossroads both metaphorically and geographically, can and will develop over time into functioning free market democracies. We continue to urge them to undertake the reforms that will allow for a lasting and fruitful partnership with the United States and the West.

2. WILLIAM B. TAYLOR, JR.

Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to the NIS Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights and Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia

Madame Chairman, I, too, am honored to testify before the Committee here today. While Mike Parmly represents the policy side of the house, I'm here to represent the assistance side, and I'm ready to answer any questions you may have about our efforts to promote democratic reform in Central Asia. But with your indulgence, I would first like to make a short statement.

Against the backdrop of the conditions that Mike has just described to you, the question arises: What can the U.S. do to help the people of Central Asia create democratic societies, given the fact that their governments are standing in the way of reform? As Mike said, we tell our foreign government interlocutors that U.S. assistance follows reform -- that is to say, if you're ready to reform, we're ready to help. Unfortunately, in the case of Central Asia, some of the governments have not been willing to reform; as a result, our assistance is focused on helping those brave individuals who are pursuing democratization from the grassroots level, even as their governments seek to thwart their every move. It's an uphill battle to say the least, but we are committed to support these democratically minded folks as long as they're willing to keep struggling.

Since fiscal year 1992, we have provided about $250 million in democracy-related assistance to the five Central Asian countries, including $35 million in FY 2000 and $36 million in FY 2001. For a combined regional population of some 54 million, that's certainly not a lot of money. We'd like to be able to allocate more money for Central Asia, but we face significant resource constraints.

Our democracy programs in Central Asia are almost entirely non-governmental in their focus. For example, while we have tried working with some of the Central Asian governments to promote free and fair elections over the past several years, it quickly became clear to us that the election officials were not interested in allowing, or were under orders not to allow, free and fair elections to take place. We therefore shifted the focus of our election-related assistance entirely to the non-governmental sector, working with NGOs and independent media outlets to help inform voters about their choices and to monitor the electoral process. The same is true of our other democracy-building programs as well. They are targeted almost exclusively at the non-governmental sector, with the exception of a few programs that work with reform-oriented local governments.

As Mike described in his testimony, the Central Asian countries have surprisingly active independent media outlets and NGOs, especially considering the inhospitable working environment that they face. The example of Kazakhstani NGOs and media outlets joining forces to protest a repressive draft media law was a very encouraging one. We would be happy to see similar grassroots coalition-building in the other Central Asian countries.

Over the past few years, we have undertaken numerous initiatives to support independent media, NGO development, and access to information in Central Asia, and we plan to do more. We are looking at creative ways to increase our support for independent print and broadcast media, including providing legal defense to journalists and media outlets harassed by the state. We are providing small grants to NGOs, including media watchdog, human-rights and election monitoring NGOs. In addition, we have established and are maintaining 17 public-access Internet sites in the Central Asian countries, with 14 additional sites to be opened soon.

There is a broad consensus that some of the most successful assistance programs we have are our exchange programs, especially those that bring over high school, undergraduate and graduate students to the United States. These programs reach out to the next generation of leaders. Since 1992, we have brought almost 10,000 Central Asians to the U.S. on our academic and professional exchange programs, including about 1,100 per year for the past several years. As one of our ambassadors once told me, these young people return home as "little revolutionaries," and many go on to assume influential positions in their countries' governments and parliaments. The Uzbek Government apparently shares our view of the importance of exchanges, because they have been allocating government resources to send young Uzbeks to the U.S. on academic exchange programs--we applaud them for their far-sightedness.

We can point to numerous examples where targeted assistance has made a difference. With our help, independent newspapers in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have been able to fulfill their important function as watchdogs by trying to hold governments accountable, albeit at the local level. Internet access is helping to counter the isolation of human-rights activists in Central Asia. Mr. Ruzimuradov's courageous colleagues at the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan were able to immediately inform the world of his tragic demise because it has a website and Internet access, made possible in part by U.S. assistance. Similarly, Ismail Adilov's human rights organization was able to announce his freeing from detention on its website, on which it credited the efforts of our embassy in Tashkent with helping to facilitate the release.

We acknowledge the fact that change in Central Asia is going to be a long-term, generational process. Our assistance can continue to play an important role by supporting courageous young journalists and NGO activists who are working to better their societies. Thank you once again for the opportunity to be here today -- I look forward to answering your questions and hearing your thoughts and recommendations.

3. Testimony of DR. CASSANDRA CAVANAUGH, Assistant Professor of History, College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, MA, consultant and former Senior Researcher, Europe and Central Asia Division, Human Rights Watch

Thank you for giving Human Rights Watch the opportunity to testify before you. Since the late 1980s, Human Rights Watch has promoted the observance of international human rights norms in the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union. We maintained an office in Dushanbe, Tajikistan from 1994 to 2000, and in 1996 opened an office in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Our general assessment is that Central Asian governments have, in the past two to three years, completely reversed the small steps toward democracy which some of them made in the early 1990s, and that their ongoing violations of their citizens' rights threaten-more than any other factor-to destabilize further an already troubled region.

