Turkmenistan: the more things change...
A commentary for the Turkmenistan Project
Arkady Dubnov
Editor’s Note: This commentary marks the first article in a
series examining developments Turkmenistan in the year since the assassination attempt
against President Saparmurat Niyazov.
So what really happened in Ashgabat a year ago, on November 25, 2002?
Did assassins try to carry out a coup d’etat, as claimed by official propaganda? Or did
President Saparmurat Niyazov’s special services stage the event as a way of trapping
exiles and insiders who might have fostered resistance to the regime? It is impossible to
answer these questions until documents related to the case, now kept in total secrecy by
authorities, become public. However, there is some information available that can allow us
to draw some reasonable conclusions.
A year ago, a handful of Turkmen with varying degrees of association
with Niyazov’s dictatorship concluded that the regime they had created would never
evolve into a democracy and conspired to remove the dictator. Word of the operation leaked
out to too many people, some of whom may have been double agents. As a result, state
security agents learned were able to prepare counter-measures. Niyazov’s propaganda
claimed there was an attempt to assassinate the president, and the special services
fabricated evidence that shots had been fired at his motorcade.
According to eyewitness accounts, there was no shooting at the site. On
the evening of November 25, Niyazov personally announced the news of the attempted coup on
television. Several hours later, he gave further details of the coup plot and named its
organizers. Just a few days later, an investigation was said to confirm his accusation. On
January 24, those responsible for developing the counter-plot received the Order of
Turkmenbashi for "exemplary conduct and guidance."
Obviously, nobody knows who the witnesses were in the "trial"
against the "conspirators," since most likely there were none. Nobody even knows
where the trial took place. On January 14, I had a conversation with Ambassador Halnazar
Agakhanov, Niyazov’s envoy to Moscow, and he was unable to give me the specific date and
location of the trial.
Two events described below, and chosen more or less at random,
illustrate how anti-democratic Turkmenistan has become since the "coup." They
also highlight how little the world cares about the suppression of democracy in
Turkmenistan.
The National Council of Turkmenistan on February 5, 2003, adopted an
act defining the term "parricide." According to the act, "a parricide"
is a citizen of Turkmenistan who "questions the correctness of the policy of the
President of the country, Sapamurat Niyazov." On October 23, in Vienna before the
Standing Council of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, members of a
Turkmen delegation used Orwellian rhetoric to describe efforts by humanitarian
organizations and relatives to visit dissidents, characterizing such action as
"attempts to interfere with internal affairs of a sovereign country." Citations
of repression became opinions. "We do not admit that problems specified in the
report…exist," said delegation members. "[Turkmenistan] will limit its
relations with the international community and maintain only those with the United
Nations."
A vicious cycle now exits in Turkmenistan in which legislation leads to
repression, repression leads to condemnation, and condemnation is justified by
legislation. This echoes the conditions that existed in the former Soviet Union. Unlike
the Soviet experience, however, Turkmen authorities have been largely successful in
keeping disputes with the outside world from filtering down to the general population.
Thus, very few people in the country know how the rest of the world vilifies Niyazov.
Despite his contempt for international institutions, Niyazov tends to
invoke the "UN-sanctioned status of neutrality" as a shield against outside
pressure. Why is this still possible? The answer seems simple enough: apparently President
Niyazov does not seem dangerous to the world yet.
The United Nations allows Ashgabat, which egregiously violates its
obligations as a UN member, to refer to its "UN-recognized neutrality." And the
OSCE allows Ashgabat to blackmail it with the threat of a walkout. With such impunity,
Niyazov makes the world more dangerous and less morally consistent. In September, at the
Commonwealth of Independent States Summit in Yalta, only Turkmenistan abstained from
signing an agreement to control the proliferation of portable anti-aircraft ballistic
complexes (PABC), which, if possessed by terrorists, threaten civil aviation everywhere.
Today, all leading countries of the world are taking measures to control PABCs. Yet
Turkmenistan is doing little and the government has made no effort to explain what became
of the Soviet PABCs on its soil.
In April 1998, as a correspondent for Radio Liberty, I covered
Niyazov’s visit to the United States. I saw him meet informally with the leaders of
American and European organizations in New York. Niyazov anticipated a question and
started talking about how somebody is ready to accuse him of "some personality
cult." He said, "Not even close. What cult? In the USSR, we had a cult of
[Lenin]. And where is that [Lenin] now? I have been in power only seven years, and I know
exactly what will come after me, where my image on Turkmen currency and my monuments will
go. But all that is necessary for my people right now, so that they believe in their own
Turkmen leaders and values."
Niyazov’s audience smiled ironically in response. Since then, many
things have changed, including Niyazov’s personality. Apparently he really believes in
his mission as prophet of the people of Turkmenistan, and the permanence of his regime.
Editor’s Note: Arkadii Dubnov is a political commentator for
the Russian newspaper Vremya Novostei (Time for the News). He has also been a
correspondent for Radio Liberty.
EurasiaNet, November 20, 2003
http://www.eurasianet.org/ |