Positive-Sum Relations with Russia in Central Asia
Ira Straus
Are America and Russia adding up positive sums or punching it
out along zero sum lines in Central Asia?
An example: after some dramatic haggling, in which it seemed like
Russian border guards were about to leave Tajikistan, it was decided on June 4 that the
Russians would stay at least until 2006. This ought to be a good thing for all parties –
for Russia, for Tajikistan and for the United States, which also has an interest in
security along the Tajik-Afghan border. Yet this could also be characterized as a turn by
the Tajik government away from a budding American alignment, which had been expressed in
earlier attempts to push Russia out. Likewise, a Russian analyst, Sergei Blagov, connected
the earlier, anti-Russian moves to Tajik exploration of turning to a U.S. alignment (in
“Are Plans for Tajikistan Unraveling?,” Asia Times, May 6, 2004). It was the
earlier anti-Russian moves that forced the game into a zero-sum mould. If that was
America’s game, it lost.
Another example: Uzbekistan has reinforced its relations with Russia,
dealing the United States a blow in its moves to establish its bases and its influence in
the region in place of Russia. This is not a quote from any single source. Rather, it is
how the events of June 15-16 – a Russia-Uzbek pact and a Shanghai Cooperation
Organization summit – have been interpreted in both the Russian and Western policy
analysis communities. The interpretation has an element of truth: there is a new bilateral
security pact that says, among other things, that neither nation "will allow a third
state to use its territory in a way that can harm the sovereignty of the other."
Russian fears shine through in this; but operationally it could dissolve into
insignificance if the United States salves Russian fears. And most of the other elements
in the enhanced Russian-Uzbek relationship are not zero-sum – not unless made so by the
belief on both sides that it must be so. The planned joint anti-terrorism institute is a
form of functional cooperation that the United States could consider making itself a part
of.
America is going to lose too often in the zero-sum game and ought to
stop playing it – or allowing itself to be played off against Russia by the local
rulers, as may have happened in the Tajik incident. Given the natural strength of Russian
influence in the region, it is simply not a sound game for America. Russia has too many
cards to play – ethnic Central Asians in Moscow whose remittances help keep Central Asia
afloat, ethnic Russians in Central Asia who are also essential to the local economy,
Central Asian debts to Russia, etc.
Yet month after month, the media – particularly the specialized media
of the policy analysis community – report zero-sum moves. If they are Russian media,
they report nasty moves by the United States and analyze how these are meant to thwart
Russia’s legitimate interests. If they are American media, they report ugly moves by
Russia and analyze how these are meant to thwart America’s beneficent influence in the
region. Often they see the moves of both sides as zero-sum – yet they give all the blame
to the other side for the zero-sum spirit, and proceed to prescribe (or predict, or
praise) a zero-sum response on their own side.
With such “help” from their respective analysis communities,
reinforced by Cold War habits, one might expect the two governments to follow completely
zero-sum policies in the region. And to end up worse off for it.
Fortunately the reality has, instead, been mixed: some major moves of
mutual support and joint policy, alongside some zero-sum moves and some in-between,
symbiotic moves. This suggests that there has been new learning from experience, not yet
filtered down into some entrenched subcultures; and that there could be a larger space for
positive-sum outcomes out there waiting to be tapped, if it could only be explored and
analyzed.
The policy analysis community has not been helping with this, neither
in Moscow nor in Washington. Not most of the time, at least. But let me paint the scenery
of a meeting last month where policy analysts did better.
It was a pleasant day at one of the inside-the-beltway think tanks in
Washington. A seminar was being held on American and Russian roles in Central Asia. The
speakers were competent, reasonable and intelligent. They quickly stumbled into the pit of
zero sum logic. Nothing new here. Nevertheless, by the end of the day, the discussion
turned itself around, worked its way out of the pit, and climbed up into the sunnier realm
of positive sums.
How did it happen? In the early stages, audience questioners as well as
panelists were mostly talking within zero-sum frameworks. It did not require a specific
effort; it was a default mode for sophisticated analysis. Speakers would sometimes
presuppose an inherent natural opposition of U.S. and Russian interests – that is, they
would make an unstated zero-sum assumption from the U.S. side – and other times,
somewhat contradictorily, would attribute Russian policies to an incorrigible zero-sum
outlook in failing to appreciate the wonderful positive-sum approach of the Americans.
They would busily develop, tit-for-tat, the implications of these assumptions, depicting
mutually opposing past moves, and predicting and prescripting similar future moves. And
while they would describe the negativity on both sides, somehow they would always dump the
blame for the negativity on Russia.