The term "dissident" in the title of this hearing is fitting. In a democratic society, people who dissent from government policies may seek real change. We tend not to call them dissidents because they have the opportunity not only to dissent, but also to group together and form opposition movements. But in the authoritarian states of Central Asia, individuals who directly criticize government policies, or accuse their governments of violating citizens' rights and attempt to hold them accountable, become dissidents, for effective opposition to the government is not tolerated. In some states people may openly discuss social problems to a limited degree, but the governments prevent discussion from translating into action; in other states, any mention of strife, poverty or injustice falls under the censor's pen.

Today I would like to discuss three aspects of the region's mounting record of repressing dissidents that demonstrate most clearly how this repression paralyzes progress toward political and economic reform: the use of politicized justice and impunity for police brutality, the linkage between corruption and repression, and finally the particularly severe treatment of those who try to defend their fellow citizens against these rights violations. In conclusion I would like to share with you some of the recommendations Human Rights Watch has made to the Bush administration on U.S. policy toward the Central Asian states in the hopes that the U.S. government will consistently use the enormous leverage at its disposal to bring about real democratic change in the region. I request that this memorandum, together with the written version of my testimony that I will summarize, be entered into the hearing record.

A Record of Repression

Central Asian governments have arrested and otherwise persecuted scholars and writers, journalists and editors, opposition political activists and even ordinary persons who dare to express critical views. Whether by banning public demonstrations and detaining their would-be participants, closing down critical newspapers or other media, jailing journalists and activists on politically-motivated charges or attacking them physically, all five governments in the region, to a greater or lesser degree, attempt to silence the voice of dissent, the voice of opposition. It is difficult to conjure a more vivid and recent example of this harassment than what happened just two days ago, when security agents in Kazakhstan prevented Amirzhan Kossanov and Ermurat Bapi, two opposition party members who were to testify in this room today, from boarding their flight to Washington.

Political Justice

Without the rule of law, no person, whether a penniless pensioner who takes to the streets, or a powerful foreign investor, is safe from the arbitrary action of the government. Sadly, the Soviet practice of "telephone justice," when a local Communist Party boss could order any violation of the law with a simple phone call, has grown more, not less entrenched over the past ten years.

Leaders in the region use "telephone justice" to suppress dissent, manipulate elections, influence the outcome of trials, and the like. In Kazakhstan, the government used it to dismiss two city council members who were from the opposition Republican People's Party and the Russian organization "Lad." Similar "telephone calls," or arbitrary interventions, have arranged the dismissal of dissidents or their family members from state employment or educational institutions, with no hope of redress. Dissidents may face criminal charges, whether clearly political in nature or based on non-political acts, and be jailed or forced into exile.

Politicized justice is not only a matter of the arbitrary actions of government officials; in many cases, dissent itself is criminalized in law. Because of this, the kinds of political charges filed against dissidents in Central Asia bear a startling uniformity. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan have laws that criminalize "affronts to the honor and dignity" of the president or other government officials. In Kazakhstan, political activist Madel Ismailov served a year in a prison camp for this offense; the state has recently lodged this charge against other activists. Libel is a criminal offense. Those whose religious belief prompts them to dissent, or who are accused of membership in banned, peaceful Islamic organizations may be charged with inciting religious or national enmity.

The classic political offense is attempting to, or inciting others to overthrow the constitutional order. It is reminiscent of the notorious Article 58 of the Soviet Union's criminal code, which punished so many dissidents for "anti-state activity." And it is used across the region against those who dissent, whether they are political activists or ordinary citizens.

In Uzbekistan, charges of anti-constitutional activity and illegal religious activity have been used to jail literally thousands whom the state suspects of disloyalty. Uzbekistan is a country where dissidence can have fatal consequences, thanks to the state's tacit acceptance of police torture. In the past three years, at least sixteen religious prisoners died in custody in Uzbekistan. I would like to tell you about one of them, Emin Usmon, who died in March.

Emin Usmon was a well-known writer and commentator in Uzbekistan. Police detained him on February 11 this year, and accused him of religious radicalism. Persons close to Usmon maintain that it was his attempts to defend the rights of other persons so accused which angered the government. Early on the morning of March 1, police brought his body back to his family home, at the same time as fifty to sixty officers in uniform and plainclothes surrounded Usmon's neighborhood. Initially, police told the family that Mr. Usmon had committed suicide, a highly suspicious allegation, considering that Mr. Usmon's well-known religious beliefs would prevent him from contemplating such a step. However, the death certificate ultimately supplied to the family stated that he had died of a "brain tumor." No independent medical examination was allowed, nor was the family allowed to view the body as is customary. Nonetheless, one relative saw clearly a still-bleeding wound on the back of Mr. Usmon's head during the procedure of preparing the body for burial. Police officers demanded that the family bury the body immediately, and the cemetery was surrounded by police officers, who did not allow other relatives or neighbors to take part. Those who did were questioned by police and warned not to discuss what they had seen. The conflicting account provided by police as to the cause of death, the clandestine return of the body and burial, and the refusal by police to allow the family to view the body all indicate that the actual cause of Mr. Usmon's death was physical mistreatment while in custody.

