Armenia’s Foreign Policy: Complementary or Conformable?
Tigran Martirosyan

The formulation of Armenia’s foreign policy, as with any nation, depends on a number of variables that are commonly used in international assessment of the rank of a nation in the global hierarchy. While somewhat mechanistic, these variables typically include the critical mass of human and material resources; degree of national cohesiveness based upon historical, social, cultural, religious, and ethnic factors; economic development and density of networks of trade; type of government and degree of openness to new ideas; political and military capabilities comparative to neighboring states; consistency of goals for exerting influence beyond its borders; number and complexity of external issues, including conflicts, that a nation can handle simultaneously; and geographical range based on location and physical reach to other subjects of the hierarchy.

Among these variables, geographical location as a principal determinant of a nation’s vulnerability, exercises perhaps the most powerful constraint on the way Armenia’s foreign policy is made and on the set of the country’s foreign policy choices. Landlocked between the Black and Caspian Seas, Armenia is tackled with a challenge of overcoming its geographical vulnerability made more dramatic by the scarcity of natural resources, an ethno-political conflict, a decade-long blockade imposed by two hostile neighbor states, socio-economic declivity, government’s inability in instituting effectual state structures and an associated exodus of human resources. In order to deflect the threats to its national security and ensure development, Armenia has chosen a foreign policy centered on a geopolitical balance among its immediate neighbors, contending regional powers and global power centers, and multilateral organizations -- all affecting Armenia and the southern Caucasus region. The policy had come to be known as a policy of “complementarity.”

Taken after the “principle of complementarity” introduced in the European Union’s (EU) Maastricht Treaty to denote cooperation between the member states and the EU’s executive body, Armenia’s policy of complementarity -- in and of itself an inter-relation of reciprocity whereby one element supplements the other -- sought to provide equal opportunities for all external powers with divergent interests to engage in Armenia. The elements that Armenia’s complementarity framework entailed were the peaceful settlement of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, expansion of membership in international -- especially European -- organizations, engagement in post-Soviet, European, and Euro-Atlantic security structures, furthering good-neighborly relations with Iran and Georgia, regulating relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan, and fostering regional stability and economic integration. Distinctive of this set of elements was the uncontested foreign policy objective to forge opportunities in Armenia and the region, in which the interests of Russia and the West would overlap rather than branch off.

In the early years following independence, Armenia was relatively successful in keeping a delicate balance primarily due to the “syndrome” of immediate post-Cold War uncertainty in policymaking circles of both Russia and the West in regards to the former Soviet republics. In mid-1990s, however, when their policies in the region substantiated in a somewhat fictitious format that set the north-south axis with Russia, Armenia, and Iran vis-а-vis the east-west corridor with the U.S., Turkey, and Azerbaijan, Yerevan engaged in a complex balancing act with Russia, on the one hand, and the U.S., on the other. Given the prevalence of the defense and security factor over the economic aspect in the national consciousness of newly independent Armenia, as well as the geopolitical proximity of Russia and closed borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan as a result of their blockade of Armenia, Yerevan assumed asymmetry in regulating the level of its relationship with one or the other power. Armenia was thus able to establish positive relations with only two of its four neighbors -- Georgia and Iran, and has made a notable progress in expanding membership in international organizations. Yet, relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan remain hostile, and the protracted conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh slanted from principally a conflict over self-determination between Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan to a “territorial dispute” between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Above all, Yerevan has failed to ensure that it maintains complementary, albeit asymmetrical, relationship with both Russia and the West.

Armenia’s complementary relationship with these two power centers, if fitly maintained, stipulates that Armenia develops military and security cooperation with Russia, which Yerevan deems as an exclusive framework guaranteeing the security of Armenia, while advancing economic cooperation, regional integration, and democracy-building assistance programs with the West, chiefly with the United States. However, the recent series of dubious “debt-for-equity” swaps that granted Moscow an unreserved ownership of Armenia’s economic enterprises primarily in energy sector by writing off Armenia’s debts to Russia, have reinforced the partnership between Yerevan and Moscow thus curtailing considerably the area for expanding Armenia’s relations with the West. Although it was evident that Russia had almost no incentive to utilize these enterprises, including hydroelectric plants and Armenia’s sole nuclear power plant, to full capacity or finance their modernization, the authorities in Yerevan have bent to Moscow’s pressure to exert control over Armenia’s economy. In doing so, the government in Yerevan has essentially allowed a third country to attain a political dominance over the fundamental attributes of Armenia’s national sovereignty – defense, national security, and economy. Armenia’s foreign policy has thus transcended distinctly from complementary to conformable.