However, one audience member, a former American diplomat in Moscow,
intervened to observe that Russian officials, while deaf to all his protestations in the
1990s that U.S. moves in the region were not zero-sum, were not always mistaken in that
deafness: some of the moves were indeed zero-sum. It was, he said, a "dialogue of the
deaf," meaning that the deafness went both ways.
After that, a few questioners and panelists were of a positive-sum
bent. They argued that the United States and Russia had more important common interests
than opposing interests in the region; that zero-sum habits were to be found within the
bureaucracies on both sides, and both sides were at fault for this; and that there were
also some positive-sum people on both sides. This led to the point that two kinds of
coalitions were possible: zero-sum attitudes could prevail by symbiosis, in the usual
tit-for-tat manner, but the space was also open for positive-sum people to make progress,
if they would communicate their interest in cooperation and develop initiatives together.
The impressive thing, this group argued, was not the zero sums that
remained after the long Cold War years, but how much progress had been made in recent
years toward positive sums. Particularly it was impressive how far the Russian leadership
had gone toward an open-minded approach in such matters as U.S. bases in Russia's
backyard. Significantly, the chair was on the positive-sum side. This is probably what
opened up space even in a think tank milieu toward contemplation of a positive-sum
approach.
Already some time earlier, positive sums had begun sometimes prevailing
in Washington on other levels. For example, responsible executive branch officials have
had to deal with America's pressing security needs and new realities, and have found this
incompatible with cold war modalities. It is in the analysis community and in permanent
bureaucracies that certain subcultures have had greater difficulty with this. But
difficulty is not impossibility. On the occasion in question, they too found themselves in
a universe where positive as well as zero sums could be contemplated.
And so, the panelists and the chair took the occasion to think out loud
about some ways of enhancing the sum of U.S. and Russian activities in Central Asia. It
probably wasn't easy for them: it wasn't in any of the prepared remarks, and there was not
much to build on in previous work of the analysis community. It wasn’t quite
brainstorming or pure improvisation, but there was an element of thinking out loud. And
this, in an atmosphere that was not entirely conducive to thinking out loud: for there was
by no means a consensus in the room for considering such positive-sum approaches, and
several audience members were quite insistent on a purely negative-sum view of the
intentions and attitudes of Russian elites. Despite these handicaps, several positive sum
suggestions were made, along the following lines:
* Open US bases in the region for Russians to visit; have some
exchanges, maybe even joint exercises or training;
* Do not let the local despots play Russia and America off against each
other. One could imagine that this would be implemented by U.S.-Russia advance
consultations on Central Asian issues, so as to put on a united front vis-a-vis Karimov,
Niyazov, etc. (To be sure, this isn't necessarily positive sum in itself, but at least it
means not letting the local despots reduce us to zero sums by playing us off. And it sets
up communications lines for working out positive-sum approaches if we have the imagination
to do it.)
* Set a date for US bases to close.
Actually the last suggestion isn't quite positive-sum per se either. It
assumes a zero-sum fear of U.S. bases in the region, but tries to reduce the Russia fears
by putting a terminus on the situation. Perhaps something similar is true of the first
proposal. Nevertheless, taken together, the result would be to create space for more
positive-sum thinking and action to emerge.
I wonder, would it be more than the carrying capacity could hold in
Washington at this time, if one were to go on to speculate about some more explicitly
positive-sum activities? That is, initiatives where the United States and Russia are truly
supporting one another's influence in the region, going beyond the preliminaries of
reducing the old negative-sum mutual suspicions? Perhaps it would be too much and people
would turn sour in the belly upon hearing of such things. Or perhaps not. After all, the
national interests of the United States require it. For policy analysts, it would be a
kind of betrayal of our professional responsibility, if we were to subordinate our
analysis of American interests to our personal or social-milieu interests in keeping a
distance from Russia. So maybe we should create some space in our minds to think about
these things, whether or not we feel ready for it.
The following are some speculations on potential initiatives for
advancing the broad American interests in the region and building up a positive-sum
relationship:
* Subsidize some Russian bases and troops to stay in the region, or new
ones to be set up where the local regime consents. America needs the Russians for border
security, drug interdiction, and other stabilizing functions; and maybe also for regional
intelligence with a modicum of objectivity, independent of the local regimes.
* In return, Russia could drop any further mention of a need for the
United States to eventually get out. An U.S. presence would give an assurance for ultimate
sovereign independence from Russia; but this would no longer be equated with Russia's
absence or with protection against Russian influence.