I have no recent examples of the persecution of dissidents in Turkmenistan. This is not because the government has suddenly grown tolerant, but because with the jailing in 2000 of Nurberdi Nurmamedov, co-chair of the opposition movement Agzybirlik, Turkmenistan silenced its last voice of dissent. While Mr. Nurmamedov was released in December 2000, after swearing an oath of loyalty to Turkmen President Saparmurad Niyazov, he is under constant surveillance, and must know that his life and liberty, and that of his family, hang in the balance.

Repression and Corruption

By repressing dissidents, governments hope to stop the flow of information on the corruption that has become a hallmark of their rule. High levels of corruption are associated with low levels of development. The ability of the governed to speak out against abuses by those who govern them is the first principle of accountability and transparency in government, basic building blocks of both democracy and efficient economic markets.

You have heard of the case of Dodojon Atovullo, editor of Tajikistan's Charogi Ruz (Daylight), Tajikistan's most popular and long-lived opposition paper. Only thanks to intense international pressure did Russia decline to extradite him to Tajikistan, where he stands accused of all three classic political charges: insulting presidential honor and dignity, inciting religious and national enmity, and calling for the overthrow of the constitutional order. Mr. Atovullo had over the past few months published several stories, in his own and other papers, exposing the corruption of those at the highest levels of government, and their alleged involvement in the narcotics trade.

Other, lesser known whistleblowers have not fared so well. Police arrested Nomonjon Arkabaev, coordinator for the Kyrgyz Committee for Human Rights (KCHR) in the southern town of Osh, in late June. Arkabaev had published an article in a local paper decrying local authorities' manipulation of the land privatization process to their own benefit. During a search of his home, police claimed to have found leaflets of the banned religious group, Hizb ut Tahrir (the Party of Liberation), which Arkabaev's supporters say were planted by the police. Arkabaev has been charged with calling for the overthrow of the constitutional order, and on July 3 announced a hunger strike to protest the trumped-up charges.

Attacking the Defenders

As the case of Nomonjon Arkabaev demonstrates, sometimes those who attempt to defend their fellow citizens face the most severe repression. The government of President Askar Akaev has for several years attempted to stamp out Arkabaev's organization, the KCHR, whose chairman, Ramazan Dyryldaev, was forced into exile in 2001.

Uzbekistan has not relented in its aggressive hostility toward defenders. Uzbek authorities released rights defender Mahbuba Kasymova after she served seventeen months in prison, but almost immediately began harassing her when she began engaging in human rights activism. Elena Urlaeva, an activist from the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan, was locked in a psychiatric hospital and forced to undergo treatment. This is a chilling throwback to the Soviet era.

At times the results are tragic. On July 7, Uzbek police returned the body of Shovrik Ruzimurodov to his family, the second Uzbek dissident to die in police custody in the last four months. Ruzimurodov had been a deputy in Uzbekistan's Supreme Soviet, elected during the halcyon days of glasnost in the late 1980s, and had remained an outspoken opposition activist, despite having been arrested on political grounds in 1992 and 1998. In the last year, Ruzimurodov, a member of the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan, had done everything possible to provide international organizations with information on the plight of villagers displaced from their homes at gunpoint and unjustly accused of collaborating with Islamic rebels. Arrested on June 15, Ruzimurodov was not allowed any contact with his family, who were not even informed of his whereabouts until July 7, when they received the news from police that he was dead. As after the suspicious death of Emin Usmon, police forced the rapid burial of Ruzimurodov, and encircled his entire village to prevent outsiders from witnessing the evidence of their acts.

What can the U.S. do?

International policy-making toward the Central Asian states often focuses on factors seen to contribute to the region's potential for conflict, such as drug trafficking, disputes over access to water, or the ongoing war in Afghanistan. Regional governments never tire of citing what they term the "threat of Islamic fundamentalism," and their international interlocutors, alarmed by the specter of the Taliban, often take these assertions at face value. Countries in such a difficult security environment, it is implied, should not have their policies examined too closely. The fact that this committee is holding this hearing shows that you reject this logic. These countries' own policies toward their citizenry, more than any external threat, pose the main danger to regional stability. Repression aggravates social tensions. It widens the gulf between citizens and their governments, undermines economic reform, deters honest investment, and stunts the development of strong civil societies.

At times, U.S. policymakers have justified close relations with countries with poor human rights records due to important strategic interests. Often, such cooperation is accompanied by claims that abuser governments are "moving toward" compliance with human rights standards, or are making progress, however gradual. But the trends in the Central Asia region, as we have seen, are toward more repression, not less, and greater authoritarianism, not democracy. Therefore, we believe that U.S. policy toward the region should be reoriented to arrest the downward political trends.