This transition has actually invalidated Yerevan’s policy of complementarity and is precarious because it may lead to a situation when Russia surrenders Armenia’s national interests. With troops patrolling Armenia’s borders, joint groups running Armenia’s security structures, companies owning Armenia’s energy sector, and even international flights from and to Yerevan operated by Russian “Siberia Airlines,” Moscow may lose its interest in Armenia. Apathetic to overly compliant authorities in Yerevan, Moscow may try to play the Nagorno-Karabakh card in an effort to appease Azerbaijan and drag the country under the Russian sphere of influence at Armenia’s expense. Alongside with the U.S. that has suspended sanctions against Azerbaijan for its blockade of Armenia and considers allocating $8.75 mln in military assistance for Azerbaijan but only $2.75 mln for Armenia in 2005, Russia may re-launch a mediation effort in Nagorno-Karabakh by exerting pressure on Yerevan for greater concessions. It appears that mediators may revive a once-contemplated project for exchange of a land corridor over Armenia linking Azerbaijan to its Nakhichevan exclave for the Armenian-controlled Lachin corridor connecting Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh as an option to settle the conflict. Armenians may thus venture to lose the fruits of their hard-won victory in the self-determination struggle in Nagorno-Karabakh, if Armenian side ever considers this embarrassing and potentially detrimental project seeking a settlement at the expense of Armenia’s territory instead of a comprehensive agreement on the political status of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Amply reasonable from Moscow’s perspective, Russia’s assertiveness in advancing a policy that meets its own national interest rather than the interests of Armenian independent statehood, is, however, not the only factor that contributed to the downgrading of Armenia’s foreign policy. Nor is it the major one. There are several other, more eminent, factors.

One is the smaller state adaptation to the fluctuating geopolitical interests of mightier states. For a smaller state with many areas of concern such as security and diplomacy, economic choice and constraint, domestic political institutions, and the challenges of ethnicity and nationalism, the possible exercise of power politics, i.e. diplomacy in which the greater nations threaten to use pressure or force in order to obtain their objectives, has a direct implication. A smaller state tends to regard virtually every interfering mightier state as a potential contender that may threaten its own security, sovereignty, and fundamental national interest. Therefore, the adaptation tactics that a smaller state applies to “mollify” a powerful state does contain a certain degree of conformism. However, the unremitting application of conformism as an instrument of adaptation cannot attain the longer-term interest of a smaller state. The more effective foreign policy tool to deter a threat likely to emerge from a mightier state is the balance of power. When the balance is upset, as in the case of Armenia’s relations with Russia vis-а-vis Armenia’s relations with the West, a smaller state must consider a set of responsive actions to return to the position of optimal equilibrium. The foreign policymakers in Yerevan have disregarded the trivial operational precept that power must be counterbalanced and have thus placed Armenia’s security in jeopardy, a move that may have unrecoverable consequences for the country.

Another factor is the phenomenon of individual conformism of policymakers. Some foreign policymakers in Armenia appear to have adopted a lop-sided concept that in order to protect its national interest, a smaller state should change its behavior whenever the international environment changes. They argue that while the national interest influences what a smaller state’s government wishes to do, it is the international environment that determines what it is apt to do. However, the notion of national interest must be too vague for these policymakers to follow in the decision-making, because they are not trained or inclined to serve the national interest. Rather, they are inclined to serve the self-interest and to appease higher officials or external patrons whose interests often adversely affect Armenia’s national interest. The hierarchical and co-optation practices that govern access to higher levels of the career for these policymakers favor conformism that stifles creativity and the capacity for their autonomous thinking, rather than innovation. If it is true that the behavior of a smaller state should change with the international environment, then it is equally -- if not exceedingly – true that a smaller state has extraordinary strengths to survive in the contemporary world by maneuvering deftly and advancing tidily its importance into greater security and sovereignty. Application of conformism to the changes in the international environment may be a gainful tactics in the short term. In the longer term, however, a consistent foreign policy influenced by the international environment but determined by the national interest is the best foreign policy.

The next factor is the apparent interest of the major power centers to deal with submissive governments in smaller states. For both the United States and Russia, the authoritarian or pseudo-democratic puppet regimes are generally preferred over the governments that meet genuine liberal democratic or national patriotic criteria, because the former are viewed as perfectly compliant and therefore susceptible to political control and influence. Russia plays a strong hand in Armenia not only because Armenia is failing to attract Western investment in its economy, but also because the U.S. is slow to take a firmer stance in developing a better-governed, modern society and diversifying the country’s economic, foreign policy, and security options. Instead, guided by a notion that weak societies with embryonic democratic features are not necessarily an improvement over strong authoritarian regimes, the U.S. is preoccupied with maintaining stability in the region that permits Washington to advance its petroleum-oriented interests but actually denotes stagnation in countries like Armenia. The authorities in Yerevan have recognized and exploited to their benefit this hidebound policy approach in which mightier states tend to impose political control over the effective sovereignty of the smaller states. The important point here is, however, that any artificially imposed stability ultimately leads to regression and from there on to instability and turmoil that the West is so fervent to avoid. Genuine liberal democratic societies that make proper provisions for leadership succession are more stable than authoritarian or quasi-democratic regimes that are subject to the whims of single leaders and thus more prone to arbitrary, adventurist, and self-defeating behavior.

