Richard Giragosian

Giragosi@msn.com

Introduction

From the outset, it must be noted that the current conflict between the central Georgian government and the leadership of the Autonomous Region of Adjaria is essentially political, with the military component an important, but only secondary factor. Specifically, the military dimension adds an important “force multiplier” to the central Georgian government’s political focus. The strategy remains one of mobilizing a popular opposition to Ajarian leader Aslan Abashidze, utilizing an approach designed to weaken the support for his leadership from within.

The Georgian strategy of pressuring Abashidze through political leverage of demonstrations is further coupled with a realization that any outright military intervention by the Georgian side would actually empower the Ajarian leadership. As the most recent events confirmed, this strategy seems to be working as the reaction of the Ajarian leadership reveals their increasingly desperate and isolated position. And as in the case of the demise of the Shevardnadze regime, the Ajarian leadership is undoubtedly learning that their tenuous hold on power is waning, with no firm guarantee of loyalty by their police and security forces.

Although Georgia’s “Rose Revolution” offered a welcome and hopeful promise for regional change, the Georgian transition is by no means complete. Moreover, the current showdown between President Saakashvili and Ajarian leader Abashidze should be seen from the context of this incomplete transition.

The still new Georgian government remains engaged in an uphill effort to regain a degree of state authority and legitimacy that has been steadily lost or squandered over the past decade. In fact, the reality remains that Georgia is still plagued by a state failure so profound that the most basic achievement by the Saakashvili government are seen as a notable and newsworthy success. And the current conflict is deeply rooted in the steady loss of state authority and the devolution of power from the center to the regions.

Thus, the current threat to Georgia is in many ways a fundamental challenge to statehood itself, with Saakashvili pursuing a new period of state-building, or more accurately, a period of state-restoration. For Tbilisi, the current confrontation with Adjaria is also tied to the broader effort to combat corruption, strengthen the rule of law and to regain a legitimacy of governance.

But it is the military aspect of this conflict, however, that threatens to destabilize the situation, especially given the complications of a Russian military presence in both Adjaria (Batumi) and neighboring Javakheti (Akhalkalaki) and the proximity of the Baku-Ceyhan and Baku-Erzerum oil and gas pipelines now under construction.

Conflict with Ajaria is not new:

The current conflict between the central government and the Abashidze regime is by no means new, nor unexpected. It has been simmering for some time, rooted as it is in the fundamental dynamics of Georgian politics and, most recently, coming to a head in the past few months. Let me briefly trace the most important milestone sin only he most recent stage of this conflict:

Early March:

Brief Economic Blockade: The 200,000-barrel-per-day port gets oil and products from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, which are shipped across the Caspian Sea to the Azerbaijani port of Baku and further by rail. From Batumi oil goes to Mediterranean markets in larger tankers.

Late March/Early April:

1. Security forces arrest four men on suspicion of conspiring to assassinate President Saakashvili, two additional suspects believed to be in hiding in the Ajarian capital Batumi, allegedly acting on the orders of Ajarian Security Minister Soso Gogitidze and his deputy.

2. Saakashvili dispatches two presidential envoys to Ajaria to reassert central government control and oversight over the customs posts at the port of Batumi and the Sarp border crossing with Turkey border.

3. General Roman Dumbadze, local commander of the Georgian Army’s 25^th Armored-Mechanized Brigade stationed in Batumi dismissed by Defense Minister, accused of gross insubordination after reportedly siding with Abashidze during a standoff between the Tbilisi and Batumi last month when Georgian troops were placed on high alert, prompting 100 of the unit’s soldiers to demand transfers to units loyal to the Georgian government. 21 April - Colonel Viktor Mikeladze, named to succeed Dumbadze as acting commander of the 25th Armored-Mechanized Brigade, reports that at least 240 of the brigade's 343 officers and servicemen have left Batumi and gave return to Tbilisi.