U.S. policy during the past eight years has failed to address these problems effectively, largely because the message conveyed to these governments has been inconsistent. Rhetorical assertions of the importance of human rights and democratization as the key to developing full relations with the U.S. have been coupled with an assistance policy that conferred benefits on those states, without regard for their human rights performance. This approach has badly undercut the U.S. government's human rights message, providing virtually no incentives to curb abuse and pursue reform. Policy-makers, particularly in the areas of economic and security assistance, seemingly fail to consult the thorough and evenhanded reporting on human rights issued annually by the Department of State.

Assistance granted through the United States Export-Import Bank has done much to contradict the U.S. human rights message to the region. By FY 2000, Kazakhstan had received more than $60 million in Export-Import Bank financing, and Uzbekistan had received nearly $900 million. In May of this year, after three years of a brutal crackdown against peaceful Muslims, and just one month after rights defender Elena Urlaeva was locked away in a psychiatric hospital, the Export-Import Bank issued another two loans, totaling more than $50 million, the main beneficiary of which are enterprises controlled by the Uzbek government. Human Rights Watch welcomes the draft bill to create an office for human rights impact assessment within the Export-Import Bank, but we hope that until such an office is created, that there can be some effective oversight to ensure that no more U.S. taxpayer money is funneled to abuser governments without a thorough review.

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, with its statutory requirement to assist only countries that are "committed to and applying the principles of multiparty democracy, pluralism and market economics," has enormous leverage to press for change. Yet, rather than draw explicit connections between investment decisions and countries' adherence to these principles, the Bank has invested significant sums in abusive countries: $571.7 million in Uzbekistan; $149 million in Kyrgyzstan, and $500 million in Kazakhstan. And with the exception of Turkmenistan, where it pointed to the total lack of political reform, the Bank has cited only the lack of progress in macroeconomic reform as justification for any scale back of investment. Even as the Bank announced that its commitments to Uzbekistan would decrease this year because of that government's currency policy, the EBRD Board also voted to hold its 2003 annual meeting in Uzbekistan's capital, boosting that country's political prestige.

The EBRD's praise of Kazakhstan despite ongoing persecution of opposition figures also casts doubt on its consistency in applying the principles of its charter. The country strategy approved in January 2001 cites Kazakhstan's cooperation with the post-election activities of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as proof of the government's good faith reform efforts, giving the government credit for talk rather than for change. In fact, Kazakhstan's opposition walked out of the OSCE-sponsored roundtables to protest the government's refusal to commit to real reform.

To stem this trend, Congress should instruct the U.S. representative to the Bank to incorporate full, up-to-date information on the human rights conditions in each country in the Bank's deliberations on strategy and individual lending projects. It should urge the administration to identify specific benchmarks for U.S. support for continued or enhanced lending by the international financial institutions.

Because regional governments often charge their peaceful, non-violent opponents with attempting to forcibly overthrow them, Human Rights Watch would like to caution against making military-security cooperation the centerpiece of bilateral relations with the states of Central Asia. An unconditional emphasis on anti-terrorism cooperation supports these governments' equation of ideas they disfavor with terrorism, and communicates that the U.S. considers the threats they face to be fundamentally external, rather than stemming from poor governance at home. It makes little sense to equip Central Asian governments to battle insurgents if at the same time those governments continue to pursue policies that may drive their own citizens to support the insurgencies, whether actively or passively. Where security assistance does go forward, for example under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, it should be everywhere paired with a clear human rights message that the level, nature, and recipients of such assistance depend on human rights performance. We hope that Congress will urge the administration to develop a coordinated interagency strategy on security assistance in the region, to ensure that all the actors involved, including the Departments of Defense and Justice, the FBI and the CIA deliver the same, consistent message.

Finally, Congress must urge the administration to use all the policy tools at its disposal to secure improvements in Central Asia. A regrettably underused tool is the International Religious Freedom Act. In the next month, the Bush administration will determine which states it will name as countries of particular concern for religious freedom. The U.S. must take a consistent and principled approach to IRFA implementation. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan should be designated as countries of particular concern this year. A clear signal should also be sent to the governments of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan that repression of peaceful religious expression also risks their designation as countries of particular concern.

Conclusion

Not only our core national values, but also pragmatism demands that the U.S. press Central Asian governments to uphold their international obligations to protect free expression. Corruption will never be rooted out unless the activities of the powerful are exposed to the light of day, and until citizens have the ability to hold their own governments accountable. Human Rights Watch believes that a policy that fully and consistently integrates human rights concerns into all aspects of U.S. relations with these countries offers the best hope for concrete improvements and for effectively addressing the economic stagnation and political instability in the region. Thank you very much for your attention.

4. Testimony of BEGELDIN GABDULLIN

Editor-in-Chief of 21st Century Newspaper in Kazakhstan

Members of Congress!

My name is Bigeldin Gabdullin. I am a journalist, the editor of the newspaper "XXI Century", which has been closed down by the Kazakh authorities and which was earlier fire-bombed. Criminal proceedings have been started against me in Kazakhstan on charges of insulting the honor and dignity of President Nazarbayev.