It's bad for America, not just for Russia and for Tajikistan, that
Russian bases are closing and troops leaving from the Tajik border area. Even if one takes
the view – as most commentators, who enjoy the tit-for-tat, do – that America has been
promoting this turn of events, it's not too late to realize it's a blunder and turn around
and do the right thing. How much better off we would be today, if we had realized we were
mostly wrong in our enmity to British power in all areas overseas half a century earlier,
instead of waiting to wise up only in the Falklands war. The harsh realities after 9-11
ought to impel us to wise up faster about our positive interest in Russian power and
influence in some regions.
* Quietly encourage the Georgians (moving our discussion temporarily
across the Caspian for this point) and Russians to make the following deal: Georgia stops
demanding withdrawal of Russian bases; in return Russians start supporting restoration of
Georgian territorial integrity in Abkhazia and Ossetia and stop making noises against
U.S./NATO presence in Georgia. In other words, the United States and Russia both stay
there, instead of each trying to push the other out.
This would build on the momentum of the recent role of Igor Ivanov in
getting Abashidze peacefully out of Ajaria. It would fulfill the hopes of Georgians for
Russia to play a similar role in the other, deeper crises of Georgian territorial
integrity. At the same time, it would build on the reality that Georgia did much to
provoke those crises: Georgian nationalism has been far from healthy in its handling of
ethnic matters since 1991. Russian mediation will continue to be needed for reassurance of
the ethnic Abkhaz and Ossets if they are to consent freely and peacefully to reunification
with Georgia despite their actual preference to join Russia.
* American support for rights of ethnic Russians in Central Asia. US
democratization subsidies to Russian-language media and ethnic Russian-led civic
organizations and parties. This would free them from the charge of being advance agents of
Russian imperialist reconquest; if only by turning them into "US agents", so to
speak.
* American public protests and pressure against discrimination against
"ethnic Russians" in Central Asia in matters of employment in government
positions, in this region, the label "Russian" is put also on Ukrainians, Jews,
and most other post-Soviets, along with Germans and all other Europeans living there.)
This would earn us tremendous credit with Russians, not just regionally but in
Moscow. It would show that we mean our "human rights"
rhetoric for real, with at least a modicum of objectivity, even when it's to the benefit
of Russia not just against it. And that would be a darned good thing for the reputation of
human rights in Russia, where the democratic cause has suffered by being connected too
often with the weakening and humiliation of the nation, and "human rights" has
too often come to seem like a code word for hostile activism.
* A regular practice of Washington-Moscow consultations on policy in
the region, aimed at joint policy and a united front when speaking to the local regimes.
Phone calls to Moscow before Rumsfeld or Powell heads off to Central Asia. In return, some
consultation, mutatis mutandis, prior to Central Asia visits by Lavrov or Ivanov,
although – realistically speaking – their visits are somewhat more routine.
* A U.S.-Russia "working group" on the region, akin to - or
merged with – the one set up on Afghanistan and terrorism in 1999. The group would
prepare joint initiatives for positive sums; and meanwhile keep track of activities of
both sides in the region, and make sure there is the advance consultation on those
activities that's needed for avoiding suspicion on either side of what the other is doing
there.
More points could be added, to be sure. I've limited myself here to
some basic ones that could be initiated in Washington that it would be hard to imagine
Russians refusing. That's an atypically high standard of realism, restricting what can be
considered perhaps too tightly. With a bit more idealism or at least a balanced view on
Russian intentions, one could ask Russia to couple these points with some others which,
while also to mutual benefit, would be most specially and obviously to the American
benefit; e.g., help in getting oil pipelines through, getting security on the line, and
stabilizing the countries along the route -- presumably still from Baku to Ceyhan,
although some other route or routes may be found more optimal once the zero-sum
geopolitics are really put aside.
There are also higher levels of cooperation and integration that are
worthy but go beyond the cautious limits I have set for the proposals above. Ian Bremmer
and Nikolas Gvosdev have written persuasively of the logic of shared bases under joint
institutional auspices.
Even without these additional points, however, the ones laid out above
would add up to a pretty hefty positive sum. One that enhances substantially the ability
of both countries to realize their vital interests -- promotion of stability and
modernization in the region and winning the war on terror.
It's the kind of thing our policy analysis community might want to be
bringing into its field for contemplation. After all, we're supposed to be in the business
of helping our government think things through and see the way to realizing our society's
true interests. Isn't that what policy analysts are for?
Ira Straus is U.S. coordinator of the Committee on Eastern Europe
and Russia in NATO.
In The National Interest, June 23, 2004
http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol3Issue25/Vol3Issue25StrausPFV.html
To discuss on a forum >> |