4. President Saakashvili Demands Release of Former Batumi Mayor from Ajarian Custody

5. Georgian President Renews Demand for Disarmament in Ajaria

Georgian government offers to pay 500 laris ($250) for each submachine gun surrendered and has earmarked some 1 million laris ($500,000) for that purpose. Georgian Interior Minister Giorgi Baramidze explains that “no one is against Aslan Abashidze or Ajarian officials having personal guards, but it's inadmissible that thousands of residents of the autonomous republic illegally keep automatic weapons.”

The Military Dimension: Georgia

Militarily Georgia remains constrained by several significant factors. Despite a firm strategic path toward greater integration into Western security institutions, and a stated goal of eventual membership in the NATO alliance, Georgia is plagued by twin legacies- a legacy of “warlordism” and a legacy of inadequate funding, both of which have only recently been addressed.

1. A Legacy of “Warlordism”

Through much of the 1990s, Georgia suffered from a wave of civil conflict spurred by separatist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Marked by the rise of a disparate collection of paramilitary groups and militias, the Georgia armed forces rapidly disintegrated into factionalism and incoherent disarray. Militarily, the 1990s represented a lost decade for the formation of a professional, capable armed forces. This was matched by a similar political trend, seen by the emergence of a powerful clan-based elites ruling over a fragile and marginalized government structure, with an absence of institutional democracy and a weakened rule of law.

The dominance of warlordism also fostered a degree of instability that reached its nadir with several assassination attempts directed against President Shevardnadze and a wave of kidnappings linked to the nexus between corruption and criminality. This instability also allowed Russia to retain its military presence and wield considerable pressure on the central Georgian government.

2. A Legacy of Inadequate Funding

From 1996-2002, Georgian military expenditures fell by two-thirds in real terms. (SIPRI data 2003)

With pressure from government officials to reduce, or even sequester, military spending in order to reduce the bloated state budget deficit, there is also an inherent element of tension in civil-military relations. The pronounced cuts in military expenditures, from 6.1 per cent of GDP in 1997 to 2.6 per cent of GDP in 2000 (roughly $22.1 million in 2000) led to a significant decline or even loss of overall readiness and capability of the armed forces.

This downward trend stems largely from the serious economic decline affecting the country as a whole, the need to tackle the mounting state budget deficit, and although less apparent yet equally difficult to solve, a degree of corruption within the military. The funding shortfalls have led to severe problems including mounting salary arrears, and an inadequate supply of basic equipment, such as uniforms and weapons, but also food. In April 2001, the Georgian government revealed the extent of the problem: salaries not paid for over 16 months and even reports of soldiers suffering from malnutrition.

The cumulative effect of years of under-funding and an outright failure to pay wages led to several high-profile incidents of desertions, mutinies and general insubordination even among Georgia’s “elite” divisions. (1) The financial crisis also encourages widespread corruption, ranging from a diversion of supplies to the black market by Staff Officers to theft by junior officers. There has also been concern over the rise in illegal arms sales by some corrupt commanders. Thus, Georgia is still largely dependent on external support for the maintenance of its armed forces.

Recent Progress in Military Reform

Former Defense Minister Tevzadze initiated but did not complete reforms. He did create Special Operations units, totaling about 1,000, and a mountain warfare unit. Current reforms by the new Defense Minster Gela Bezhuashvili are much more promising – he has fired 18 of 22 active duty Generals assigned to the Defense Ministry – and focus on the bloated and corrupt Interior Ministry and the still problematic Defense Ministry, each in urgent need of overhaul and streamlined reforms.

Energy Security

The phase out of the $64 million US GTEP program should not be seen as an end to US assistance. The US and British are now moving to a new “train-the-trainer” approach, matched by new and more intensive training of Command Staff, all targeted to bolster the reform effort.