I am very grateful for this opportunity to appear before members of the United States Congress. The fact that you have repeatedly shown interest in the human rights situation and the state of democracy in our country is deeply appreciated. The representatives of the opposition parties of Kazakhstan realize that everything that is said by us in Washington will become known to the whole world.

The regime of Mr. Nazarbayev fears this forum. It attempts, therefore, to prevent our representatives from coming here. I must tell you that Amirzhan Kosanov and Ermurat Bapi, who were invited to attend these hearings, were detained at the airport and their passports were seized by security officers, although these officers knew perfectly well where Kosanov and Bapi were going.

The minister of foreign affairs,Mr. Idrisov, said in a newspaper interview that these hearings are nothing but an insignificant behind-the-scenes gathering arranged by a small group of congressmen who had invited their friends and I quote his words "I would like you to understand that these hearings are not official. These are backstage hearings". Well, accordingly, it seems that all of us testifying and present here are unofficial persons behind the curtains. But those who have come here from Kazakhstan represent not Nazarbayev, Idrisov and the likes of them. We represent our people.

With me in this room are the leaders of the opposition. Every one of them has been a victim of persecution. The family of Gulzhan Ergaliev was attacked, she was beaten, her husband was crippled for life. Dzhumbai Dospanov, the leader of the opposition in Western Kazakhstan has facing constant pressure and was tried in court for his activities.

The journalist Sergei Duvanov has been deprived of the right to practice his profession because he was unwilling to tell lies and conceal the truth. Tatiana Deltsova lost her job because she reported in her news program on television about the provocations staged by the special services against Professor Masanov and Amirzhan Kosanov, who together with their families were physically sealed in their apartments with all telephone lines cut and were threatened in order to stop them from attending an opposition meeting. Tatiana was forced to leave Kazakhstan, and she is here today.

Veteran human rights advocate Karashal Asan Ata, a prominent dissident during the Soviet period, was recently tried for criticizing the President. He was charged with insulting the honor and dignity of the President. The newspaper "SolDat", which published his article, was also closed down. Ermurat Bapi, chief editor of that paper, was sentenced to a year in prison and remained free only thanks to a timely amnesty.

However, our comrade - Satzhan Ibraev - is in prison charged with preparing an armed attack. We fear for his life and ask you to help this prisoner of conscience.

The leader of the Republican People's Party of Kazakhstan, Akezhan Kazhegeldin, has also been charged with preparing an armed insurrection. Another ten or so criminal indictments have been prepared against him ranging from non-payment of taxes to arms possession. He has been forced to live abroad for the last three years in spite of the fact that developments in his country demand his presence, since he is the most likely candidate to win any honestly conducted election.

Nazarbayev will never voluntarily agree to true and honest elections. His main goal is unlimited and permanent power. For the sake of this goal he has violated the Constitution, suppressed democracy and destroyed civil liberties. Yet for him power is not a goal in itself but a means to an end - self-enrichment. President Nazarbayev, his family and his entourage have created an un-precendented system of corruption, have helped themselves to fabulous riches, and have perverted officialdom.

I am attaching a note to this statement which explains how, when and how many millions of dollars were received in bribes and how much money was stolen from the national treasury, where and in what accounts these funds are kept, and who among the American businessmen acted as an intermediary in paying and receiving bribes and helped with the embezzlement. This is the result of the journalistic investigation conducted with the help of the true friends of Kazakhstan in different countries.

The Department of Justice of the United States is currently conducting an investigation prompted by suspicions that American companies have been paying bribes to President Nazarbayev. He was demanding bribes not only in the form of money but in planes, tennis courts and other luxuries.

It is known how sensitively Nazarbayev's regime reacted to the passage of Congressional Resolution 397 and the State Department report on human rights violations in Kazakhstan. According to information received from our allies in Kazakhstan's government circles, President Nazarbayev asked the Administration to exert influence on your committee in order to cancel these hearings. This is as hard to believe as it was hard to believe the reports that the President had asked Madeleine Albright to stop a US criminal investigation involving him as the recipient of multi-million dollar bribes. And yet, that turned out to be the truth.

We realize that only the people of Kazakhstan can secure democracy and freedom in Kazakhstan. We do not ask the United States to intervene in the political process and to bring about the replacement of the president. But we know how effective US support of democratic forces can be when they are helped to overcome an information blockade. There are no newspapers left which are not controlled by the regime. This is so because all printing facilities are under its control. Please, help create an independent printing facility in Almaty! This would allow the opposition to carry truth to the people.

The same applies to the Internet. The regime controls all providers and engages openly in censorship. The latest example: an article by Seymour Hersh, which appeared in the "New Yorker" was blocked out from the opposition site "Eurasia", because this article tells of how Nazarbayev helped sell Iranian oil and what commissions he received for this. I am, therefore, asking the United States Administration in the name of all democratic parties to create an independent Internet provider which would not violate freedom of information.