The major factor of conformism in Armenia’s foreign policy is the unpopularity of the ruling elite. The Soviet totalitarian experience fueled into Armenia’s authorities a political culture already marked by authoritarian traditions implying that they never experienced a political system that could be classified as anything close to liberal or participatory. The current political system of a strong authoritarian presidency immune of efficient control and accountability to the populace that has enticed most of Armenia’s ruling elite, offers widespread practice of vote-rigging and subverting the rule of law. The disgruntled population at large has virtually no belief in their ability to influence or change their leadership. Therefore, the government’s veering towards Russia essentially demonstrates the need to secure its existence in power at any price. When a government does not summon a broad-based popular support at home, it becomes more prone to bending under the pressure from the outside or turn to an interested external power for protection. However, the evidence of Armenia’s contemporary history shows that virtually no government that reaches office through the unfair election can claim popularity.

If Yerevan is anxious about rectifying the situation in which the balance of complementarity in its foreign policy has been subrogated for the inertia of conformity, it needs to enhance Armenia’s position within the evolving triangular cooperation among the EU and NATO, Russia, and the U.S., with stronger emphasis on the EU and NATO aspect. This aspect may enhance Armenia’s ability to maintain an optimal balance with both Russia and the U.S., because Europe is a power center where other major powers can come to terms in regards to smaller states like Armenia. Agreeing that their aim is to cooperate, not to compete, with Russia in the former Soviet space, both Europe and the U.S. seem to take up the challenge to place greater emphasis on Europe’s “new neighbors” in the southern Caucasus. In all probability, their long-term goal is to create stable and upward-moving partners -- a goal that may be as much in Russia’s interest as it is in the West’s. The dangers facing Russia such as the nexus of terrorist and weapons of mass destruction threats facilitated by failed states and religious extremism, trafficking in persons, and the AIDS epidemic, are similar to those facing the EU and NATO, and the U.S. They appear to share a conviction that dangers are most effectively met when they act in concert. The convergence of their interests, therefore, entitles Armenia as one of the focal players in regional and broader European integration and security.

Recognizing Russia’s positive role in maintaining Armenia’s security, Yerevan also needs to follow changes in the global system of security and expand cooperation with NATO as it develops important partnerships with both the EU and Russia. With seven members of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) that joined the Alliance, NATO will work to refocus PfP on the southern Caucasus, which the transatlantic community considers a front-line region in the war on terrorism, and where PfP’s culture of cooperation and inter-operability can make a greater contribution to the West and Russia’s common efforts in strengthening regional security. NATO’s relations with Europe and Russia are key to the transatlantic community’s ability to act collectively. Just as EU and NATO enlargement have brought more security to Europe, Russia’s cooperation with both Europe and NATO could help foster security and political reform in the southern Caucasus and in Armenia, in particular. Because NATO’s enlargement is not just a zonal expansion but also a pursuit of new patterns to oppose threats that may erupt outside its operational borders, Armenia may choose to elevate its security level by participating jointly with NATO in confronting these threats. As the most effective organization in the field of military and political security, NATO potentially may offer its good offices for confidence building between Armenia and Azerbaijan and between Armenia and Turkey.

Armenia’s foreign policy can be conformable solely to the country’s fundamental national interest, which should be implicitly understood as strengthening of Armenia’s independent statehood. In order to overcome its geographical vulnerability and maintain significance to the outside world, Armenia needs to focus on creating foreign policy alternatives by preserving an optimally proportionate relationship with all interested states and organizations. Conversely, a tendency to become a client state dependent on one or the other power center has grown considerably in Armenia. It has come to the point when Armenia is unable to defend and foster its own foreign policy agenda that should be helping involve Armenia’s impoverished and disenfranchised population in the state-building process by promoting foreign investment, searching for new markets, and diversifying transport routes for Armenian exports. It is uncontestable for probably every sober-minded policy expert that in the harsh geopolitical location in which Armenia finds itself, military and security cooperation with Russia is crucial for Armenia. However, foreign policymakers in Yerevan need to come to realize that there must be limits to Armenia’s partnership with any country that could prevent a partnership from swerving from a mutually profitable cooperation to a stiff patron-client relationship.

To avert such a scenario, Armenia needs to forge a domestic policy focused on statehood-reinforcing measures to overcome the high poverty rate, autocratic trends, and the widespread governmental corruption, complemented by a comprehensive foreign policy seeking to increase the country’s weight within the relationships between Russia and NATO and the West, Europe and Russia, and Europe and the United States. In order to minimize and utterly prevail over clientistic and conformist trends in its foreign policy, Armenia needs to counterbalance its partnership with Russia with those Western programs that aim to promote economic reform, encourage democratic habits and practices, and help the people build their own civil society.

Tigran Martirosyan is a Washington-based analyst writing on developments in broader Caucasus region and a PhD candidate at George Washington University. Mr. Martirosyan formerly worked at the Johns Hopkins University-affiliated Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, and held a senior diplomatic post in Armenia specializing in the analysis of U.S. policies towards the region.

Received via e-mail, April 14, 2004