But the primary focus now is on three areas:

(1) Energy security: guarding the strategic pipelines and seen today in the mining of the port of Batumi;

(2) Counter-proliferation, Georgia’s “dirty little secret,” especially after the discovery of Ricin and other radiological materials (note danger of use for “dirty bomb”)

(3) Overall military-to-military programs to enhance professionalism and efficiency, linked to reform effort.

Georgia holds overwhelming military advantage, which was forcefully demonstrated in recent military exercises near border with Ajaria. Although direct confrontation or intervention into the region would be made difficult, there is an option for Special Operations action- as in the mid-January operation arresting former railway head Akaki Chkaidze from Batumi hospital and late-March operation in Svaneti targeting criminal gangs.

1. One of the more worrisome incidents involved the mutiny of a unit stationed outside of Tbilisi in May 2003. Fortunately, the mutiny was peacefully resolved after the mediation of senior government officials.

The Military Dimension: Adjaria

Paramilitary/militia force: less than 2000 Interior Ministry troops, 7-8000 armed civilian supporters, but recent defections to Tbilisi mounting. Fairly well-supplied with ammunition and small arms, but militarily rather insignificant. Indications of access to two T-72 tanks, a few armored personnel carriers (APCs), some artillery and possible one or two helicopters. Abashidze personal security force: 100 men and some freelance Russian soldiers from local base. Stress inclusion of local Russian military and Georgian units in Ajarian leader’s patronage network, military power co-opted and bribed to bolster Abashidze regime stability.

Rogue Russian General Yuri Netkachov - formed and trained a small rapid deployment brigade, local Russian and Georgian commanders bribed by Abashidze, sharing in corruption and incorporated into Ajarian patronage network. Responsible for blowing up bridges, cutting railway links and mining Batumi port. (Note effect of bridge demolition and mining of Batumi on local Ajarian population)

The Russian Factor

Current conflict reveals as much about the state of the Russian military as it does of the state of the Georgian military. The two Russian bases at Batumi and Akhalkalaki, in violation of the 1999 Istanbul OSCE summit’s promise to withdraw, have evolved into local garrisons, with a dangerous majority of local Ajarians and Armenians. In Ajaria, corruption of local Russian commanders, rise of rogue elements, such as General Yuri Netkachov saying much of state of decline in Russian military. (Add details on Netkachov as rogue actor) Also note the personal ties of Moscow Mayor Luzhkov to Ajaria (real estate & construction business with Abashidze clan)

Conclusion

Thus, as a test for the new Georgian leadership, its restraint in the handling of this conflict is key – the inaction, not the action, of the military is an important step forward. (Note the dangers posed by the still extensive proliferation of small arms).

The next stage, however, is in some ways more difficult. Even in the wake of a Abashidze departure, his clan-based elite (his son is Mayor of Batumi) will remain to be dealt with and the serious, although manageable, threat posed by the Abashidze regime militia/paramilitary forces will also need to be addressed. An important step in this direction and test for Tbilisi will be the post-Abashidze transition” the need to retain its autonomy, and the period of direct presidential rule hopefully limited in order to use free and fair elections as a means toward garnering legitimacy. (If time allows, raise implications for other regions)

Saakashvili is engaged in a consolidation of state power, building a new national military, but, nevertheless, facing significant obstacles of corruption, separatism, Russian economic pressure and economic constraints. The current Ajarian conflict offers a sense of promise, but not without a fair degree of peril for the Georgian state. But so far, it seems apparent that Saakashvili has weathered his first major crisis and has even demonstrated a degree of statesmanship absent so long from the Georgia of strongmen.

Georgia: Military Overview

Sources: “The Military Balance, 2003-2004”, Oxford, IISS, 2003, pp. 64-5, 73; Giragosian sources.

The presentation was given prior to the culmination of the crisis in Ajaria and, therefore, fails to cover the most recent developments in the wake of the departure to Moscow by the Ajarian leader.

This presentation is part of a broader study that the scholar is working on, focusing on the dynamics of regional transition and on the Georgian situation in particular.