With these tools we will be able to return our country to the road to democracy. An important prerequisite for the peaceful political development of Kazakhstan is the opportunity for us all to live and engage in political activity in our own homeland. If the leader of the democratic forces Akezhan Kazhegeldin, other political figures and journalists continue to be kept out of the country, public outrage will be used by proponents of violent action. This has already happened in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. It may happen in Kazakhstan as well.

The longer Nazarbayev remains in power, the greater the likelihood of violence, extremism and religious fanaticism. To those who place their hopes on Nazarbayev, who wish him well, I would give the following advice: help him depart the political arena with dignity. Nudge him toward a peaceful dialogue with the opposition and toward a democratic transfer of power. Counsel him to think of how his name will appear in history books. His children are mired in corruption, but his grandchildren are still young and innocent. He must think of them. According to news reports, the son of Slobodan Milosevic is hiding out in Kazakhstan. Where will Nazarbayev's grandchildren flee to if popular unrest breaks out? Only to Cuba, to Afghanistan, to Iran. But only as long as these remain rogue states.

I thank you for your interest and for your help in giving all of us hope that the United States of America does care about the repression and corruption that exists in our country.

5 U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN CENTRAL ASIA

Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., Research Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies, the Shelby and Kathryn Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation.

U.S. Interests in Central Asia

Central Asia, geopolitically and economically, is an important region of the Eastern Hemisphere, occupying areas adjacent to several nuclear powers, such as Russia, China, India and Pakistan. It is located in proximity to a potential nuclear power, Iran, and is a major repository of oil, natural gas, gold, uranium and other minerals.

While historically predominantly Turkic and Moslem, Central Asia was influenced by Russia, which conquered it during the second half of the nineteenth century and continued its rule during the Soviet period. However, currently, Russian influence is increasingly being supplanted by that of China and Islamic movements and forces, some of them militant, with bases in Afghanistan, Pakistan and beyond. To the lesser extent, Turkey and the West - the United States and the European Union - have influence as well. In the future, the competition for influence in Central Asia is likely to increase.

On July 16, the presidents of Russia and China signed a Treaty for Good Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation in Moscow. This treaty is the first such agreement between these two Eurasian powers since Mao Zedong signed a treaty with Joseph Stalin of the USSR in 1950, four months before the outbreak of the Korean War. The 1950 pact was clearly driven by anti-Western sentiments.

The motivations behind this new treaty are much more complex, and involve serious geopolitical, military, and economic considerations. In a sense, it is a logical product of the improvement in Sino-Russian relations that began under the last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev. It also should be taken as a signal to the Western world that a major geopolitical shift make be occurring in the Eurasian balance of power, with serous implications for the United States and its allies.

The treaty comes on the heels of another significant security arrangement: On June 14, Russia, China, and four Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) announced the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a friendship ostensibly aimed at confronting Islamic radical fundamentalism and promoting economic development. Taken together, the formation of the SCO, coupled with the July treaty signing, portend an important geopolitical transformation for Central Asia, Russia and China. These two regional giants are positioning themselves to define the rules under which the United States, the European Union, Iran, and Turkey will be allowed to participate in the strategically important Central Asian region.

The U.S. has several important state interests in Central Asia. It should strive to:

Deny one country or a group of countries, such as Russia and China, the ability to dominate the region to the exclusion of American presence; and deny China the ability to establish a new sphere of influence in the region

Prevent the transformation of Central Asia into a base for radical Islamic forces, such as the Taliban or Usama Bin Ladin's organization, including stopping these entities from establishing training camps and bases of operations in the region and frustrating any attempts to subvert or take over Central Asian governments;

Prevent the region from becoming a major corridor for drug trade into Europe and the Commonwealth of New Independent States

Ensure access for U.S. companies to energy and other natural resources and markets in the region

Encourage and support the development of civil society, the rule of law and transparent market economy

Thus far, achieving these goals has been difficult, especially in the areas of the observance of human rights and support of legitimate political dissent.

Geopolitical Context of U.S. Policy in Central Asia

Opposition to the United States as the sole superpower is akey component of the developing strategic partnership between Moscow and Beijing. In addition, both Russia and China are concerned about Moslem radical movements in their territories and around their borders. Since the 1970s, the Turkic Moslem Uighurs in the Western Chinese province of Xinjiang, 7 million strong, have been conducting a violent struggle for independence. They have killed police and soldiers, planted bombs and robbed banks. In 1997, Uighur militants exploded a bomb in Beijing, wounding 30 people. They have also developed connections to radical Islamic movements and are training in religious schools (medrese) and camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Uighurs also reside in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, across the border with China.

The stability of Xinjiang is important to China. It is seen as a test case of central control, relevant to Beijing's grip over Tibet and Inner Mongolia. Xinjiang is also viewed as a traditional buffer against Turkic Moslem invasions from the North-West. The province also contains three major oil basins: the Turpan, Jungar and Tarim, with up to 150 billion barrels of reserves, according to some optimistic estimates. Last but not least, the People's Liberation Army maintains numerous bases and nuclear weapons testing grounds in the region, which could be threatened if the Uighurs gain control.

