Crisis Lessons

Sergei Karaganov

The Iraq crisis is not over yet. It will still produce unexpected twists and turns, and unpleasant surprises for many sides involved. But when all is said and done, it has ended with a victory of military force and behind-the-scenes diplomacy of the United States, as well as of Great Britain and their allies. Unproductive debate over why the apparently well organized Iraqi resistance collapsed so soon or the pointless discussion of why we dislike America for what it has done in Iraq could go on and on

But it would be better to appraise the new situation that this country will have to act in, and look at how Russian diplomacy has thus far performed in the circumstances.

September 11 did not create a new reality, but simply opened people's eyes to the reality that was there all along but had not been recognized. Neither did the Iraq crisis create a new reality, but now it will be more difficult to ignore what was ignored before.

First, the era of national-liberation revolutions and movements and social experiments in the 1940s-1990s produced a vast number of states that showed their inability, at least at the given historical stage, to ensure normal development on the territories they occupied or a worthy life for the majority of the people living there. Zero or negative development, mass corruption, and ineffectual despotic regimes, exacerbated by demographic and religious problems, are a growing threat not only to these states themselves and their populations, but also to the rest of mankind. These regions are a source of instability, diseases, and terrorism. They constitute the gravest danger in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking, and other global problems. This region encompasses a greater part of Africa, Central Asia, and the Near East, possibly including some of the FSU states. Russia balances on the rim of this region.

Second, the United States resolved to enforce order and modernization, the way it sees fit, in a substantial portion of this region - the Near and Middle East and Central Asia, strengthening its positions there in the process. Africa is less important, so it has been left alone for the time being.

Third, despite its dubious legitimacy and hamfisted propaganda campaign, the first such attempt to enforce order, from Washington's perspective, has been a success. Now similar efforts will be repeated - not necessarily involving the use of force. After the success in Iraq, the threat of force should be enough in most cases.

Fourth, the United States could get stuck, but it could also go overboard and start acting far more unceremoniously, including with regard to Russia's direct interests.

Fifth, the Security Council is no longer in a position to operate on the basis of its 1945 mandate. As far as the organization itself is concerned, for all its usefulness, it is losing effectiveness while it has grown almost four-fold - mainly thanks to the aforementioned states.

Now about how we have performed. I will say it outright: We have not done very well; but then, thank God, there has been no debacle.

Firstly, our intelligence services misled us - or we deluded ourselves - about the Iraqis' ability and readiness to resist the attack.

Secondly, our policy did not seem to be coordinated enough. Sometimes we clearly improvised and sometimes acted at cross purposes.

Thirdly, we lacked a coherent strategic objective. Did we want to preserve international legitimacy or save the UN Security Council or make friends with the Europeans and play them off against the United States or remain on good terms with the Americans? All of these objectives are justifiable if they are based on an underlying strategic line. There was no such line, however. This is not so much the problem of a particular crisis as of the entire foreign policy.

Fourthly, we simply refused, shortsightedly, to look after our economic interests in Iraq. This is not about trading in principles, but about the kind of image that we project as a state - one of the 19th century, playing the geopolitical, vainglorious games of the kind kings used to play, or one of the 21st century, concerned with upholding its special interests. Less important, including economic, interests can be sacrificed to more important interests. Yet I for one did not see any prioritization while the government agencies - above all the Economic Development Ministry, which, as is known, was entrusted with defending Russian economic interests in Iraq - simply ignored their duties.

Fifthly, one of our policy objectives has been false. It is counterproductive - even for tactical purposes at the UN - to try playing against its most powerful member. The ship is just barely afloat. It must be saved as a matter of urgency, but the crew is indulging in exercises on what is already history. The ship should be repaired and modernized, and this should be done with those who will stay on board and sail on. Unless the UN is reformed without delay, it will follow the path of NATO, or worse still, of the OSCE.

Even so, despite all miscalculations, we have scraped through this time - largely thanks to personal Putin-Bush diplomacy and the dispatch of Yevgeny Primakov to urge Saddam to step down and save the nation.

We have scraped through, however, not thanks to any consistent action, but to a series of haphazard moves that proved successful. In an increasingly challenging and hazardous world that we have entered, this approach will sooner or later doom us to failure and definitely to serious opportunity losses.

National-liberation movements and social experiments in the 1940s-1990s produced a vast number of states that showed their inability, at least at the given historical stage, to ensure normal development on the territories they occupied or a worthy life for the majority of the people living there.

http://www.mn.ru/english/issue.php?2003-15-4