Russia is in a similar position as it enters its seventh year of conflict in Chechnya. Radical Moslem penetration of other North Caucasus autonomous republics, such as Daghestan, is increasing, as evidenced by non-Chechen participation in terrorist activities in Russia. The Russian leaders fear a chain reaction among the country's 20 million Moslems.

In the long term, the threat of Moslem insurrection in Central Asia could well become more serious. The ruling regimes, allied with Russia, suffer from a lack of legitimacy and are bereft of democratic process. With economic reforms in the Central Asian countries sputtering or stalling, corruption is running rampant, GDPs are flat, and living standards are abysmally low. These conditions provide fertile ground for Islamic radicals, who are busily recruiting and training the next generation of Jihad warriors. The radical, drug-pushing Taliban regime across the Amu Darya river is particularly menacing.

The flood of drugs and weapons across the Tajik-Afghan border is a challenge to the Russian expeditionary force (the reinforced 201st Infantry Division), while indigenous support for the Taliban, as well as the pervasive corruption and political maneuvering that characterize both Moscow and Dushanbe, prevent Russia and the Tajiks from effectively countering the Islamic rebels.

The secular, authoritarian, and corrupt regimes of Central Asia rely upon their traditional ties to Moscow as a form of life insurance. And Russia believes it must either fight the Islamists in the deserts of Central Asia or face them in Northern Kazakhstan, where many ethnic Russians reside.

Russia finds its options limited. It can either face the instability in Central Asia on its own or to bring in China as a partner. Beijing views Central Asia, with its weak governments and rich natural resources-especially oil and gas-as a future natural sphere of influence. The recent institutionalization of the SCO demonstrates that Moscow and Beijing hope to be the decisionmakers in Central Asia, possibly to the exclusion of Turkey, Iran, and the United States. What remains to be seen is how effective the two counties will be against the Taliban, the Islamic Front of Uzbekistan, and the Bin Laden organization.

Sources of dissent: the failure of post-communist reforms in Central Asia

Since the collapse of the USSR, all five Central Asian states have been ruled by the Soviet-era nomenklatura, the communist elite which attempted to transform itself into nationalist leadership. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are still ruled by the men who were in charge in the mid-1980s, while Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are governed by leaders who have been in power since the early 1990s. However, instead of following models of democracy and market reforms, all these leaders have either largely ignored the reform process, as is the case in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, or made some attempt to initiate economic reforms, but then backtracked and are now mired in unprecedented corruption, lack of transparency and criminality. It is little wonder these regimes are quickly run out of legitimacy and popular support, and have to revert to brazen manipulation of their political system, or outright authoritarian methods, to remain in power and fight off political challenges.

Economically, Central Asia's resource rich countries, such as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, with their huge oil and natural gas deposits, suffer from glaring inequities in the distribution of wealth. In both countries, only the ruler, his family, and a few political allies and cronies benefit from the energy riches, while the majority of the population suffers from low incomes, social underdevelopment, diseases and environmental pollution.

In poor countries, such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the situation is desperate. When hit by drought or other natural disasters, rural dwellers are often on the verge of starvation. The populations of the two countries turning en masse to drug trafficking and other illicit activities. High unemployment levels among young males are a sure-fire prescription to fuel militant Islamic movements, as numerous examples from Algeria to Indonesia demonstrate.

While the people are dissatisfied, and often desperate, the rulers are most of all interested in their own power and political survival, as well as personal enrichment. They are doing everything possible to deny the development of legitimate channels of protest, such as political parties and the free media. Instead, the aggrieved population is turning to radical Islam's promises to deliver "the true path" of Allah, even at the price of great personal sacrifice and suffering.

Silencing the Voices of Dissent

According to human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, the national commission on human rights, opposition media, and activists both in the respective countries and in exile, as well as the eyewitness accounts of Western experts, the Central Asian governments generally attempt to paint all opposition with one brush - that of international terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism.

The existence of the Islamic threat in Central Asia is undeniable. However, it is important to distinguish between militant Islamic radicals, moderate Islamic activists, clerics and politicians, and secular, Westernized human rights activists. By persecuting the two latter categories, the ruling regimes tend to isolate themselves and increase the possibilities of social upheavals which could result in the deposition of these regimes in the future.

It is also important to emphasize that without developed political channels for redressing grievances, ensuring freedom of worship, facilitating political change and the rule of law, striving for manageable levels of corruption, and protecting freedom of the media and freedom of association, thousands of Central Asians: Uzbeks, Turkmen, Kazakhs and others, will swell the ranks of radical organizations, such as the Islamic Front of Uzbekistan, the Moslem Brotherhood, and others.

Banning genuine political parties, such as Erk and Birlik in Uzbekistan, the National Republican Party led by the former Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin in Kazakhstan, or Ar-Namys, led by the former Vice President Felix Kulov in Kyrgyzstan, is a sure way to incur criticism abroad and fan the flames of dissent at home.

The degree to which dissent is repressed is uneven throughout the region. Turkmenbashi (Chief-of-Turkmens) Saparmurad Niyazov's Turkmenistan is the most oppressive, with all the trappings of a totalitarian dictatorship. Niyazov was proclaimed president-for-life by his tame parliament. He built a 40-foot golden statue of himself, which rotates to follow the sun. He regularly purges Turkmenistan's libraries and schools of books he dislikes.Opponents to Niyazov are kept in extremely harsh imprisonment for lengthy periods; after being forced to publicly confess their guilt on national TV. The lives of many of the regime's opponents are threatened. Religious minorities, including Christians, are constantly harassed.

There is no independent media, and heavy censorship of the Internet and news from abroad, as well as restrictions on travel, are in place.

President Islam Karimov's Uzbekistan developed an ideology which is based on worship of the past, including the cult of Amir Timur (Tamerlane), in whose honor a shrine was erected in the center of the capital city Tashkent. Tamerlane's empire covered most of today's Central Asia, but reached as far as Russia in the West, and China and India in the East. This is an outright cult of military power and territorial aggrandizement.

Uzbekistan is holding between 15,000 to 30,000 political opponents and religious activists in its jails. Many reports claim that some people are arrested for as little as wearing a beard or traditional Moslem garb. According to local and Western human rights organizations, torture is widespread, despite Uzbekistan being a signatory of the international convention banning torture.

At one point, between 70 and 80 percent of all mosques were shut down under the pretext of lack of registration. There are very few, if any, attempts to find a modus vivendi with moderate Moslems. The Uzbek government hopes that Russia and China will support its authoritarian policies, if Uzbekistan initiates rapprochement with Moscow and Beijing, and distances itself from the West. However, the slow pace of economic reforms, and threats from radical Moslem organizations on its borders may ultimately provoke destabilizing hostilities, and it is not clear whether China and Russia will be capable of protecting the Karimov regime.

The leadership of Kazakhstan also demonstrates a heavy hand in dealing with political opposition. As in other Central Asian countries, libel is a criminal offense, and insulting the president often is a cause for criminal prosecution, as Madel Islmailov, the leader of Workers' Movement found out in 1999. Other opponents of the regime, such as Mikhail Vasilenko, Petr Svoik, and Mels Yeleusizov, a leader of the environmental movement, have been placed in administrative detention.

Freedom of the press suffered a heavy blow when the Franklin Press, a printing house supplied to Kazakhstan with American taxpayer's funds, was forcibly sold to a company controlled by Dariga, President Nazarbaev's daughter. Boris Giller, the founder of the leading privately-held free media company, Caravan, was forced to sell his asset and has emigrated from the country in 1998. Dariga Nazarbaeva, the owner of Caravan,also controls most of Kazakhstan's electronic media.

Freedom of the media is extremely important, as Mr. Nazarbaev is reportedly under a at least one grand jury indictment in this country, according to a report by Seymour Hersh in this month's issue of the New Yorker. No official Kazakhstani newspaper is permitted to print this news, as by law all personal information about the president and his family is a state secret. In addition, according to a new law, the Parliament granted President Nazarbaev immunity from prosecution for any and all crimes committed while in office, with the exception of high treason.

It was hardly surprising that President Nazarbaev lashed out at the last Shanghai Six summit against the United States, accusing Washington of being too didactic and aggressive in promoting democracy. Today in Kazakhstan, opposition newspapers are often harassed and even physically attacked, and Internet access is kept artificially expensive. Internet sites are controlled by the security services, and opposition sites are often censored.

In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, some improvements in the mid-1990s was followed by a deterioration in handling political dissent, observing the rule of law and respecting freedom of the press.

Conclusion

The failure of local elites to embrace participatory frameworks of governance and transpartent market reform, oppose corruption, and recognize basic individual rights, has led to the current rise in political instability. The threats of Islamic insurrections and internal political opposition are forcing the governing regimes to appeal to regional powers for support. The United States should fully recognize the threat of Islamic extremism in the region and elsewhere, as this extremism is aimed against American interests and American citizens, as the World Trade Center, Khobar Towers and the Cole attacks have demonstrated. However, unfortunately, regime insecurity is also a cause for brutality, a motivation to silence the voices of political opposition and criticism. While this may work in the short term, it can make things worse in the long run, including in Central Asia.

Thus far, the U.S. Administration, EU governments, and international organizations, have failed to convince Central Asian leaders to follow democratic models, to make their economies attractive to foreign investment, or to respect the pluralism of political opinions. This is a political, as well as a civilizational choice the Central Asian leaders have actively made, while at the same time seeking succor in Moscow and Beijing.

Today, with Russia and China attempting to play the leading role in the region, the chances of Central Asia embracing democracy remain slim. However, the United States should continue to uphold the ideas of freedom of speech, free media, freedom of religion, and the rule of law. These ideals are not contradictory to American political goals in the region - on the contrary, if implemented, they would make the political systems of Central Asian countries more sustainable and legitimate, and thus would increase regional security and stability, enhance economic development, and boost foreign investment.

Eurasianet, 27 July 2001

http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/eav072701a.shtml